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NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Article Praises U.S. Position on Kosova

AU2201191295 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 20 Jan 95 p 1

[Commentary by Blerim Reka: "A Letter With Many Meanings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the first time since taking over the helm at the White House, President Clinton has devoted particular and exclusive attention to the issue of Kosova. In his reply to the letter from congressmen Engel and Molinar, he outlined in public, for the first time, his views on the Kosova problem. In this recent statement, it seems President Clinton has gone further, exhibiting substantial knowledge of the Kosova problem and also showing a serious readiness to solve it.

There are three striking new elements in his letter: the linking of the lifting of international sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro to a tangible and peaceful settlement of the Kosova question; the expansion of the body of rights that must be returned to Kosova to include "political" rights; and the possibility of establishing official contacts through the opening of offices in Prishtina and Washington.

Making the removal of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro conditional on Kosova is not, in fact, a novelty, bearing in mind the recommendations made to President Clinton last September by the Institute for National Strategic Studies with regard to the conduct of U.S. policy in the Balkans. As President Clinton was counselled at that time, "...sanctions must be made conditional on the situation in Kosova and that in Bosnia." Thus, in his most recent letter, President Clinton has demanded that: "The question of Kosova must be examined before Belgrade is released from the UN sanctions."

The second point in President Clinton's letter, his insistence on the restitution not only of human rights but of "political" rights, views the question of Kosova as not only a problem of a humanitarian nature, but a political problem, of Kosova's status, which demands an answer as such. This explains the U.S. President's serious characterization of the problem of Kosova as a regional problem requiring "a peaceful and lasting solution in the Balkans." The congruence between this description and another recommendation of the United States Institute for National Strategic Studies about the Balkan situation, in which President Clinton is asked "to apply preventive diplomacy not only in the area of the former Yugoslavia, but throughout the region," shows that this is not merely a personal wish or prediction.

The third dimension, that of the possible opening of offices of Kosova in Washington and of the United States in Prishtina, may appear "consular," and is at the stage of an initiative, but shows that the issue of Kosova is acquiring greater official diplomatic status.

If one looks at the broader geopolitical constellation at the time when President Clinton announced his attitude toward the Kosova problem, one can discern certain other, broader developments of diplomatic importance, besides the effect of the publication of President Clinton's letter. His first public letter about the Kosova issue follows immediately after his recent demand addressed to Athens for the unconditional normalization of relations with Albania, and at the very time when joint U.S.-Albanian military maneuvers are taking place in the Albanian Adriatic.

From an internal point of view, this letter comes in the first month after the Republicans, who, as we know, favor a radical turnabout in U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans, assumed a mandate to lead the highest U.S. representative and legislative body. This therefore is a careful and not at all spectacular or pompous policy, which must be interpreted as "America is with us," but more as a measured but serious stance taken by the U.S. Administration on the possibility of solving the Kosova problem by applying the mechanism of preventive diplomacy and without military scenarios of the kind seen in Bosnia or Croatia.

Zhulali Holds News Conference on Army Readiness

AU2101190795 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Article by Bujar Muharremi]

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Safet Zhulali held a news conference at the Army Cultural Center this morning.

Facing national radio-television reporters, the ALBANIAN TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, newspapers, and correspondents of foreign agencies, the minister gave a report on the work performed in the Army during the last year. He pointed out that achievements are important and that a great deal has been done to strengthen the Army and the country's defense. He stressed that restructuring and further strengthening of the Army remain the main tasks for the coming year as well.

At this news conference, Zhulali pointed out some of the main achievements of the past year, stating that there was a deterioration in the conflicts in the Balkan region, that the dimensions of war increased in Bosnia and Serbia further intensified violence and terror in Kosova. According to Zhulali, during the past year the Balkans were characterized by an increase in military potentials.

After mentioning the work done toward strengthening civilian control of the Army and the reform in the administration of the Interior Ministry, as well as the work done to draft a European military legislation, the minister stressed the intensification of the Army's contacts with the world. He mentioned the visits of personalities and high-level military delegations from the United States, NATO, Germany, Turkey, and Austria, as well military agreements with these and other countries. Zhulali evaluated these intensive relations with NATO and the armies of these countries, stating that they have influenced past changes in the Army's concepts and attitudes.

Meanwhile, Zhulali considered our country's participation in the Partnership for Peace initiative a step toward consolidating Albania's defense. Zhulali considered military agreements, joint training, and the dispatch of military and logistical assistance by the United States, Turkey, Germany, and other countries the assistance of friendly countries to the Albanian Army. The minister asserted that the Albanian Army currently has at its disposal the necessary means and the proper reserves to accomplish its tasks.

Speaking of the military exercise Sarex 95, Zhulali declared that this exercise is of great importance to our Armed Forces because for the first time, they will participate in exploration and rescue training and will have the opportunity to get acquainted with the current means and techniques of the U.S. Army and those of NATO. The Albanian special forces are nowadays at levels comparable to those of their European counterparts, Defense Minister Zhulali stressed. He reminded those present that work is currently under way to draft plans on the modernization of the Army for the year 2000.

After addressing other problems of military education and qualifications in academies and universities abroad, Zhulali pointed out that the Army has had the support of the country's political forces in accomplishing tasks responsibly. He thanked the Army cadres and soldiers for the results attained in implementing reform in the Army. He also thanked various countries for their close cooperation with Albania in strengthening and completing the Albanian Army.

Reporters then asked questions about problems of the reform, the implementation of the embargo, the budget, and Army expenses.

Answering a question about reactions toward an armed conflict in Kosova, Zhulali said that President Berisha, parliament, and the government are making efforts to see that no conflict occurs in Kosova. They are trying to ensure international support for Kosova. On the contrary, events may lead toward a national resistance, Defense Minister Zhulali stressed, concluding his news conference.

Commentary Discourages Euphoria Over Trade Treaty

AU2001163395 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian
17 Jan 95 p 3

[Commentary by L. Skiroi: "Another Gift From the United States Expected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The office of the White House press secretary, in conjunction with the White House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, recently issued a statement reporting the signing of two new treaties for trade and investment in Eastern Europe, one of them with Albania. This report was amplified in Tirana with great shouts of delight.

Of course, everybody here has the right to shout over even the most modest firm, just because the party sitting across the table from us is called United States of America. However, for thas very reason, this treaty must at the same time be viewed concretely and with the necessary reserve. Even if some ardent supporter of Americanization in the government press tomorrow shouts that he has discovered America, we must, in our analysis here, follow the example of the United States itself by looking at matters logically and without the excitement of an underdog.

Why should we judge on the basis of concrete facts? The most stubborn fact of all is that this is still merely a newly signed treaty that expresses the good intentions of the U.S. and Albanian administrations. However, for it to come into effect, we must see some concrete action, or, as Mr. Baker Said in Tirana: "We must see who catches the fish."

Premature enthusiasm is of no use anymore. We recognize one fact: This treaty is not the first between the United States and the countries of Europe, but the twelfth. We learn from the Western press and what little of the Eastern press reaches Tirana that treaties of this kind between the United States and the countries of the East have so far been more the object of political games or political humor than anything of useful value. We think that the most recent states of the East to sign this treaty (Latvia and Albania) will not benefit any more than have the 34 other states snapped into this frame. However, let us wait for the excitement.

The second problem that must be thought about is whether or not investment and trade with a state starts first of all from a state initiative when no private initiative is yet evident. This cannot happen, because we are no longer in the time of Mao but in the era of capitalism, and U.S. capitalism at that. In this connection, let us ask whether we have perchance seen any U.S. investors, or whether we have seen any Albanian businessmen going freely to conduct trade or invest in the United States? No. Were we waiting for such a simple treaty, or has the climate and an entire tradition been absent? How did this climate suddenly appear overnight? Therefore, before getting excited, we should look at matters concretely.

The third aspect of the treaty is that of its substance, which is absent. It does not take a deputy, minister, or civil service specialist to see what the practical and real aspect of an agreement is. An ordinary Albanian businessman can tell what has to be added to a treaty in the sphere of investment, business, etc. in order to make it substantial. In practice, everybody understands how many problems have to be overcome before one can actually go to the United States. An Albanians starts with the most simple question, which is the right to travel to the United States: Who has this right and who can acquire it? What Albanians are in a position to invest in the United States? And so forth.

Everybody can therefore understand what a formality this treaty is, and how informal. What is informal is the willingness of the U.S. administration to put its seal even on this matter regarding the countries of East Europe, where Albania is situated. In fact, the Clinton administration is coloring in the blank map with the appropriate colors. There is therefore no reason to show enthusiasm over other "pupils" who have nothing to do with this piece of homework.

Council Spokesman Protests 'Corruption' Charges

AU2101213895 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The spokesman of the Council of Ministers has sent television an expanded clarification which states, among other things, that in the wake of misinformation and calumnies to strengthen the fog of corruption and avoid the fight against it, the newspaper DITA INFORMACION on 19 January published a malicious, insulting, and false article in which, with total irresponsibility and malicious intentions, the chairman of the Council of Ministers chairman [Aleksander Meksi] is charged with corruption in the trade of cement and kerosene stoves in 1993. Attacks such as this, by certain groups, have become increasingly frequent and intentional

Being conscientious about the difficulties we are experiencing, the government calls on the public to disassociate itself from groups that seek to destabilize the country through slander and false accusations that strive to separate the fight against corruption from its real goals. It is up to the justice system, to which we will refer, to move to protect the state's interests and protect individuals from such harmful attacks, punishable by the laws of every democratic country. Such actions are harmful to democracy, the rule of law, freedom, and the inviolability of the individual, and above all constitute an assassination against the free press, states the explanation that the spokesman of the Council of Ministers sent to Albanian TV.

Fuel Oil Released To Make Up for Gas Shortages

AU2101181495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Throughout today, reports have been coming in on factories', kindergartens', and schools' being forced to close in a number of towns because of fuel shortages. At a meeting today, the Interdepartmental Council on the Military-Industrial Complex and National Mobilization Readiness decided to release heavy fuel oil from the state reserves to meet the requirements of the district heating plants in Sofia, Pleven, and certain other towns. Journalists were told of this decision by Deputy Prime Minister Ivaylo Trifonov, who chairs the council. In his view, this will solve the problem forthe next two or three weeks, by which time normal supplies of natural gas from Ukraine will be restored. Trifonov emphasized that the release of these quantities of fuel oil will not disturb the balance of the state reserves and the mobilization stocks.

In the meantime, BTA reported from Burgas that pressure rose in the gas pipeline from Ukraine today, and the situation at the Neftokhim Refinery is gradually beginning to return to normal. The production facility that temporarily had to be changed over to operate on fuel oil owing to the fall in the gas pipeline pressure to 13 atmospheres has switched back to natural gas, thus eliminating the losses.

A report from Bulgargaz states that there have been no changes today in the amounts of gas delivered as compared with yesterday, and that the pressure of 31 atmospheres is being maintained. Of the country's thermal heating plants, only the Turnovo plant is out of service, owing to a shortage of heavy fuel oil.

Yanko Yanev, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, stated that no rationing of electricity supplies is necessary for the moment. He said that Reactr No. 3 at the Kozloduy nuclear power station is operating at full capacity. Reactor No. 1 is due to be shut down owing to the expiry of its service life. Checks are to be made on the reactor using funds from the European Union, Yanev added.

Prime Minister Submits Caretaker Cabinet Report

AU2001181995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Article by Silviya Velikova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Reneta Indzhova this afternoon handed President Zhelev the report on the work of the caretaker cabinet over the last three months.

In a brief statement to correspondents, President Zhelev stressed the personal services rendered by Mrs. Indzhova that ensured that the caretaker government worked as a team during the past three months. He pointed out that this is the first government since 1989 that has reported in such a manner, and reminded the correspondents that the report will be published.

BSP's Videnov Outlines Goals to New Parliament

AU2101214095 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Jan 95 p 3

[Statement by Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] leader Zhan Videnov at the 13 January session of National Assembly]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Representatives of the people:

The 37th National Assembly has already begun its work and we, the people's representatives, are justly proud of this fact.

I would like to congratulate all the people's deputies from all parliamentary factions on their success in the elections. Let us hope we can develop positive qualities as politicians, listen more carefully to the voice of our electorate, assert the authority of our governmental system, and work for the benefit of our nation in the name of the progress and future of Bulgaria.

I am convinced that after four years, having accumulated new political experience and living in a new, richer, more just, and more secure Bulgaria, we will have every reason to be proud of this parliament's achievements.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, allow me to greet in your persons, all those who represent all Bulgarians with good will. We are greatly indebted to them because with their votes, confidence, and civic maturity they resolved the problem of the country's government, guaranteed political stability, and entrusted with the responsibility of ruling the nation those who desire to and can do this,and are willing to commit themselves to this task.

The 18 December 1994 early parliamentary elections were perhaps the most important step our society has taken after 10 June 1990. The new National Assembly is an expression of constitutionalism, democracy, and parliamentarism, which the Bulgarian citizens asserted through their vote. This people's vote comprises a correct assessment of the past years, a great responsibility in resolving the problems as a nation and a state, and a hope of overcoming the crisis and effecting a change for the better in the life of each citizen.

We have a clear and categorical mandate: to work for the future. As far as the more recent or more distant and half-forgotten past of our motherland's modern history is concerned, I can only say: "deep respect for all those who revived, constructed, and modernized the Bulgarian state, and for all those whose fate has been cruelly and unjustly crushed in the constant fierce political clashes that continued for an entire century. Let us put an end to the shameful political vendetta of the past years! There will be no return to social models of five or 50 years ago, which history has rejected!"

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, three weeks ago with their votes the citizens of Bulgarian entrusted the Bulgarian socialists, agrarians, and ecologists with the mandate to rule the country at a grave and responsible moment of the nation's development. We are different, but in this parliament we are together, in order to join efforts to strengthen the democratic institutions and assert a more just social order. Our efforts are subjugated to a national goal expressed in the Constitution adopted on 12 July 1991: to construct Bulgaria as a democratic, social, and rule-of-law state. The policy of the Bulgarian left is a policy of modernizing Bulgaria.

We accept the challenge of the new time and world, and the responsibility for implementing economic reform, stabilizing the democratic institutions, and integrating Bulgaria into a united Europe. We will be guided by the eternal values of freedom, justice, and solidarity.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, today Bulgaria is a sick state, with a sick economy, government, and morale, and many suffering people. Shall we allow the hunger, cold, and despair to crush hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians?

We want to change all this. We want the people to live in a calmer, richer, and more dignified manner. We have an economically developed, democratic, and socially just state, rather than a half-destroyed, ruined, and robbed state. With its traditional and new partners in the East and West, our country must assume a worthy place in the Balkan crossroads and in a united Europe, rather than in the underdeveloped Third World. We must preserve, develop, and transfer to future generations the national values, wealth, and creative possibilities of the Bulgarian spirit.

We are realists and we know that we will have to defend our national strategy under conditions of a grave crisis and complex transition. However, we shall implement our election promises, even under such conditions. Hope has not died; it is being revived. Only the illusions of the last five years have perished, and that is a good thing.

No one regrets the fact that the restoration model of transition, forced on Bulgaria back in 1990, has failed. On the contrary, we are happy with the fact that the voters gave us the chance to stop the destruction, renew Bulgaria, and give the country the change, justice, and security it needs.

For all this we need social support, a broader parliamentary majority, and a coalition government protected from political obstruction. We have proved that conducting a policy of the outstretched hand and national consensus is our principled, consistent position. We shall display a maximum constructive spirit and commitment in implementing the mandate entrusted to us by the voters.

Regardless of the attitude of the other parliamentary and extraparliamentary forces, we shall implement our main duty to the voters: to fully assume responsibility for governing the country for the next four years. We have assumed the commitment of formning a cabinet within the next two weeks, submitting the 1995 budget within two months, completing the land reform, and allowing new owners—cooperatives and agrarian companies—to restore ruined Bulgarian villages with the help of the state and the entire society. We also assumed the commitment of effecting real change in social affairs and the public sector, rather than implementing isolated experiments in health protection, education, science, and culture, which used to be a goal in itself. We shall begin social privatization already in 1995. We shall enact a law by which we will give the Army, Police, and Judiciary everything they need in order to carry out their public duty and guarantee peace along the borders and order inside the country.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, the national tasks which the new generations of Bulgarians have set for themselves cannot be implemented without the active and conscious participation of all honest, worthy, able, and diligent citizens of our country. Those tasks present a challenge even greater and more fraught with responsibility to the state institutions: the National Assembly, government, president, judiciary, municipal authorities, and political and social forces.

We all will carry out our national duty with self-confidence and responsibility, because the achievements of democracy are based on the civic society, stable institutions, and strong parties. We shall seek forms of parliamentary and extraparliamentary cooperation with every party. Primitive confrontation should not become the actual policy of any faction. This applies both to the rulers and the opposition.

From a concept born at the roundtable, the idea of a national consensus must turn into a parliamentary fact that encompasses all institutions.

The idea of a national consensus should not be interpreted in a primitive manner any longer. This means, first of all, that we must work in the name of specific national priorities and under conditions of a democratic civic society—in which there is a clash of opinions, positions, and interests but also constitutional mechanisms that guarantee the rights, freedoms, and dignity of everyone. This is a much better road than the one Bulgaria has followed up to now. We have ideas, competence, and willingness that allow us to march along this road. We commit ourselves to governing the country honestly, competently, and responsibly.

Therefore, allow me to conclude my statement in the spirit of the best traditions of the Bulgarian state system with the slogan "Unity Is Strength!" Long live Bulgaria!

Party Daily Warns of 'Dangerous' Foreign Policy

AU2001182195 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Milena Boyadzhiev: "Dangerous Revision of Our Foreign Policy Lies Ahead"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Yesterday President Zhelev and the leadership of the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement] parliamentary group discussed how far the future Socialist cabinet will permit itself to make adjustments to Bulgaria's foreign policy. After the meeting, DPS leader Ahmed Dogan reported that the two sides communicated to each other their fears that the new rulers will change our foreign policy, especially in the Balkans. He predicted a rapprochement with Serbia and certain other Balkan states at the expense of third countries.

On 13 January DEMOKRATSIYA reported that the new Socialist government is expected to follow an openly pro-Serbian policy and to neglect our contacts with Turkey. BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] headquarters is planning to make the Athens-Belgrade axis pass through Sofia. The scandalous promises that Nora Ananieva and Velko Vulkanov made during their visits to Serbia last year are likely to become a reality. A source at BSP headquarters claims that a noisy propaganda campaign will be launched in the very near future against maintaining the Yugoslav embargo, regardless of the international commitments that Bulgaria has undertaken. Yesterday, a red initiative committee circulated letters of protest around the foreign embassies in Sofia, demanding that "the embargo imposed by the United Nations on Iraq should be immediately lifted."

Following his talk with the president yesterday, Dogan confirmed the report that the BSP/BCP [Bulgarian Socialist Party/Bulgarian Communist Party] will do everything that it can to stop, or at least delay, Bulgaria's integration into NATO. Dogan said that, during the meeting, it was remarked that a shift is expected in the foreign policy priorities on which consensus has hitherto existed, such as integration into NATO. Dogan expects a realignment toward other great powers, and, although he did not name the country, everybody knows that the Socialists are looking to the East.

The ruling party's intention to turn its back on NATO became evident yesterday, when they decided that there was no need for a parliamentary commission on relations with Euroatlantic organizations, as the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] parliamentary group has proposed. As is known, in the future, the Socialist government will have a special ministry for European integration; however, this will serve only as a talking shop, and will do nothing to promote Bulgaria's closer association with NATO.

Dogan said that this attempt to revise our foreign policy will be extremely dangerous and may even become a problem for our internal security. He recalled that under the Constitution, it is one of the prerogatives of the head of state to take part in forming our foreign policy. Dogan declared that it would not be merely in bad taste but something far worse if the future government failed to accord its foreign policy actions with the president.

Ganchev Explains BBB's Legislation Plans

AU2001190095 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with BBB leader George Ganchev by Vesela Doneva; place and date not given: "Opposition Should Ask Me To Lead It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Doneva] In the first official statement on behalf of the Bulgarian Business Bloc [BBB] that you made to the 37th National Assembly, you said that, to serve the Bulgarian people, you would form an alliance with the devil.

[Ganchev] I have been repeating this for five years and will continue to do so, no matter whether the alliance is with the left, right, or center. The only thing that I will not do is form an alliance with foreign forces that would pull the strings and ignore Bulgarian interests.

[Doneva] Where do you plan to place the accent in your activity?

[Ganchev] The people have empowered the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] to rule. If we have any respect for the people, we must work constructively with the party that the people chose, and when that party messes things up, we will be a worthy, constructive opposition.

[Doneva] What specific steps will your parliamentary group take in the first instance?

[Ganchev] We will campaign for the speedy passing of the insolvency law, to enable us to attract foreign investment to Bulgaria. We will fight for a statute to eliminate double taxation and demand at any price a three-to-five-year tax holiday or preferences for foreign investors. We will fight for a law on protection against creditors and for setting up a Chamber of Accounts so that everybody knows who drinks and who pays the bill. We will try to push through a law on state employees with the aim of at least partially rooting out corruption,

[Doneva] Do you plan to propose your own version of any of the draft laws, or will you merely participate in the debates on them?

[Ganchev] We will submit our own amendment to the Commercial Law for a 5-percent tax on profits. Instead of the general director getting this money, it should be given to the tax collector, who would reallocate it for sports, culture, and education, so that we can keep young people in Bulgaria. The bills that I mentioned just now need to be clarified, cleaned up, and given a better focus. We have already proposed experts to serve on all the parliamentary commissions, and have nominated chairmen for three main commissions.

[Doneva] Which ones?

[Ganchev] On foreign policy, which I want to chair. I have made my point of view clear and think that it will be accepted. We also want to chair the agricultural commission and the commission on youth, sports, and tourism. Young people voted for George Ganchev and the BBB, so we must have this commission at any cost.

[Doneva] Do you have any proposals on participating in the leaderships of any other commissions?

[Ganchev] We have put in four other applications for deputy chairman posts, in the commissions on health care, culture, national security, and local self-government. We will also have members on the budget and finance commission, the economics commission, and two members on the national security commission. We are also competing for the chairmanship of the radio and television commission.

[Doneva] Would you comment on the views expressed by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] on the elections: namely, that the BSP's victory is a loss for Bulgaria?

[Ganchev] I think the SDS defeated itself by its negative campaign against everything and its claim that they are the only opposition and the only representatives of democracy. This is a gross mockery of the others, including us.

[Doneva] Do you reject the idea of uniting the opposition?

[Ganchev] Not in the least. The opposition should come to see us—ask me to lead it, and lead it in the most constructive way, instead of the destructive way it is being bandied about at the moment.

[Doneva] It is no secret that you are setting your sights on the presidency.

[Ganchev] Everything is completely open and above board.

[Doneva] Do you think your term in parliament will help you in these intentions?

[Ganchev] I doubt it, because the people are very well aware of what George Ganchev has done for Bulgaria in seven years and they know that I am a unifying figure, not a disuniting one. You will see that I will ask neither the BSP nor the SDS for official support, as Zhelyu Mitev Zhelev did. I will represent myself and win the presidential election in a worthy manner as an independent unifying figure.

Russia's Gaydar Discusses Economic Situation

AU2001125895 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Jan 95 p 15

[Interview with Former Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar by Vaclav Lavicka in Prague; date not given: "Political Influence on the Russian Economy Will Be Very Strong, Says Yegor Gaydar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Russia has very little chance of succeeding in restoring economic growth before the presidential elections in 1996, says Yegor Gaydar, former prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairman of the parliamentary liberal faction Russia's Choice.

[Lavicka] At what pace is privatization now proceeding in Russia?

[Gaydar] After we completed the relatively extensive program of voucher privatization in the middle of last year, we were able to proceed to the next stage, a stage that did not require special instruments—vouchers—to create a demand for property. This involves pecuniary privatization, in which it is possible to utilize some of the revenue from sales to resolve budgetary problems.

The program for the second privatization stage was not approved by the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament. However, President Boris Yeltsin made it possible, by a special decree, for the State Property Committee to continue working on the program.

Unfortunately, the Property Committee's new head, Vladimir Polevanov, has not shown the ability to fulfill privatization tasks so far. Moreover, his numerous pronouncements are raising doubts about whether he is at all resolved to continue privatization or whether he took the job in order to commence renationalization.

A major argument erupted within the Russian Government on this subject, so privatization has been held up considerably. At the moment, it seems that people whose views concur with my own are gaining the upper hand—people led by Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays, who has again assumed control over the State Property Committee.

[Lavicka] What do you consider to be the main problem affecting the Russian fuel and energy complex, on whose supplies many East European states depend?

[Gaydar] The most burning problems in the fuel and energy complex today are associated, although it may seem strange, not with production but with demand. It has become the main limiting factor of production. The possibilities for export are limited objectively—by the capacity of the oil pipelines and Russian ports.

In the oil sector, it is the many weak points that limit access to the world market. When, in the years 1991-92, Western companies threw themselves enthusiastically into Russian oil production, they had no idea that the main problem lies not in production but in transportation. It is now emerging that the investment projects in this sphere will not be among the most profitable in Russia.

[Lavicka] Do you think resources will also be found in the budget to support the other branches on which Russia's export potential depends?

[Gaydar] There will never be enough resources in the budget from which the enhancement of the individual branches could be financed. The issue does not at all involve looking for money in the budget, but in creating the prerequisites for making extensive use of private investment resources.

[Lavicka] Is it possible to chart the most likely course of Russian economic reform this year?

[Gaydar] Unfortunately, this is now extremely difficult because we have to take several scenarios into consideration. A great deal will depend on how the political struggle associated with the war in Chechnya and its consequences—inevitably connected with the budget—turns out. All of this will have a strong influence on the economy. The military operations in Chechnya have dealt th[illegible]ussian economy a palpable blow. We will see to wh[illegible]tent the Russian Government is capable of dealing with the situation.

Havel Discusses BIS 'Scandal,' EU Membership

LD2201173795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech at 1315 GMT on 22 January carries a 10-minute recorded interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Robert Tamchyna from the "Conversations at Lany" program.

Tamchyna asks: "Allow me today not to formulate my question comprehensively and ask you directly and simply about your stance on what we are calling a scandal concerning the work of the Security Intelligence Service [BIS]."

Havel outlines the development of the scandal, beginning with a news conference at which Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda, chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], voiced his suspicion about BIS's work. Havel says he became interested in the matter after having been briefed in detail by Deputy Prime Ministers Kalvoda and Josef Lux about their suspicions. He says he visited BIS offices to acquaint himself with the current situation within the service.

Havel says: "I have to say that the impression I gained there was favorable. In my view, the existing system of safeguards is strong enough to prevent any abuse by anybody. However, my task was not to investigate the suspicions mentioned or to check them and try to confirm or refute them; my task was to acquaint myself with the system of BIS's work. My impression was positive, but that does not necessarily imply that the suspicions mentioned are groundless. This simply must be investigated by the appropriate parliamentary commission. The government will also discuss it, and I also intend to take further steps in this matter. I simply want to follow this matter."

Havel criticizes speculation in the newspapers about ODA's possible reasons for raising this issue. About the need for an investigation, Havel says: "I think this is a matter for the state because the responsibility for BIS's work rests with the government."

Havel stresses, however, that this scandal does not represent any threat to democracy in the Czech Republic.

He says: "Democracy in the Czech lands is not under any threat. Our political system is not collapsing; there is no crisis. A suspicion exists that some people have violated the law. This will be either confirmed or not confirmed. This is all. It is necessary to take a matter-of-fact approach to this and not to turn it—at least I do not feel any need to do so—into wide—ranging political speculation about relations among political parties."

Havel stresses that what is needed is a proper investigation and concludes his comments on this matter by saying: "I would like to see the existing government coalition stay in office at least until the elections, to see good communication within the coalition itself. This is probably in the interest of the entire country.

"However, I have the feeling that this involves something even more important: to have a political and constitutional system capable of solving a crisis if any arises. This is, let us hope, only a theoretical option. Let us hope that no crisis will arise."

Asked about the differences between his and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus's statements about the date of the Czech Republic's application for European Union membership, Havel says this alleged clash with the prime minister is a pseudoproblem.

With regard to the EU application, Havel says: "There is a general political consensus in our country that we should apply for membership in the European Union on the eve of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Some EU Commission members, including President Santer, have confirmed to me that the appropriate moment for our application is probably before the intergovernmental commission meeting, to give the conference a specific idea about what countries are really applying for membership when the conference discusses the future. There is a general political consensus about this."

NATO Concerned About Classified Data

AU2201183995 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 16 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Sabina Slonkova and Jaroslav Kmenta: "For the Time Being, NATO Does Not Trust That Prague Could Keep Secrets Well Enough"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—For the time being, the North Atlantic Alliance has no confidence in the Czech system of protecting classified information, and therefore it has indirectly appealed to the Czech authorities to change the approach to working with classified military and economic information in their country.

NATO wants thus to prevent sensitive information from leaking from a republic with an imperfect system of information protection to the risky countries that could misuse it. "It is not a matter of some conditions on the part of NATO, it is only an issue at the diplomatic level. The Alliance will provide us in the future with secret information only if we are actually able to protect it. Therefore, it is in our interest that we create effective protective mechanisms," said Vavrinec Korcis from the Interior Ministry, which was entrusted with drafting a new law on classified information protection.

A major change in the information protection was approved by Klaus's cabinet in its penultimate session. The government adopted here a resolution in which it promises to create a safe system of protection of classified information. Furthermore, the government approved the agreement between the Czech Republic and NATO on the protection of classified data, which it did as the first of the countries interested in joining the Alliance.

Thus, a special body will work at the Interior Ministry, through which NATO will pass on to the republic information of strategic significance and, concurrently, it will pass such data from the republic to the Alliance. Without the previous knowledge of this body, then, the sale of avionics for the L-159 aircraft, for instance, by the firm Rockwell to Aero Vodochody, cannot be arranged in the future.

The Defense and Interior Ministries admitted that the most difficult task will be to define anew the procedure in the selection of people to work with classified information. To date, the only thing determined in either department was whether they have been agents of the communist state security or have a criminal record.

These checks, however, do not satisfy the criteria applied by NATO in the selection of people working with classified data. According to the U.S. and West European standards, they must also pass a means test, their family relations have to be checked, their opinions, and their psychological makeup.

"So far, only the theses of the law are being drafted, which are to define these facts. It depends on the political will to what degree it would be acceptable to curtail certain rights of these people," Korcis said.

There already is a body in charge of the protection of classified information at the Defense Ministry, but it cannot make certain that no data leak about the purchase of arms or military hardware, for instance, when private companies are involved. Defense Minister Holan confirmed that according to the recommendation of the experts from NATO's Security Office, the classification of the level of secrecy and the process of selecting people to work with classified material will have to be altered even in the Army.

Prime Minister Concludes Visit to Egypt

LD2201180395 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has ended his official visit to Egypt during which he was accompanied by Privatization Minister Jiri Skalicky, Economy Minister Karel Dyba, and a group of Czech entrepreneurs who held talks there about opportunities for extending cooperation between the two countries.

The prime minister was interviewed during his return flight by Czech Radio editor Pavla Jazairiova about cooperation between our country and the Arab world. [passage omitted]

[begin recording] [Jazairiova] During your talk today you said an important thing about our determination to cooperate with the Arab world as much as possible.

[Klaus] I think that it is in our interest to open ourselves to the world. For a long time we were a closed country which was not able to be present anywhere and did not get involved in anything important.

We are interested in reaching beyond Europe and in this context there is no doubt that the Arab world is among the spheres where we need to be heard and seen. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Minister Visits Aircraft Gunnery Range

AU2201164195 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 14 Jan 95 p 12

[Article by "ll": "Libava Is the Most Important Military Zone in the Czech Republic, Minister Holan Claims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Libava-Kozlov—Defense Minister Vilem Holan considers Libava the most important military zone in the republic. He made this statement yesterday during a visit to the aircraft gunnery range that is being built in that area. He met with district office chiefs, in whose districts the zone is located, to discuss with them other opportunities for the region.

"Although we have not signed any specific documents, we confirmed the existing agreements," the minister told reporters. "We are trying to satisfy all demands made by the citizens but one must accept that Libava is a military zone, the responsibility for which is borne by the Army," he emphasized. Holan is not favorably inclined to any other use of the zone.

Except for a small area near the military academy in Vyskov, Libava is the only place in Moravia for soldiers to exercise. Nevertheless, the Army has allowed access to the zone's border regions for scout camps, and the public is allowed to visit certain parts of the zone on weekends, when military exercises do not take place there. Asked whether a civilian administration of the zone is being considered, the minister answered that this must be decided by law. "So far, the old laws apply here. More than 1,300 civilians live in the region, and therefore this issue must be solved as soon as possible," the minister said.

Holan also visited a military fortification from the time of the First Republic in Darkovicky, where the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII will be celebrated this year. "I realized here how serious our ancestors were in the matters of defense. It can be a great lesson for our generation," he emphasized.

Economy Minister Assesses U.S. Visit, Talks

AU2201163995 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 16 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Economy Minister Jan Ducky by Jergus Ferko, on board a T—154 aircraft on 15 January, during the return flight of a 30-member Slovak delegation from the White House Conference on Investment and Trade in Central and East Europe in Cleveland: "Jan Ducky: Great America Shows Great Interest in Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ferko] Mr. Ducky, could you briefly characterize the entrepreneurial philosophy behind the U.S. penetration of the postsocialist countries of Europe?

[Ducky] All statements made by U.S. administration officials at the Cleveland conference communicated, first and foremost, their immense endeavor to assist their own exports to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and thereby contribute to the creation of new jobs in the United States. This approach is instructive also for us because an export-promoting policy leads directly to a lower rate of unemployment. I liked this American philosophy, which clearly sees behind each 1 million dollars worth of exports jobs for the American people. We, too, must and want to promote exports in this way.

[Ferko] What course did your talks with the U.S. side, particularly with Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown, take and what were their results?

[Ducky] Besides attending the plenary session of the White House conference, we conducted a number of bilateral talks, for example with Kenneth Brody, president of the Ex-Im Bank. The most important of the bilateral meetings was that with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown and his collaborators—Deputy Secretary Richard Holbrook, Director of U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) Joseph Grandmaison, and Executive Vice President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) Christopher Finn. We were pleased that Secretary Brown was well informed about Slovakia and greatly appreciated the economic results that we achieved in the two years of independence. He said, literally, that for a state that had started from scratch in many ways, the results were miraculous. I repeat, he used the term MIRACULOUS RESULTS [preceding two words published in capital letters]. Miraculous in terms of GDP growth, the rate of inflation, and the retained level of unemployment. This assessment by a high-level U.S. Administration official ought to reinforce trust and embolden U.S. entrepreneurial circles to invest in Slovakia. The United States signalled to Slovakia that it is interested mainly in the fields of energy, transportation, telecommunications, environment, and the raw material base. We must convert the interest expressed into specific offers and projects for U.S. investors.

[Ferko] The Cleveland conference was attended by representatives of 16 postsocialist European countries. What is Slovakia's position within the framework of this group of 16, in your opinion?

[Ducky] Besides Secretary Ronald Brown, also a number of other participants in the conference voiced appreciation for the results achieved by our country and acknowledged that, within the framework of postsocialist states, Slovakia is moving into one of the front positions. Our macroeconomic indicators speak a clear language and the world assesses them positively. At long last, we are being assessed according to real facts and figures, and not according to what someone thinks or, as a matter of fact, would like to think about us. Secretary Brown also uttered the sentence that Slovakia is getting into a leading position among equals.

[Ferko] Will the White House conference in Cleveland serve as an impulse for the Slovak Government that some issues contained in the government program need to be "forced" and given a higher priority?

[Ducky] We briefed the U.S. side about the draft of our policy statement. Our government's program, and the priorities laid down in it—the promotion of exports, investment, and agriculture—are in line with U.S. ideas. We are now facing the pressing task of convincing U.S. businessmen that they will find in Slovakia equally good, if not even better, conditions for investment than elsewhere. If the Americans are interested in exporting, we are interested mainly in their investment exports, that is, in the import of state-of-the-art technology that would provide jobs also for our own people. The United States represents an immense potential source of investments. This makes the fact that great America shows such great interest in us all the more promising.

[Ferko] Mr. Ducky, could you, in conclusion, briefly characterize the significance of this Slovak mission to the United States?

[Ducky] I must stress that we visited the United States in a truly representative lineup (I suppose that there was no other delegation that included five ministers) and, also in this way, we made clear to the U.S. side our serious interest in cooperation. Some U.S. firms have already started working on large-scale projects in Slovakia, be it within the framework of the OPIC Fund or within the framework of the TDA. Minister Rezes signed in Cleveland an agreement on the provision of a $523,000 grant for our Ministry of Transportation and Communications to finance a feasibility study in the sphere of telecommunications. The U.S. side appreciated the composition of our delegation and it was even accentuated by President Bill Clinton during his meeting with all delegations. Moreover, in his speech he mentioned Slovakia in an unequivocally positive light. The visit by our ministers and their collaborators, bankers, industrialists, entrepreneurs, and experts to the United States definitely was not in vain. I am confident that our successful mission to the United States will very soon bear very specific and literally tangible results.

Meciar Presents Government Statement 19 Jan

LD2001122295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0940 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Address by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to a session of the Slovak parliament in Bratislava—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Esteemed Mr. President, Speaker of the Parliament, Members of the Parliament, and Members of the Slovak Government: This policy statement is being presented to parliament by a government that came to power as a result of free and democratic elections, a government consisting of political parties that were willing and able to reach an agreement and take on responsibility for the management of public, state, and civic affairs.

The government policy statement has already been delivered to you. You have it now in front of you, and all citizens of the Slovak Republic have been able to examine it through the mass media. Therefore, esteemed ladies and gentlemen, I am not going to bother you with the whole policy statement but will deal only with certain specific issues.

The government is presenting to you a policy statement that considers ensuring the elementary strategic changes and shifts in the development of the Slovak Republic as its highly ambitious goal. First of all, the government considers the implementation of the program of European integration as its foremost task. It is necessary to realize this program and move from theoretical discussions to practical implementation.

In the sphere of economic policy, the government considers it necessary to put an end to the stage of a restrictive macroeconomic policy and move toward a policy of progress, healing, and the development of all social structures.

The government considers it necessary to actively develop its work in such a way that a high decree of dynamism in the development of society is achieved so that, during its term of office, the transformation of the educational system, health care, and social services is completed and all these spheres can fulfill their purpose in line with social interests.

The government considers it its task to help develop the process of renewing humanism, morale, and interpersonal relations so that all this results in better relationships in society. We are interested in, and will assist with, the strengthening of unity among the citizens of the Slovak Republic in those areas where it is essential for respecting personal, nationality, religious, and other freedoms and liberties.

The government is presenting this statement to parliament at a time of change and restructuring throughout Europe. A united Europe based on the principles of solidarity, freedom, democracy, and respect for national identity has become the goal governing all of our practical measures. The endeavor to participate in a Europe that is shaping and integrating in this way calls for a lot of effort on our part in overcoming obstacles along this path. It also calls for the rejection of everything that is negative, such as xenophobia, racial and ethnic intolerance, and discrimination. Progress along this path calls for respect for the rights of all minorities, be they ethnic, religious, or whatever, so that the unity of society is achieved while the individuality and uniqueness of all minorities is respected.

Starting from a statement of aims, we have to embark on practical steps that will fill our deliberations as to when we should become members of an integrated Europe with real meaning.

Preparing to enter a Europe in the process of integration requires that we safeguard our own development dynamics. That is why we cannot take as a starting point merely the level we have reached today and the level that is now represented by advanced European countries; we must envisage their future development, and we must measure up to their future development at the moment of integration.

On this path we stress the need to seek a sequence of steps appropriate to the state of our society, its resources, and possibilities. This will correspond to the strategy that has many paths but, admittedly, a single aim. Seeking one's own path is not seeking a third path, but corresponding ways of using resources and mobilization of everything that is accessible to us.

On this path we will also use, primarily, the internal resources of the state, but we shall also use all the advantages of international integration.

The Slovak Republic clearly declares its interest in membership of the European Union, and it is the government's ambition to submit an application to the European Union by 31 July of this year. The Slovak Republic clearly declares its attitude to the European security structures, and is striving for membership in the European Union and NATO, while respecting all-European security interests so that everybody is secure.

The Slovak Government considers it necessary to stress the attention it pays to relations with our neighbors. We are interested in developing good—neighborly relations which must be based on respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence and rejecting policies of force. In this connection the government notes that our neighbor Austria now belongs to the European Union. We consider it important to maintain good relations with the Czech Republic. We are prepared to make a significant contribution toward improving relations with Hungary. We want to continue the traditions of cooperation with Poland, as well as with Ukraine.

Questions connected with borders can be eliminated by talks. The problems of minorities should not be divisive;

on the contrary they should be a unifying force. In this respect the government expects the citizens of national minorities living in border areas to help strengthen and improve interstate relations.

During the debate on the policy statement, the question of all-European integration and the fundamental foreign political aims did not require any major remarks in the committees. We think that in the situation existing today there are no entities in parliament which would unequivocally reject or question these aims.

To agree with the policy statement means also to identify with the aims. To rejection the policy statement, under any pretext, means in reality also to reject these global aims and intentions.

As regards economic development, for the first time since the creation of an independent Slovak Republic the government has clearly defined an economic strategy and its main long-term tasks. The government's strategic goal is to lay the foundations to enable our citizens to achieve economic and living standards that are comparable with those in developed European countries. This should be achieved by the year 2010 at the very latest. Only then will a Slovakia's full-fledged integration with European structures be possible.

The government will endeavor to utilize the human potential and its qualifications, creativity, and adaptability to the new conditions. It will also utilize production potential in a way that will bring to the forefront domestic science, research, development, and the specifics of the various regions. Finally, it will harness geographical conditions to achieve a territorially balanced development [words indistinct].

The gradual participation of the Slovak Republic in the process of European integration calls for the strengthening of the fundamental values of the European Union, such as permanent peace, unity, freedom, equality, solidarity, and economic and social security within the economic and social system. This means gradually tackling the process of adjusting legislative and technological norms to those of the European Union and to shape economic strategy in line with the tools of the monetary, fiscal, budgetary, and customs policy based on the European Union's conditions and criteria. It also means implementing the gradual liberalization of foreign trade, ensuring the convertibility of our currency, and preparing ourselves for a common European Union currency. The government will ensure a speedier completion of the transformation of the economic system, including property relations, in such a way that a system of postindustrial society comes into being.

Government policy will be designed to create prerequisites for fulfilling the following macroeconomic targets:

—to maintain and gradually increase the dynamism of our economic performance so that the average annual growth rate of our gross domestic product, as measured by fixed prices, amounts to 5 percent;

—to gradually push the rate of unemployment under 10 percent;

—to keep the annual rate of inflation within 10 percent and create prerequisites for its gradual reduction;

—to maintain a positive development of the balance of payments, and, through the growth of hard currency reserves, create prerequisites for making the Slovak crown fully convertible;

—to ensure that, measured by IMF methods, the state budget deficit does not exceed 3 percent of gross domestic product and has a downward trend;

—to keep the total state debt within the limits comparable with European Union criteria and gradually reduce it.

With the above aims in mind, the government will ensure the implementation of the kind of industrial policy that will draw on the existing potential of the domestic raw material base and the development of tourism. This industrial policy should encourage greater reliance on modern, progressive, ecologically sound, and energy-saving technologies, and raise the competitiveness of domestic production.

The government will prepare and implement a public investment program and, because different investment projects result in different economic effects, the government will decide on investment priorities.

The government will support the continuing transformation of the cooperative movement based on the principles of democracy, solidarity, and voluntary membership, and constituting a significant element of economic production and of social potential. The government believes that the combination of purposeful macroeconomic control and economic policy will create prerequisites for a policy of development and stabilization capable of ensuring the transformation of the economy toward permanent revitalization and growth.

In the immediate future the government will adopt measures to eliminate existing negative phenomena, such as the high incidence of insolvency and the lack of financial discipline. The government will also deal with the financial losses and financial management of state-owned enterprises and limited companies, and with the high level of the National Property Fund involvement in other companies established by such enterprises.

With the aim of mobilizing the sources of budgetary income, the government will emphasize greater strictness of the tax collection system. The law will be improved, staff qualifications will be raised, and checks carried out by more competent personnel. Financial relations between trade companies will be adjusted, including relations with sister companies; this area represents a source of exceptional losses directly affecting the state budget.

The government is interested in improving the quality of the financial policy's tax implications. This should be achieved through closer coordination in implementing financial and monetary policy measures. The government will therefore ensure smoother relations and better cooperation with the National Bank of the Slovak Republic and will also improve the legislative framework of mutual relations. As a step toward a fundamental and permanent revitalization of the economic development, the government will also adopt financial measures and initiate and support monetary measures aimed at revitalizing the financial policy of economic enterprises.

In line with IMF methods, and with the ultimate aim of achieving a balanced state budget, the government will ensure, even in the drafting stages of the budget, that the deficit does not exceed 3 percent of the gross domestic product. This will call for the implementation of certain changes in approaching the drafting of the 1995 state budget and for a fundamental change in the 1996 budget so that they are in line with the budgetary principles observed by the European Union countries. Therefore, we must restore the original purpose of the state budget, that is, the direct financing of state tasks and the social needs guaranteed by the Constitution, such as education, health care, culture, and social policy.

The government will extend the current policy of investment activity subsidies in the entrepreneurial sphere by utilizing the resources of the National Property Fund, that is by using economic means as indirect subsidies in specified spheres such as investment projects, culture, science and technology, and exports. The government will pay particular attention to recovering payments owed by foreign debtors so that such payments become a more significant source of the state budget income.

The setting up and consolidation of the state treasury based on the model used in European Union countries will be a fundamentally new element in budgetary management. On the basis of the two-year experience with the implementation of the current tax system, the government will ensure its further improvement so that it is unambiguous, fair, understandable both to entrepreneurs and citizens, and limits tax evasion.

The government considers privatization one of the pivotal spheres of the process of economic reform. Its continuation and speeding up belongs among priority tasks. By changing ownership the government sets as its aim to achieve activation of the human factor and stresses the personal responsibility of people.

Through the process of privatization, the government wants to create ownership structures in which domestic local businessmen and employees of privatized enterprises have a significant share, and which will build a firm foundation for a participatory economy. The government will reach these strategic aims, above all, by implementing a combination of standard methods of privatization and coupon privatization. It will implement competitive forms of sales with the acquirer selected on the basis of precisely formed and substantiated business intentions which will respect the peculiarities of the business and needs for its development.

In order to support the development of the home business stratum, we will facilitate forms of sales by gradual payment [splatkove], while counting investments as part payment of the purchase price. Because of increases of social viability in the process of privatization and mutual creation of a participatory economy, the government will be committed to employees' participation in the privatization of businesses in which they are working.

The government will support the purposeful entry of foreign capital into the Slovak economy, it will facilitate establishing joint businesses with foreign participation so that foreign financial resources can aim, above all, at modernization and growth of new technologies and financial recovery of these businesses. It will prefer similar viewpoints also for sales of businesses to foreign investors.

The government will make sure that the second wave of coupon privatization continues without unnecessary delay, while we will offer for coupon privatization part of the shares of the stock and share companies which have emerged from state businesses, so that majority parts of shares are privatized by sales to strategic investors under conditions of long-term development, secured by agreements, given to privatized entities.

The government will strive to ensure that, within the framework of the process of privatization, we can speed up activities inseparable from the process of privatization, but functionally belonging to the Fund of National Property. What is involved is more consistent demanding of claims, achieving better payment discipline of creditors of the National Property Fund, and better control of stock and share companies where the National Property Fund has a property participation.

Economic and industrial policy will create conditions for the process of revitalizing and restructuring of industry and increasing its competitiveness. The prerequisite for the use of our potential and [word indistinct] of the Slovak Republic is developing infrastructural systems of transport, information, telecommunications, power, and finances, and their integrity.

The government considers the strategic aims for the development of industry to be: stabilization of individual industries; increasing output while maintaining conditions of permanently tenable development; increasing exports and ensuring their competitive ability; reducing power, raw material, and material requirements; increasing use of domestic raw materials;

increasing the additional value of production and the highest possible valorization of national labor; increasing labor productivity; and, at the same time, creating new labor opportunities such as efficient valorization of secondary domestic raw materials.

The government will make sure it works out analyzes of industries in order to ensure comparative advantage, competitive ability, and prospects of application in the domestic and foreign markets.

The government will pay constant attention to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as well as the power industry, in the program of proposed priorities. Similarly, in the wood processing and timber industries, projects for the development of the cellulose and paper industries will be supported, [word indistinct] apart from assessing domestic raw material base. In the engineering and electrotechnical industry, the government will seek forms of support for potentially competitive productive capacities with good technical and technological bases.

In order to support increasing quality, a quality program will be adopted with the aim of giving the consumer greater protection against dangerous low quality products. We will introduce certificates of product quality management and will adjust the relevant legal regulations and norms. The government will initiate in principle a rearrangement of market regulations, and will restrict sales controls in the markets.

We are stressing the development of active tourist travel, spa treatment and tourism for health, whose contributions toward the economy should increase more markedly.

The government will modernize foreign trade policy and will assess the main tasks of directing foreign trade for the 1995-96 period with the prospects up to 2000. It will adopt an export support program which will be aimed, above all, at politically promoting Slovakia in the markets of advanced economies, particularly the countries of the European Union, and at winning new markets.

The government will seek cooperation with the Czech Republic within a strong union, including concluding agreements guaranteeing mutual balance of payments relations, extending the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) to new member countries, gradually removing the barriers to mutual trade in industrial and agricultural products between the member states of CEFTA.

The government will expand interstate bilateral agreements for the exchange of goods, emphasizing the countries of the Near East, Africa, and Asia. Similarly, it will support all forms of international trade and economic activity with the Russian Federation and other countries of the CIS with the aim of achieving a more even trade balance.

The government will support the export of investment projects and top technological equipment, as well as other significant exports. One of the government's significant institutional instruments for securing the development of small and medium businesses will be a national agency for the development of small and medium businesses, with a network of regional advisors, information centers, and business innovation centers. The government considers dynamically developing sector of small and medium businesses, including cooperatives, to be an important instrument in the restructuring and modernization of the national economy. [passage omitted]

The government will create the conditions for building a transport and communication infrastructure which will stress, above all, the significance of Slovakia's geographical position, so that Slovakia can become interesting not only for transit transport, but also tourist travel. By developing a transport infrastructure program, we will create a starting point for the development of business relations between East and West. The government will prepare a program for completion of the highway network and modernization of the railway network.

In the sphere of rail transport, the government will create conditions for a better use of this kind of transport in view of its ecological advantages. It is a government priority to safeguard modernization of the north-south corridor from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea, that is the section in our country: Bratislava, Zilina, Cadca, Skalica, [name indistinct], and the connection across the newly built rail border-crossing Bratislava-Petrzalka-Kittsee.

We can improve transport conditions between East and West, above all ensure the efficient use of transport capacities between Slovakia and Ukraine, by using wide-gauge railways and speeding up and improving the quality of transport between Bratislava and Kosice; modernizing equipment in East Slovak transloading stations; modernizing and electrifying the north-south Plavec-Kosice-Cana sector; modernizing and renovating rolling-stock, and so on.

In 1995 we expect to see the first major investment projects in developing the highway network. We expect the section of the D1 highway between [Liptovsky] Hradok and Hybe to be completed this year, and the Trencin highway bypass, together with through routes in Liptovsky Mikulas, Martin, Lucenec, and in the Spisska Nova Ves and Kosicka Bela areas, in the following years.

Construction will begin of highways and road sections linking up with the international road network, above all of highways constituting sections of international transport corridors. The construction and linking of highways in the Bratislava area will take place in such a way as to achieve a linkup with the Austrian and Hungarian highway networks and will commence this year.

We also expect future significant projects to include the highway section between Horna Streda and Trencin and between [words indistinct]. On domestic roads, construction will commence on bypasses for Zarnovica, Nova Bana, Cadca, Oravsky Podzamok, [word indistinct], and Kosice, as well as the reconstruction of roads between Poprad and Kezmarok, and between Levice and Sahy.

In the sphere of bus transport, the government will draft a law on road transport, introduce a system of licensing for individual bus routes, sort out the system of granting noninvestment subsidies and social concessions, and gradually transfer powers over bus transport to regions and municipalities. At the same time it will continuing transforming the state companies forming part of Slovak Road Transport.

In air transport we will create the conditions for regular air links between Bratislava, Kosice, and other countries.

In the communications sphere, the government will build on existing plans for the development of communications up to the year 2000. It will consider the possibility of further developing communications based on a combination of its own and foreign resources.

The government will guarantee that radio and television signal distribution is based on the plan for the whole territory of the Slovak Republic to be covered by radio and television signals by the year 2000. The government will create provisions for the expansion of complementary telecommunications services, the introduction of which is made possible by digital technology. After 1996 it will guarantee the introduction of a digital network of integrated services.

By using the Institute of Territorial Planning as an instrument for activating investment-backed construction, the government will create the conditions for the [word indistinct] arrangement of land in such a way that individual investors can implement their investment plans. It will guarantee the conditions for the more rapid drawing up of territorial planning documentation for the sale of companies and land in the public interest, above all for the completion of key projects, consistent with normal practice in European Union countries. It will also simplify procedures for the preparation of construction projects.

The government will draw up a program of public investment projects on the basis of the development programs of individual ministries and will set the order of priority for their implementation. It will use primarily nonbudget resources to finance these projects, and will stimulate the greatest possible use of private financial resources.

The government will create the conditions for granting long-term mortgage loans accompanied by effective use of deposit rights [zalozne pravo]. The government regards the development of housing as a highly important social task. It is high time to halt the slump in housing construction and to revitalize it.

Although securing housing is becoming a matter for the individual citizen, the state has not shed its joint responsibility for finding a solution to this problem. The government will therefore reassess the plans for state housing policy and guarantee an increase in housing construction. It must also create conditions for granting mortgage loans with an appropriate term of approximately 20 years and with part of the interest being paid from the state budget. An autonomous system must also be created to support the construction of housing for lower-income sectors of the population.

In agriculture, the government will implement the strategic objectives marked out for agriculture in the so-called Green Paper and subsequently endorsed by the parliament.

Conditions have been created in agriculture and in the food industry which form a good base for maintaining balance and stability in the food market, for securing for food supplies in the state, for economic and ecological stability, for the equal spread of business activity between the regions in agriculture, and for maintaining a stable level of population in the countryside.

The key to this is to make good use, in the conditions of market competition, of the existing technical and construction potential in agricultural production, and of the human resources in all forms of agricultural enterprise. This plan envisages linking agricultural production with the relevant processing industries.

As to forestry, the important thing is to preserve and perfect forests.

Water management aims at protecting surface and underground water reservoirs, and at the smooth supply and economical use of drinking and household water.

In the first stage of implementing the objectives of the Green Paper, along with the government's moves in 1993 and 1994, we halted the economic decline of agriculture, which started in 1991. This is shown by the fact that in 1992 as many as 90 percent of enterprises were on the brink of bankruptcy, whereas in 1994 almost one half of farming cooperatives and one third of state farms made a profit. Our aim is to ensure that at least 70-80 percent of farming subjects are capable of (?breaking even), as in the most advanced states of the European Union.

The intentions, politically promoted, of forcefully liquidating large-scale agricultural production have not been implemented. The Slovak cooperative movement will celebrate its 150th anniversary in 1995, and it is one of the suitable forms of land management for Slovakia for the future. We also want to advance other forms of agricultural businesses and of individual farming.

The government will pay special attention to consolidating country life, in particular by reviving primary agricultural production: breeding sheep, cattle, and similar, and by advancing the production of more labor-intensive products like fruit, vegetables, grapes, and medicinal herbs. We want to support firms which process agricultural products for the local market and produce local specialities. We want to support business activities which are not based on farming, such as traditional crafts, cooperation with industry and regional services, and which promote all forms of countryside tourism.

The government will support plans for the development of the agriculture product-processing industry, provided they are worked out on the basis of the European Union competitiveness criteria.

As part of the overall government policy, our economic and social policy measures will aim at creating a continuous reduction of the population's expenditure on food, compared to their overall expenditure, which currently is 38 percent. In the long term, it should fall yearly by one percent at least.

The government considers the following as the long-term priorities in regional development: the best possible harmonization of the region's economic and social development with the region's existing potential and comparative advantages, while maintaining the region's ecological stability.

The government will make the utmost efforts to fulfill the social [word indistinct] program. This needs to be understood in broader perspectives—there is the issue of support and social security as well as that of the human being and his needs. We understand the social system as a legal regulation of industrial relations and regulation of the labor market. This should be incorporated in the Labor Code and other laws.

Essential changes in the labor market should be accomplished primarily by means of the target set by the government, which means bringing unemployment down to a maximum of 10 percent of the population of a productive age.

The government is aware that there are industries still suffering from overemployment, that the pressure for structural changes will lead to the release of excess labor forces, which means the people currently employed. Despite this we are setting this task not only for ourselves, as the government, but for the whole of society. [passage omitted]

The government rejects proposals to move the retirement age above the existing age limit of 60 years [for men] and 57 years [for women]. On the contrary, it wants to stabilize it and, when possible, to meet special demands when justified.

The government guarantees that it will provide the subsidies granted to citizens by law. The government will therefore prepare a whole project on the development of human resources, and it will put forward a great deal of laws, such as the Labor Code, the law on civil service and so on, which will regulate the essential social relations and the functions of society.

The government will pay comprehensive attention to health care. The only way forward in this is to complete the reform launched in 1992 and interrupted in 1993. [passage omitted]

Apart from Slovaks, there are also many other nationalities here. All of them have the right freely to express and develop their culture. Our thinking is pluralist. However, while developing everything that is positive in culture, in returning to past creative work we must reject the influence of commercialization, violence, and pornography, which are increasingly passing for art and appearing in many institutions.

The government will respect and protect freedom of speech. It will protect pluralism. It will help build public service institutions, but must at the same time guarantee protection for citizens from the abuse of civic freedoms, and must prevent people and their interests being harmed.

We often encounter a negative understanding of Slovakia. These are not just the prejudices which accompanied Slovakia's entry onto the international scene. There is also much which is totally unfounded and comes from inside, presenting a false impression of what happens in our country. Personal feelings, subjectivity, disgruntlement, in many cases unfulfilled personal ambitions, all make people capable of harming the interests of the state as a result of their own petty feelings and interests. That ought not to be done by citizens, and certainly not by those acting in the name of public institutions.

In nationalities policy, the government is fully committed to adopting all European guarantees of minority rights. It accepts the Council of Europe's observations on its provisions for minority rights, and is opening up the Slovak legal system in such a way that when new regulations are adopted allowing for a broader framework of rights, these will become part of the legislation of the Slovak Republic.

The government regards churches and religious associations as the bearers of our national and cultural heritage and important partners in the formation of the spiritual life and morals of society. The governmet is in favor of support for the churches and of working in partnership with them. It seeks to maintain the existing honest and open relations with the churches. The process of organizing the relationship between the state and churches and religious associations forms part of the social and economic transformation. The government will seek to guarantee the new quality of this relationship contractually, while respecting the number, social standing, and significance of individual churches.

The government wishes to expand relations between the Slovak Republic and the Holy See based on a treaty, and expects a special impulse from the planned visit by the Holy Father to Slovakia.

The future profile and financing of churches will depend on the practical application of the law which has already been passed concerning the mitigation of certain property injustices against churches and religious associations. The government welcomes joint action by churches in expanding international ties and in creating a positive image of Slovakia around the world. The government will create the conditions for churches to operate in the social, charitable, and health spheres, in culture, education, sport, and also the Army.

The government is aware that the decisive prerequisite for the spiritual development and economic prosperity of our state is an effective program continuing the reform of the education system. It is important to recognize differing opinions and freedom of thought as the starting point for all changes in terms of content to the education of young people. There has been much discussion about this.

Unfortunately, this discussion misses the fundamental point of this problem. People do not discuss the content of the curriculum but instead discuss the organization of the education system, which in Slovakia is exceptionally well developed. People propose measures which seem to be aimed primarily at dismantling a good education system, while at the same time ignoring such questions as curricular content, the professional makeup of graduates, and the relationship between the two.

In terms of standards of knowledge, our citizens compare extremely well with foreigners. That is why those factors which formed an educational basis for the spiritual development of citizens will not only remain, but will be multiplied. That basis must be comparable to the European standard, but where it is higher there is no need to lower it.

One of the government's priorities will be to develop teachers and strengthening their social standing, moral and material rewards, and social security. Even during the economic transformation we will certainly seek all possible resources for differentiated pay increases in the education sector favoring the best and most qualified teachers. In cooperation with the unions we (?are putting forward) a timetable for tackling the problems of pay in the education sector. The government will continue with the creation of appropriate conditions for equality between state, church, and private schools.

From the point of view of developing democracy, the government supports parliamentary democracy in which executive power stems from a legislative majority. It will accept opposition opinions which benefit society, and will create mechanisms to enable minority opinions of interest groups to seek support or acceptance.

The government is considering drafting amendments to the law on political parties and to electoral laws for elections to the National Council [parliament] and local councils.

The government considers it necessary to reorganize public administration rationally and institutionally. That means, above all, creating modern and effective local government while at the same time continuing with reform of public administration. The aim is to create an administrative system which will better meet citizens' needs and which will be simpler and less of a financial burden.

Our objective is to set up a new system of territorial division in Slovakia. It will be based on the idea that the state should share responsibility for social cohesion and the coordination of social-economic development. The government will seek to reduce bureaucracy and to improve professional standards in the civil service. In building a state under the rule of law, the government will continue working on our legal system, in harmony with the principles of democracy and humanism. It will ensure the revival of the sovereignty of the law. [passage omitted]

The government will create political, legal, organizational, personnel, and material-technical conditions for the independence of courts and judges. At the same time, care must be taken to secure the smooth running of the judiciary. We expect prosecutors to react more flexibly and more uncompromisingly to any display of unlawfulness. The government will prepare an amendment to the law on the role and the position of prosecutors. [passage omitted]

Taking into consideration the scope of the security guarantees achieved so far, the stable political orientation toward legal and political European security structures, and the country's economic conditions, the government will initiate the drafting of a long-term plan to develop the Army and manage its human resources. Its target will be to create a small but adequately armed army, whose high standards will guarantee the defense, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of our state.

As regards the need to suppress crime, the government considers it essential to create the best possible organizational structure of the police corps, both centrally and in the regions, and to make clear the personal responsibility of leading officials. Rules will be adopted to reduce the administrative burden on the police force—some administrative tasks will be transferred to the public administration—and we will emphasize decentralization within the police from the higher to lower organizational strata.

In the effort to eliminate corruption and all forms of dishonest property gain, whoever commits it, the government will prepare and consistently promote a comprehensive system of clean hands in the public life. The aim will be to improve morality, discipline, blamelessness, and incorruptibility in the civil service. This will make it possible to positively influence citizens' discipline, morality, and honesty. In this connection, the speedy discussion of the law on the conflict of interests will also become a contribution.

The government will continue to implement the approved concept of the prison system. The government will appeal to the Council of Europe to reconsider whether, in a situation where preventive measures and strict punishment do not reduce the growing number of brutal crimes, the permanent ban on capital punishment, which follows from the international documents we have signed, is justifiable.

In the legislative area, the government will continue to form the legal system of the sovereign Slovak Republic, aiming at the stabilization of our legal system. It will also help prepare measures affecting the whole legal system with the aim of improving the legislative process.

The government will promote the updating of those legal decrees issued by the former federation's authorities which are part of our legal system and which have not yet lost their validity.

The gradual harmonization of the Slovak Republic's legal system with European Union law is an important legislative task, resulting from the government's foreign policy of incorporating the Slovak Republic into the European integration processes and, specifically, from the European agreement about the Slovak Republic's association with the European Community.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, this is the third time that I have presented a policy statement to parliament and asked for its confidence. This is the third time that I have addressed parliament as the prime minister of a democratically elected government. This is the sixth government Slovakia has had since 1989. The main condition for the implementation of these aims is to stabilize the internal situation in Slovakia, and to prevent further destruction and decomposition of its internal structure.

The common task for the government, for parliament, and for the political structures and citizens of this state is to prevent the continuation of the internal decomposition, and any further internal political struggles. It is our experience that they have always resulted in moral, political and material damage.

Slovakia is our common homeland, our common home. All of us—parliament, the government, the president, all of the constitutional and state authorities in this state—are responsible for our country's further advancement, flourishing, and prosperity. [passage omitted]

Discusses Ties to President

LD2001160395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1135 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Parliament is debating the government policy statement today. Before the session opened, our editor Zuzana Stukovska interviewed Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

[Begin recording] [Stukovska] Will you be waiting for parliament's final decision?

[Meciar] It would be appropriate for me to be in parliament for the conclusion of the debate. However, at the same time, talks are being held between the representatives of industry, the Association of Employers, bank managers and their association, trade union representatives, several experts from economic institutions, academics from the economic sphere, and government representatives. The talks will be concluded on Sunday evening and this meeting is to draft the economic policy for 1995. It should also agree on the basic strategy in the social sphere. [passage omitted]

I will be attending both parliament and this meeting until Sunday evening. [passage omitted]

[Stukovska] [passage omitted] You spent more than two hours discussing the agenda of the fourth parliamentary session with President Michal Kovac on Wednesday. In its wry style, the communique said that your talks were calm and matter-of-fact, and that there was agreement on most of the issues discussed. Mr. Meciar, will this agreement be reflected in [an improvement of] the fragile relations between the president and the prime minister?

[Meciar] I would not put it that way. Our relations are not fragile. They are defined by the Constitution and the Constitution is unambiguous. The issue to be discussed was the technical aspect of our relations in order to avoid any misunderstanding. These misunderstandings are not necessarily produced by me or by the president or, to say it the other way round, by the president or me. The aim was to achieve a situation whereby the administrative bodies surrounding us respect certain rules and facts, thus excluding or limiting the possibility for future conflicts emerging. [passage omitted]

We really have resolved with the president many issues in such a way for the situation to gradually improve. However, many questions remained unresolved. [end recording]

Comments on Trip Abroad

LD2001223995 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1815 GMT 20 Jan 95

["Regular" interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Zuzana Stukovska; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stukovska] As you have already indicated, you will spend most of next week abroad. Although it was generally expected that your first journey as a prime minister would take you to some of the neighboring countries, on 23 January you leave for Brussels, which is the center of the West European and Atlantic security structures. What are your proposals and expectations?

[Meciar] Brussels is the center of the European Union. If we want to declare [words indistinct] and if we want to submit our application it is necessary to agree on the rules and procedures so that our application is realistic.

Brussels is also the center of the Western European Union in which we have the status of an associate member. This needs to be reconfirmed and further joint steps have to be agreed.

I will also pay a visit to NATO headquarters, where we signed our Partnership for Peace treaty; this needs to be reconfirmed. There are new initiatives expected to take place in 1995 and 1996; these need to be discussed.

We are facing a rather important period. In 1996 the method of the integration of the security and economic structures proceeds will be decided. I will not be debating whether it is with us or without us, but how. Therefore, in the scope of international politics it is important to declare goodwill and then debate how to carry it through.

It is also important that the states are not only consolidated from within, but they also have a good relationship with their neighbors. That is why I am going straight from Brussels to Budapest, and just stopping over in Bratislava. In Budapest I will hold talks with Hungarian Prime Minister Horn. Our relations can be very beneficial. Worsening relations harm both governments and countries. Therefore, it is my endeavor to achieve a substantial improvement, and whenever possible to adopt new forms of relations so that we create a relationship of confidence, cooperation, mutual respect, and mutual benefit. All this is possible if there is goodwill on both sides. The Slovak side has a lot of it.

[Stukovska] Hungary is currently the most complicated neighbor of ours. Prior to your visit you said on several occasions that you were optimistic about it. Where does your optimism come from, particularly when you must know that the representatives of the Hungarian Coalition from the Slovak parliament are planning their visit to Budapest before you?

[Meciar] I hold talks with the government. I met Prime Minister Horn in August. It was a productive meeting and I am encouraged by the fact that both parties respected everything we had agreed upon. It is also encouraging that the Hungarian Government realizes that it is necessary to improve relations with its neighbors as a part of the global resolution of global relations.

Similarly, our economies indicate that we have almost stopped cooperating and that the essential exchange of goods has not shown an adequate rate of increase. On the one hand, you have ethnic minorities saying what they are good for [as heard]; on the other, good relations and all the aspects that make them good, such as mutual benefits, mutual trade, and mutual cooperation, slowed down because of the minorities. Therefore, it would be desirable for the minorities to be, not the point of division, but rather the point of things we have in common. [passage omitted]

Talks of Minority Rights

LD2101210595 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1830 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met journalists during a meeting held in Soporna today. [passage omitted]

With regard to minority rights he said that our state observed all the international legal norms that guarantee minority rights. Our state observed the right of the Council of Europe to check the protection and observation of these rights. The prime minister said that Slovakia was prepared to adopt an obligation in its legislation whereby any higher standard to be adopted internationally will also be considered part of our legislation.

According to the prime minister, an analysis has shown that the protection of minority rights in our country is observed, respected, and is of a high standard. He also said that he was prepared to hold consultations with legitimate representatives of the minorities. However, on the other side, there should also be goodwill to sit down at the table and hold talks. The representatives of minorities were invited long ago. Therefore, as Vladimir Meciar said, he was waiting for a positive signal indicating their intention to hold talks. One more reason for these talks was the fact that, from an international viewpoint, the representatives of minorities speak about the need to protect minority rights but, on the other hand, they were ready to hold talks with all governments but their own.

With regard to the Gabcikovo hydro project, the prime minister holds the view that if there is goodwill on both sides this issue can be resolved without the international court in The Hague.

Council Approves Government Policy Statement

LD2001232695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After a two-day session the Slovak National Council has approved the government policy statement. A total of 139 deputies were present for the voting. All 83 deputies belonging to the government coalition voted for the policy statement, 44 deputies were against, while 11 deputies abstained. Through this result of the vote on the policy statement the National Council has expressed confidence in the government.

President Kovac Dismisses Resignation Rumors

AU2001174695 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 19 Jan 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Pavol Minarik in Bratislava; date not given: "I Do Not Have To Think About Retiring for Health Reasons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Minarik] You have said recently that Slovakia needs political peace and not foolish personal duels. Will 1995 be that year of peace?

[Kovac] I really want it to be a year of peace and hope. The transition to what we might call political peace will obviously be gradual. When I speak about political peace, I do not have in mind the disappearance of criticism or of differences or dialogue between the opposition and coalition. Rather, I have in mind the absence of unnecessary political strife, mutual attacks, accusations, and criticism from positions of hostility, phenomena, in short, that evoke unrest, grudges, and a negative atmosphere on the political scene and among the public.

[Minarik] Do you think that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and its chairman have once and for all abandoned their "preelection promise" to dismiss you as president?

[Kovac] I cannot assess the issue responsibly but I proceed from the government's policy statement. In the passage about measures toward stabilizing political life, there is no mention of changing the present parliamentary system into a presidential one, or of any other similar measures that would suggest the shortening of the president's term of office. Quite the contrary, there is a passage in the policy statement in which it is said that, in the interest of stabilizing political life, the government would draft amendments to the laws on political parties, parliamentary elections, and elections to community representative bodies. There is no reference to measures aimed at changing the Constitution.

[Minarik] For a few days now, there have been rumors in Bratislava that you will soon be resigning for health reasons. What is your state of health?

[Kovac] This comes as a great surprise to me and it makes me laugh a bit. My health is normal for my age. I have not noticed anything serious regarding my health that could indicate that I should think about retiring for health reasons. To be honest, let me admit that I have recently had problems with my back. But even younger people have such problems. It may have been noticed that I have been going for infusions and been deduced from this that my state of health is not good.

[Minarik] Under what circumstances would you resign as head of state?

[Kovac] If I were convinced that remaining president were detrimental to Slovakia's interests and that I were not useful.

[Minarik] You and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar shook hands as a gesture of reconciliation but the budget of the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic, and only its budget, was subsequently cut by half.

[Kovac] I did not take this as an act that should lead to the renewal of confrontation between the government and myself but as an endeavor to find potentials for savings. In the final analysis, this was only the provisional budget for the first quarter of the year. But we will probably have time to negotiate seriously about the budget for the whole year. I assume that the opportunity will then arise to assess matters with all due seriousness. I really have no interest in employing an unnecessarily large number of people in the presidential office. I believe, however, that I am able to assess how large a staff is essentially needed for me to perform my duties according to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

[Minarik] According to the opinion polls, as many as 50 percent in Slovakia would prefer some form of coexistence with the Czechs, which differs from similar polls conducted in the Czech Republic. Is this an expression of disappointment on the part of Slovak citizens with developments in the Slovak Republic?

[Kovac] To be honest, I do not know about the results of such a poll and it is thus difficult for me to take a stand on it. I proceed from the fact, however, that parties whose programs comprised some form of renewal of the Slovaks' coexistence with the Czechs ran in the recent parliamentary elections in Slovakia. The results of the vote clearly showed these parties' failure. I infer from this that the majority of the population of Slovakia have put this problem behind them and that they seek solutions that would satisfy their needs within the framework of the Slovak Republic and, of course, the fact that Slovakia is a country that, together with other states of Central Europe, seeks integration into the same grouping.

[Minarik] Will you make use of your right to appear in parliament with a report on the state of the republic?

[Kovac] I will and I am already preparing myself for it. No agreement has yet been reached on the date, but it will apparently be either in March or in April. At any rate, I intend to appear before parliament with a report on the state of Slovak society.

[Minarik] Do you think that Slovak Television fulfills the function of a public corporation, as set down by law?

[Kovac] Not just in Slovakia, but also in other former communist countries, and even in advanced Western states, there exist no clearly defined criteria of public corporations. I know that in neighboring Austria they are also having certain problems with this. As long as the criteria and the mechanisms of safeguarding them are not clearly laid down by law in our country, there will exist various opinions on what constitutes television's character as a public corporation. One group will claim that television is not a public corporation, another group that it is. Personally, I believe that Slovak Television is a public corporation.

A different issue, however, is how to guarantee objectivity in its broadcasts while complying with the principles of plurality of views and keeping the public informed. However, I myself have heard from Jozef Darmo, the new director of Slovak Television, that there is an endeavor to amend the relevant law. The proposals and views that he expressed in this context, which concerned the mechanisms of establishing a television council and of guaranteeing television's independence of political parties and the government, seemed to me to be sufficient. This could be the path that might, hopefully, eliminate various doubts about Slovak Television in the future and also attempts by various political groups at subordinating this information medium.

[Minarik] What do you think contributes to Slovakia's good name and what inflicts most damage on it?

[Kovac] The development of democracy, the application of a pluralistic system, and also the guarantees of basic human rights are being watched very closely in all former socialist countries. This naturally also holds true for Slovakia. Everything departing from the ideas of European Union member states regarding, for example, the rules of democracy at the same time raises doubts about the observance of these rules. The issues of media independence or ethnic minority rights are, understandably, intimately connected with this. All steps that raise doubts in one way or another naturally damage the good name of the Slovak Republic.

Everything that leads to the strengthening of those rights and of the rules of democratic life, on the other hand, improves the good name of the Slovak Republic. A part of our public believes, however, that Slovakia is being greatly damaged by nonobjective and false information about what Slovakia is like, how it is developing, and so forth. This, too, must have a negative effect on Slovakia's credibility. We cannot be indifferent to whether journalism about the Slovak Republic in neighboring countries is objective. I, however, regard it as extraordinarily important how our country is perceived by statesmen and politicians. They do not base their opinions on the Slovak Republic so much on journalism in their own media as on information that they receive from Slovakia through diplomatic channels. This surely depends also on the objectivity of diplomats and their endeavor to consider a broader range of information. I believe that such interest is prevalent among them. This is why there is a difference between information on the Slovak Republic in some foreign media and what reaches the desks of the relevant state officials via diplomatic channels.

[Minarik] What do you consider to be of the greatest importance for the Slovak Republic from the economic point of view?

[Kovac] I consider economic stability and the continuation of economic transformation exceptionally important. As is known, Slovakia achieved fairly good economic results last year. The prerequisites exist for further economic recovery, economic development, and growth. Within the framework of transformation, special attention is being paid to the course of privatization and to the liberalization of trade. It clearly follows from the policy statement of the new government that the privatization process will continue and also that the adaptation of Slovakia's legislation to the states of the European Union will continue. Deflecting from this direction could raise all kinds of doubts and damage Slovakia, as it would any other country declaring, on the one hand, its interest in becoming integrated in the Union and, on the other, taking steps running counter to such a declaration.

Kovac Interviewed About Political Situation

AU2301112195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Jan 95 p 8

[Interview with President Michal Kovac by Juraj Veres, Julius Gembicky, and Jan Fule; place and date not given: "Michal Kovac: A Change of the Constitutional System Is Not a Guarantee of Our Domestic Political Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [NARODNA OBRODA] Mr. President, in your New Year address, you reached your arm out in a gesture of reconciliation. To what degree was this gesture symbolic, and what response did you expect from politicians and citizens?

[Kovac] I have always emphasized that what the public officials say and do, by the very nature of its being done publicly, has a great significance and a great effect on the thought process and conduct of citizens. I cannot perceive such gestures as anything but an earnest intention, a definite expression of good will. All our subsequent actions are under constant public scrutiny—my conduct, the conduct of the prime minister, and that of other officials. I am convinced that it is important to every one of us that we come out in relations with the public as people who honor their word. In this instance, then, that we keep the promise expressed by a public handshake. Time will tell. It is important that the citizens have the opportunity to objectively follow this process.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Had you known about the cutback in your chancellery's budget at the time you drafted the New Year address, would you still have called for a reconciliation?

[Kovac] At the time I drafted the New Year address, I knew how it was with the chancellery budget. It would not be correct to draw premature conclusions from the government and parliament's decision, for instance, to cut only the budget of the president's chancellery, although this step did not conform to the spirit of reconciliation, and I opt for patience and detachment. Therefore, I want to perceive this as an attempt at restraint that began in the president's chancellery, and may continue in drafting the budgets of other central bodies. Even if that were not the case, I believe that the president has to remain true to the demonstrated goodwill and proceed in the spirit of what is, unfortunately, frequently classified as a mere theatrical gesture. Slovakia needs political peace rather than nonsensical personnel duels. One should fight against evil, against threats to democracy and the dignity of man.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Have you noticed any changes after your offer of reconciliation?

[Kovac] I have not had any opportunity to talk with the prime minister. The sole exception was a telephone call concerning my chancellery budget for the first quarter. I learned about the situation 30 minutes prior to the government session. I addressed an appeal to the prime minister asking that they should not cut the budget and that we seriously discuss the issue within the framework of the preparation of the budget for the entire year, that the draft be assessed by experts from the Finance Ministry, the president's chancellery, and possibly also independent experts. The prime minister promised to deliver my request at the government session. I presume that he did so. The government, apparently, did not accept my demand, and nor did the parliament.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Would you, yourself, also be pleased if, within the framework of the reconciliation, the coalition were to terminate the activity of the investigation commission that is examining the events of last March? What if the commission presented its results at the same time as you deliver your report on the state of society, which you are to present to the parliament in March or April, and if the two reports were contradictory?

[Kovac] I realize that on the one hand, there are issues incorporated in plans for the near future that at first sight seem to be a search for those responsible for the situation in March 1994. As if a programed process of revenge were going on. On the other hand, there are gestures supposedly expressing conciliatory efforts, and not only between the president and the prime minister. After all, Vladimir Meciar offered reconciliation also to the opposition parties, journalists, and others. If I admitted, however, that the commission, which is working on the search for the causes of the crisis development, does not intend to continue in a spirit of reconciliation, but rather in a spirit of political retaliation, then I would consider it the worst step since the new government was formed. It would damage the interests of Slovakia. For myself, I would perceive the debate on such a report in the parliament, the subsequent adoption of a resolution that would accuse the president of an activity aimed at the elimination of the democratic constitutional system, and the conceivable resolution on the reduction of the president's term of office, as a political process. I do not believe that our parliament would be a party to such a political precedent. The need for serious scientific analyses of the causes of the crisis development in the past is another question altogether.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Part of last year was also characterized by the tense relations between the parliament and the government, the president and the prime minister. What development in this respect do you expect this year?

[Kovac] I expect relaxation, constructive cooperation, and a positive development. I assume that we will meet and discuss these problems with the prime minister. I realize that the government is now very busy drafting the policy statement and the budget for this year. Therefore I have not insisted so far. In our office [chancellery], we will also have to make up a new organizational structure and style of work based on the reduced staff. So, on our side, the time is not yet ripe for being clear about everything either. When this happens, it will be an opportunity for us to discuss these issues with the prime minister. At this moment, I cannot tell whether we will reintroduce regular meetings with the parliament chairman and the prime minister. We must jointly find a suitable means of communication.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Since the first democratic elections in 1990, no Slovak government has survived four years. Do you believe that Vladimir Meciar's third government will beat this limit?

[Kovac] I intend to do everything that accords with the Constitution, my conscience, and the principles of democracy to help them beat this limit. The early parliamentary elections are behind us, and the political classification of our society is clear. A coalition government was formed that has a promise of four years ahead of them. This period is a decisive one for the future development of the Slovak Republic, particularly after 2000. It is in the interest of all of us not to waste this four-year period by trivial disputes but rather put forward the interests of the country from the vantage points both of the immediate and the distant future. It would not be reasonable for us to live in the expectation of an early change of government. I consider it very important to enter in the spirit of effective contribution to the stabilization of the domestic political situation, reinforcement of democracy, strengthening of the legal character of our state, and the creation of all important prerequisites for our integration into the European structures—and to do so in the first wave. This accelerated integration has its advantages, and it is of vital importance for our future development. The country, applying for it, knows precisely which rules of domestic political life it must respect. Our government and parliament know it, too. One must not forget that our fragile democracy is supported not only by internal forces but also by other democratic states. We are not alone. That also is a sufficient guarantee that the Slovak Republic will also follow the path of reinforcing the democracy and the path of the integration into democratic structures.

[NARODNA OBRODA] In your election campaign speech you said, among other things, that the elections probably would not solve the problem of the insufficient internal strength of our parties and movements. How do you feel about the strength of our parties and movements after more than four months?

[Kovac] I believe that a guarantee of our domestic political stability is not only in legislative solutions, and definitely not in a change of the constitutional system. I see permanent solutions in the opening of the natural democratic space for the shaping of the political parties. Whatever we cut back in this sphere, in any party or movement, using the influence of a personality, it will be to the detriment of that political body. It will cut back the process of internal shaping, postpone the stage of political balance and the firm rooting of these parties in the political spectrum of our society and in the international political structures. Hence, legislative measures are not a permanent and stable guarantee of domestic political stability. This certainly does not mean that it is not necessary to amend the electoral law or that it is not necessary to elaborate more on some details in the Constitution.

[NARODNA OBRODA] It is not yet 100 days since the government was appointed, and therefore we cannot assess its work. We can observe, however, that the government will not manage to present its policy statement to the parliament within 30 days of its appointment as required by the Constitution. Would you care to comment on this fact?

[Kovac] Everything that could lead to doubts concerning legality and constitutionality is bad. We are in a situation in which we need to cultivate in the public respect and esteem for laws and the Constitution. Many of us still remember well how the totalitarian government accommodated laws and the constitution to its needs. Therefore, we must be especially careful, even when it comes out that a certain law is imperfect. Even then, we must insist on its being respected. The stand of the public and constitutional officials then affects the stand of the citizens with respect to honoring even the laws that do not pertain to political arrangement. Many citizens would feel that if the public and constitutional officials do not respect the laws and decisions by the Constitutional Court, why should they respect them.

[NARODNA OBRODA] So, we are talking about the screening law now?

[Kovac] Yes, the screening law. I can be intrinsically convinced that the law is bad, yet, while it exists, I have to respect it without a single reservation. Therefore I asked for affidavits from the newly appointed members of the cabinet.

[NARODNA OBRODA] What about the government policy statement?

[Kovac] I expect that the parliament will receive the policy statement on 13 January, so the deadline could be made. It is just a problem of interpretation now—whether the term "submit" means also to physically appear before the deputies. It would be better not to raise any doubts about it, but since this has already happened, it could serve as a lesson that certain matters should not be taken lightly but rather executed on time, and not so that some citizens can perceive it as a violation of the Constitution. I believe that this was not intentional, and most likely the pressing nature of other commitments caused the discussion to be delayed somewhere.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Mr. President, how do you feel about the need for a law on the protection of the republic? Do you believe that it would be useful to our society?

[Kovac] At this time, I am not convinced that the law on the protection of the republic is needed. Perhaps, an amendment to some stipulations of the Civic Code would be appropriate. This, however, would require a thorough analysis. One should come up with such an initiative only after the society is convinced that there is a legal vacuum, and what the law is to solve is in the interest of democracy, citizens, and the protection of human rights. I believe that, under such circumstances, the citizens would have no problem understanding it, especially if they knew that it is not aimed against any group of citizens, basic human rights, or specific phenomena, but rather against what actually threatens the interests of the state, democracy, and constitutional order.

[NARODNA OBRODA] The government entrusted the foreign minister with drafting the Slovak application for membership in the European Union. What do you, Mr. President, consider most important in this context?

[Kovac] The priority is to put in order relations with the neighboring countries. This applies to the Hungarian Republic in particular. At every meeting with the representatives of EU countries, they emphasize to both Hungarians and us that only when we put our mutual relations in order, settle the controversial issues, do we stand a chance of membership in both the EU and NATO. It is also tied to the question of the status of the Hungarian minority, and this despite the fact that it is not our most important domestic problem. I do not mean to say that everything is in order. We should, for instance, think about the minorities participating in the executive power. That is not just a question of the Slovaks and Slovak political entities but also a question of the Hungarian political entities. I see a connection between the principle, when political entities are formed on the basis of ethnic minorities, and the share in the executive power. If the civic principle is applied, the citizens of Hungarian ethnic background will be able to join various organizations according to their leaning toward the left-wing, liberal, or conservative orientation. Within the framework of these organizations then, they can take part in the executive power. There is also the third way—in the sensitive areas, the representation of the ethnic minorities in the administrative structures can be guaranteed. The assignment of funds for ethnic culture would then not be decided by a ministry official but the decision would be made in the presence of competent minority representatives. There is also the possibility of creating a body, other than a government council, that would deal with ethnic minority issues. The creation of such mechanisms could prevent the unhealthy politicizing of certain normal phenomena and processes.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Mr. President, is there a threat of the foreign political isolation of our country? It seems that foreign visits to Slovakia, and trips abroad by our politicians are becoming rare.

[Kovac] I do not share this impression. One should not forget that the new year is only several days old, and that everywhere in the world, this is the time of specifying foreign activities. No one has canceled any of my trips, and no one's visit to Slovakia has been canceled. We are expecting visits from Presidents Mitterrand, Klestil, Havel, and others. I should visit Israel, for instance, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Poland, Hungary, Great Britain, and I should also go to Latin America.... So, I do not feel that anything has changed since the new government was formed.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Another question is the banking institutions, investors, who have their own criteria. The world of capital is very sensitive to political changes, and it takes a while before it determines the type of politics produced in the country, and only then does it make decisions.

It is likely that foreign capital was also closely watching the fate of the two privatization laws, which you returned to the parliament to be discussed again. The opposition intends to turn to the Constitutional Court in this context. At this time, it is one of the busiest institutions. How do you feel about the doubts cast on the decision of the Constitutional Court? Just a few days ago, we had the scandal with the medicines, and there were many others.

[Kovac] There always has to be someone—the supreme court in some countries, the constitutional court in others—who has the final say, who makes the decision. This decision is no longer discussed, everyone respects it, and the constitutional officials in particular. The attempts to question the decision of our Constitutional Court are the type of activity that destabilize the situation in this country. Another problem is the idea that the Constitution should solve everything. That is another extreme. Some political bodies use the complaints lodged in the Constitutional Court to boost their popularity. This is also a phenomenon that does not belong among the positive activities.

[NARODNA OBRODA] At the beginning of our interview, however, you accepted changes to the existing Constitution, and also in the electoral law....

[Kovac] It would be worth considering introducing such an amendment to the Constitution that would in an impasse situation, in which the parliament and the government were rendered inoperable, enable the president to dissolve the National Council and call early elections. Despite the decision of the Constitutional Court, the apportionment of the executive power between the president and the government continues to be questioned. This concerns the well-known instances when the prime minister proposes someone's recall or appointment. This could be specified in the Constitution itself. Regarding the electoral law, proposals exist recommending a combination of the majority and proportional systems. This problem should also be seriously studied, and not in a purpose-oriented manner but rather from the point of view of the needs of the country.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Mr. President, as the government coalition was formed, Slovak National Party Chairman Slota expressed his loyalty to you. Later, he did not rule out the possibility that in conceivable presidential elections, if the parliament cut your term in office, he might run for the post. How do you feel about the difference in these positions?

[Kovac] I am aware of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia having in its election program the recall of the president or the cutting of his term in office. Mr. Slota, on joining the coalition, dissociated himself from this demand.

If the present constitutional system were to be replaced by a presidential one, it would logically imply a reduction of the term of office. It may be that Mr. Slota has a different opinion on this issue now. The president should be elected directly by the citizens. Mr. Slota might know about the plan to change the constitutional system, and to bring in a presidential system; in this context he did not rule out his candidacy.

[NARODNA OBRODA] During your trips around Slovakia, you must meet with some of the 26 exonerated district office chiefs, who asked you last March to resign. It is not an enviable position. How do you feel about cooperating with them?

[Kovac] I believe that it is more of a question for them than for me! I can imagine cooperation with the prime minister, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia deputies, cooperation with the ministers, so why should I not be able to imagine cooperation with them? My conscience is clear, and I can look straight into anyone's eyes.

Hungary's Horn on Minorities, Other Disputes

LD2201125495 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It is in the interest of both our countries to solve disputed issues, said Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn in an interview he granted to TASR prior to the forthcoming visit by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to Hungary.

He stressed that their solution was the necessary condition Hungary and Slovakia had to meet in order to become fully fledged members of either the European Union or NATO. He admitted that views on how to proceed to solve disputed issues differed. In his view, this is due to the complicated historical legacy. However, this can be overcome by patient talks, during which the interests of both sides are taken into account, and not least by a great effort to imagine oneself in the other person's shoes.

According to Gyula Horn, it is not possible to compare the standing of the Slovak minority in Hungary with that of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia as the historical conditions of their development have been totally different and this has led to a different level of awareness of national identity.

Party Spokesman Comments on Minority Rights

LD2201192895 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Government program does not include a separate chapter on the protection of minority rights, according to the spokesman of the Hungarian Civic Party of Slovakia. Minority topics are to be found in the section on foreign affairs, which is extremely interesting, as that would imply that the Hungarians or the other minorities are not even citizens of Slovakia. This was stated by the spokesman, Kalman Petoecz.

Party Chairman Urges Resignation of President

LD2101195795 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 21 Jan 95

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the dispute over the election of the president of the Republic, the MIEP [Hungarian Justice and Life Party] supports neither the endeavors of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] nor those of the Smallholders. [MIEP chairman] Istvan Csurka has said at a meeting of the party's county leaders that Arpad Goncz ought to give back his post voluntarily and initiate the amendingt of the Constitution.

[Unidentified correspondent] [Passage omitted] At the general assembly Csurka outlined his party's position as regards the election of the president of the Republic. The MIEP chairman blames the failure of the change of regime on the president of the Republic, accuses him of bias, and also blames him for the disorder in society. According to Csurka, by resigning, the president could prevent the fight in connection with the presidential election.

[Csurka] "At the moment, it is exclusively the television and radio in the hands of liberals that decide who will become president. The same applies to the National Assembly, where the coalition majority, which has already agreed on the matter, will decide."

[Correspondent] The MDF's request, i.e. that the right to elect the president be given back to the opposition, is considered by Csurka particularly pathetic. Neither does the MIEP does not support the initiative of the Smallholders, who have started to collect signatures for a referendum on the matter.

[Csurka] "Therefore, the MIEP's stance is as follows: If Arpad Goncz does not return his post voluntarily and does not initiate the amending of the Constitution reinstating the direct election of the president by a referendum, let the parliamentary majority of the coalition elect him and let him fail together with his parties once and for all."

Defense Minister on Need for Army Reform

LD2101143295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Army and Society Friendship Circle was set up this morning. This new organization must be important for the Defense Ministry, as Defense Minister Gyoergy Keleti was also present at the meeting. Karoly Levai reports:

[Levai] In recent years, the sources of danger to our region's security have changed; the danger of wars between Central European countries fought with regular armies has significantly diminished, said Defense Minister Gyoergy Keleti in his lecture. He added that, at the same time, internal civil wars that might present a danger to Hungary could possibly occur. However, experts are unanimous in saying that this does not reach the so-called war threshold. Therefore, it is possible to carry out Army reform, which is necessary from various points of view, in calm conditions and without haste.

Army reform is necessary because with the army's present organizational structure, the budget cannot finance the maintenance of an appropriate level of security. On the other hand, accession to NATO, too, would make the army's organizational transformation necessary. In this connection, Gyoergy Keleti said they want to reduce national service to nine months from the beginning of next year, with a transitional period of about 12 to 18 months, and to reduce the numbers of conscripts by about 20 percent. He stressed, however, that they would not dismiss professional soldiers.

Only after this would they begin modernization of military engineering. This modernization may last a decade since its cost, at today's prices, may reach 1.6-1.8 trillion forints, the defense minister said.

HTMH Denies Press Support Purposely Delayed

LD2001211295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At a press briefing this morning, the Federation of Hungarian Journalists in Romania objected to the fact that the Office of Hungarians Abroad [HTMH] delays giving financial support that was approved by the Hungarian parliament. Levente Suekoesd reports on the office's reaction.

[Begin Suekoesd recording] In an interview with the "Chronicle" program, HTMH Chairman Laszlo Labodi rejected accusations levelled at the office. He said the transfer of the financial support was not delayed by the HTMH between September 1994 and January 1995. The delay was caused by the slow administration at the Federation of Hungarian Journalists in Romania and the long transaction time at the Hungarian National Bank.

According to Labodi, the documents were held at the office for only a few days. He thinks the representatives of the Hungarian press abroad should have been aware of the conditions of transferring money, since all of this was spelled out in the notification sent by the HTMH to the Federation of Hungarian Journalists in Romania. Labodi has not received any written request to investigate the delay. If such a request does arrive, they will order an investigation, said Laszlo Labodi. [end recording]

Tax Office Chief on 1994 Revenues, Prospects

LD2101131995 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The APEH [Tax and Financial Inspection Office] is of the view that last year's tax revenues prove that favorable processes are taking place in the economy. This was said, among other things, by the chairman of the APEH at a briefing assessing 1994. On the basis of the tax revenues, APEH chairman Zoltan Pitti can see a rise of two to three percent in the GDP.

[Unidentified correspondent] Zoltan Pitti drew this conclusion, which gives reason for optimism, from the fact that the APEH collected 33 billion forints in taxes and other contributions, compared to what was stipulated in the supplementary budget. The increase in the general turnover tax revenues is particularly significant, said Zoltan Pitti. [indistinct passage omitted]

He talked about consumer taxes in a pessimistic manner. Zoltan Pitti said that two billion forints less than expected were collected. He gave the reason for this, citing, on the one hand, the expansion of the black market and, on the other hand, the organized restriction of consumption.

Outstanding debts present the main problem. Collection of a portion of this added 51.6 billion forints to the budget last year. However, outstanding debts still amount to nearly 100 billion forints. The largest part of this is owed by companies in a critical condition; thus, there is hardly any hope of collecting them. [passage omitted]

Economic Report Notes Contradictory Trends

AU2201195395 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 20 Jan 95 pp 1, 12

[Correspondent's report: "1994 Was a Year of Superlatives"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As regards the economy, among the years that have passed since the change in regime, 1994 could be called the year of "superlatives" from many points of view. The greatest achievement: It was the first time since 1987 that economic performance, or the GDP, increased considerably compared with the previous year. Compared with the past four years, industrial production, exports and imports, and investments showed the biggest increase in 1994. The year 1994 also showed the biggest increase in real wages and the smallest increase in consumer prices. At the same time, parallel to these achievements, unfavorable processes also took place in 1994: The current deficit in the balance of payments reached a record of almost $4 billion; Hungary's net foreign debt increased most in 1994; the budget deficit, compared with the GDP, was the highest in 1994.

The Hungarian economy was characterized by extremely contradictory trends in 1994. Favorable processes began in the real sphere but, at the same time, unfavorable trends increased at the macroeconomic level. What happened in the economy in 1994?

After long years of regressive economic performance, the GDP in Hungary increased by 3 percent in 1994, but it still reached only 82 percent of the 1989 GDP. The last similar increase in GDP—4 percent—occurred in 1987. Does this mean the end of the seven lean years? Is an economic boom in the offing? We do not know yet. However, certain researchers, politicians, and prominent representatives of the real sphere claim that something has begun in the economy, after the previous dismal economic performance. At the same time, economic experts, Finance Ministry officials, macroeconomic experts, and the facts show that 1994 was unparalleled not only in this respect but also in the extraordinary increase in Hungary's foreign debt, a debt that, as it is, was not small.

Given the fact that the increase in the real economic performance took place at the cost of a serious deterioration in economic equilibrium, the main task of the government's economic policy for 1995 is to halt this unhealthy growth. In other words, last year's economic data prove that it is impossible to achieve a lasting economic growth based on the current structure of the Hungarian economy, because this growth does not originate from economic modernization and an improvement in the export-import rate; instead, it originates from an increase in domestic consumption. Therefore, we need the often-mentioned economic restructuring. Without this, economic growth will be financed by increased foreign debt and an increase in the budget deficit.

While Hungary's net foreign debt decreased by almost $3 billion along with a decreasing GDP between 1990 and 1992, this foreign debt increased by almost $5 billion in the past one and one-half years. Hungary's net foreign debt stood at $18.7 billion in October 1994, as opposed to $13.3 billion in 1992. Thus, the proportion of Hungary's net foreign debt compared with the GDP was 36.3 percent at the end of 1992, and this figure increased again to 45-46 percent at the end of 1994.

One of the greatest "concerns" of certain government economic experts is that while the GDP decreased by more than 20 percent between 1989 and 1993, consumption only decreased by less than 10 percent. The year 1994 was an exception in this respect too, because the GDP increased by 3 percent and individual consumption only increased by 1 to 2 percent. The population's standard of living has been continuously deteriorating since the change in the regime. Real wages have decreased year by year with the exception of 1994, when they increased by 5-7 percent. At the same time, real wages decreased every year between 1990 and 1993, with as much as 8 percent in 1991.

The year 1994 can also be called a "special" year because it showed the smallest increase in consumer prices since the change of regime. Compared with a 35-percent inflation in 1991, the inflation rate for 1994 stood at 18.8 percent. At the same time, one must note that several central price measures, such as an increase in energy prices, were postponed in 1994 because of the parliamentary elections.

The domestic balance of payments also showed unfavorable trends in the past four years. While the state budget was still balanced in 1990, it showed a deficit by 1991—a deficit that made up 5 percent of the GDP. In 1994, this rate was close to 9 percent. At the same time, we can already regard as an achievement the fact that the budget deficit in 1994 remained within the level accepted by parliament. The central budget deficit in 1994 stood at 321 billion forints, with an additional 10 billion forints originating from the social security deficit. Thus, as a whole, the budget deficit did not reach the stipulated figure. Only 1993 showed a similar case.

Thus, economic processes were quite contradictory in 1994, and experts interpret these trends differently; as a result, they also draw different conclusions as regardings the future economic policy.

Growth and (or) stabilization? This is now the main issue of economic policy debates. There are people who think that the government's economic policy is too restrictive and they criticize the planned reduction in consumption. These people claim that those who "are forcing" stabilization are basing their opinion on a false evaluation of the situation: namely, that domestic consumption increased in 1994 because of a rapid increase in investments. In other words, in their opinion, an economic policy that concentrates on reducing consumption and only urges investments, ventures, and exports on the level of declarations is a mistaken policy that leads in the wrong direction. Instead of a strong restriction, the stress should be placed on the latter. Thus, according to these experts, the GDP should not have to be reduced this year, and the decrease in consumption and real wages would also be bearable. Foreign equilibrium would increase considerably as a result of measures that encourage exports and investments. This is the opinion mainly of representatives of the real sphere, but several economic experts also share this opinion.

The government's economic policy promises restrictive measures for another year or two and then growth. According to their interpretation, with a constantly deteriorating budget deficit and the high deficit in the current balance of payments, economic growth can only lead to accelerated debts and a short-term financial crisis, rather than to stabilization. Therefore, domestic demand should be reduced, as well consumption by the population and the community; consequently, the GDP must also decrease, Finance Ministry experts claim.

Envoy Discusses Hungarian Self-Government Issue

LD2201231495 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 22 Jan 95

[Studio interview with Dr. Eva Mitrova, Slovak ambassador to Hungary, by anchorman Andras Totfalusi on the "Weekly Courier" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Totfalusi] Madame Ambassador, how do you assess the situation of minorities, including the situation of Hungarians, in Slovakia? [passage omitted]

[Mitrova] In order to be objective, and not because I want to be modest, I would like to stress that the minority issue is not exclusively a Slovak-Hungarian or Hungarian-Romanian speciality in Europe. It is a serious problem in many countries. [passage omitted]

I am very optimistic, because the Council of Europe, which has dealt with this issue in a very fair manner, has recently managed to have certain common criteria regarding minorities summed up in a framework convention. A further basis for my optimism is that both Slovakia and Hungary immediately announced in Strasbourg that they are ready to accept and sign this document as soon as it is submitted for signature. [passage omitted]

I very much hope—or, rather, I am convinced—that there is a political force in Slovakia whose aim is to make sure that the Hungarians of Slovakia feel good and at home there. And I also hope that this will be proved within a few days. [passage omitted]

As far as self-government [oenkormanyzat] is concerned—and I do not wish to speak only of the Hungarian self-governments—it needs some time and development. We are not really even ready for the charter on self-governments, as far as the European Union is concerned. This applies to all self-governments-governments: the Hungarian, the Slovak and...

[Totfalusi, interrupting] There are Slovak minority self-governments in Hungary.

[Mitrova] Yes, we were very pleased with this fact, and we highly appreciate it. [passage omitted] This is a complex question. As soon as the other countries establish self-government, the Hungarians [in Slovakia] will also have it. [passage omitted]

Chechnya 'Potential Threat' to European Security

LD2001171295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1357 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Jan (PAP)—We have justifiable reason to treat the Chechnya tragedy as a potential threat to security and cooperation in Europe, the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission stressed in a statement adopted today "On the Tragic Conflict in Chechnya," which is to be sent to the prime minister.

"The brutal use of force against the civilian population of Chechnya by the Russian Armed Forces, has caused numerous and serious violations of human rights as defined by the norms of international law. Military operations in Chechnya often have a criminal character, which question the credibility of the Russian authorities as an important partner in the European system of international security. We are concerned that such forms of armed violence as these taking place in Chechnya could lead to a breakdown of the fragile and unstable democracy in the Russian Federation. We have justified reasons to treat the Chechnya tragedy as a potential threat to security and cooperation in Europe," the statement reads.

According to the commission, "the attitude shown by many Russian politicians and military commanders that we see in Chechnya gives rise to concern among Poles. On the other hand, we receive with understanding and satisfaction the scope and force of protests by public opinion in the Russian Federation itself against the aggressive actions in Chechnya. This protest gives hope that democracy in the Russian Federation will not be defeated."

The commission expressed the conviction that the Polish Government should: become actively involved in the activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] aimed at the peaceful resolution of the conflict by the mediation mission in Chechnya; continue and broaden humanitarian aid for the victims of conflict; and consistently continue the policy of ensuring national security that provides for closer cooperation between Poland and the states of NATO and Poland's active role in the OSCE.

The Foreign Affairs Commission of the Polish Sejm expressed the hope that "military activities will soon stop in Chechnya, that neither side will use force, and that the Chechen nation will fully regain its right to an independent development and democratic legal order."

MSZ Head on EU, NATO, PSL, Russia

WS2001143095 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Jan 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with former Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski by Adam Michnik and Edward Krzemien; place and date not given: "Russian Fist and Polish Scissors"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [GAZETA WYBORCZA] Mr. Minister, your resignation spells the end of an epoch in foreign policy. It is also the end of an important phase that the Pawlak government has been going through.

[Olechowski] I hope that this will not be the end of an epoch in foreign policy. This is what I am trying to avoid.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Could you tell us what the Pawlak government is like?

[Olechowski] Indeed, it really is Pawlak's government. It is Pawlak who calls the shots. No votes are held.

This is a cabinet that is very sensitive to the Sejm configuration. Complex relations between the government and the Sejm are constantly being discussed. What should be changed today and what should be done tomorrow. "Why should we take any risks on our own initiative?" Why bring up a difficult issue since it may be rejected by the Sejm?

I objected to this. A government should reconcile responsibility and efficiency. If there is some important issue to be dealt with, I must bring it up, despite all opposition, because I am a responsible person. However, a person who only wants to be efficient practices the art of evasion. He only wants to win. Therefore, he discusses only such issues which are easily approved, but he does not bring up any difficult problems.

It is not a government of great projects and great energy; it is not a government which declared: we want to do our best to cause this, this, and that in Poland. It is a government that only takes care of ongoing affairs; it is a government that evades conflicts and difficulties, so that it will not have to handle any quarrels and dangerous situations.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What are the difficult problems that the government has failed to tackle, even though it should have?

[Olechowski] There are two economic issues which accumulate what I have said as if in a pill. One of them is reprivatization. [Privatization] Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek, as well as other ministers, tried to raise the issue. However, all the time it was postponed because the most important thing was not to antagonize the people in the Sejm.

As for the other issue, the tax on stock exchange transactions, it was the other way around. Everyone agreed that this tax was nonsensical and that it would not fit in the European system at all. However, a favor to the deputies had to be done.

In the area of foreign policy, in all issues which required active involvement the situation was like this. After all, it is always possible to reach a consensus on the level of declarations. However, there are moments when firm action is needed. Such a moment was certainly the time when our contingent of troops was to be dispatched to Haiti. I was alone then; no one backed me. On still another issue, concerning the plan to dispatch our peacekeeping forces to Nagornyy Karabakh, I did not even reach the preliminary stage. The prime minister said in public that he had stopped my initiative.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Why did he do that?

[Olechowski] Because he believes that no international actions should be taken in that region. According to him, it is a zone of Russian responsibility, it is a zone of Russian influence. It will be enough if Russia itself restores law and order there.

This stand taken by the prime minister made a special impression on me. As far as I know, we object to any concepts of influence zones. We are also trying to stimulate international responsibility for what is happening in the world, regardless of where it is happening; however, we are trying to stimulate this responsibility for what is going on in our region especially. It cannot be that we want the world to feel responsible for us, but at the same time we do not feel responsible for anything. Therefore, both Haiti and Karabakh were important to me, just like any such action.

Besides, I also proposed that Poland support international initiatives in Chechnya; however, my initiative fell through as well.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Let us make a balance of the Polish foreign policy. Over a year ago, after you assumed office, you said in an interview for GAZETA WYBORCZA that you would consider yourself an efficient minister if within a year you managed to obtain a schedule and criteria for Poland's integration with the European Union [EU] and NATO. You have failed to achieve that. Why? Was your policy inefficient?

[Olechowski] I have gone quite far on that road; I have not changed the direction and therefore, we are much farther now than we have been. We did not obtain a schedule because this was impossible. However, we did obtain something which is the greatest commitment as far as Poland's integration with EU is concerned. I am now thinking about the document on the strategy for the integration of Central and Eastern Europe, approved in Essen. On the other hand, however, even though it is a stronger commitment, it concerns 10 or 11 countries, not only the Visegrad Group. Therefore, the issue is more complex than it was before. However, we are already an associated member of the West European Union.

As for NATO, our progress is more noticeable there. We have already had two summits of the organization: the one in January, with the "Partnership for Peace," and the December summit, when the year's discussion on NATO extension was started. In this case it is possible to imagine some practical schedule—on condition, of course, that efforts are made to obtain it. The rate can be very fast.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Which means?

[Olechowski] Candidates for members of the organization are to be informed this year about the results of the internal debate in NATO. This may already be the beginning of negotiations. Actually, such were our intentions—we wanted to enter the phase of intensive negotiations in the middle of this year. As I see it, the organization may admit, in one way or another, new members in 1996 or early in 1997. It means that commitments can be made at that time.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Did any controversies arise between yourself and other ministers about the position of relations with NATO and EU in our foreign policy?

[Olechowski] Yes, there were controversies, but the idea itself was not questioned. Some people were simply very skeptical and wondered whether we would be admitted to NATO at all. Such opinions do not differ much from the views found in the election programs of the [governing] coalition parties. In the programs they put a greater emphasis on EU and economic integration. They perceive this as a necessity—Poland must find a place for itself in this economic configuration.

However, their statements concerning NATO integration are not very enthusiastic. They believe that this will fail.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Are they wrong?

[Olechowski] Yes, they are. The NATO summit in December proved that the admission of Poland and other Central European countries to EU would be more difficult than integration with NATO. The decision on the opening of negotiations on the extension of NATO was made only because the United States was determined to do it. This was possible due to the fact that NATO has a leader—the United States. The European Community does not have such a leader and it is a more complex establishment than NATO. Germany and France are important states; however, neither of them is the leader that would be able to swing a similar decision.

Thus, if we want to join the Western community, it will be easier for us to become a member of NATO. Two years ago the situation looked different.

Now, if we do not enter into NATO, then, I believe, we will not enter EU either, because there will be too many barriers. We keep forgetting that such a matter as who is part of the family and who is not depends to a considerable degree on the existence of a sense of belonging. The Nordics were admitted to EU as close relatives. Now, to many people we are either distant relatives or we do not belong to their family at all. Some Slavs? Why should they be in the same community. Therefore, we must make efforts and keep proving that we fit in there.

In NATO the situation is not as difficult, and this is why a greater emphasis must be placed on this organization. In our country only one formation of politicians is fully convinced about the necessity to join NATO. Those in the present [governing] coalition were very critical of this institution in the past, or, at least, they were rather unfavorably disposed toward it.

Today it is simply inappropriate to say that one is against NATO. It is the same as saying "ass" in front of other people. One does not use foul language after all.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] However, you are saying not only that politicians of the coalition are unfavorably disposed toward NATO, but that this government has a different concept.

[Olechowski] In the government and in the coalition there indeed are people who really want Poland to be admitted to the Western community. There are also persons who are skeptical, who do not believe that this will be possible. They will not impede the process, but they will not help either. Finally, there are also people who have other concepts. Especially circles of the Polish Peasant Parties [PSL] are beginning to form concepts of Poland as a regional superpower. The origins of this concept should be sought in the program of this grouping and of some rightist parties. This really brings to mind the concept of a region between seas [koncepcja miedzymorza], presented by Leszek Moczulski [leader of the Confederation for an Independent Poland].

Well-known people from PSL are voicing views that our region, from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea, should be a neutral zone, tied by commercial and political agreements. It would be best if this were a demilitarized zone. This means that they are in favor of institutionalizing what we today refer to as the gray zone between Russia and EU.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What would relations with EU be like between the countries of this region?

[Olechowski] In line with this concept, economic integration is inevitable; however, Poland might enter EU on better conditions—as the country which is the main organizer in the entire region. However, these plans are impractical.

PSL traditionally does not trust the Germans. It is a great problem for our politics because how can one negotiate fast integration with EU if one does not trust the country which is to be our main advocate there? This mistrust is quite conspicuous. The prime minister purposefully insisted that his first foreign visit should not be a trip to Bonn. There were also certain events, nominations, that were almost more than the nerves of the Germans could endure. People who openly demonstrated their dislike for the Germans were appointed to high posts in joint Polish-German establishments. Persons who were able to communicate with their German partners really well were recalled...

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] ...you mean, among others, PSL Deputy Janusz Dobrosz who was appointed head of the Polish-German Cooperation Fund by the prime minister. Dobrosz was one of the most rabid adversaries of signing a treaty with Germany.

[Olechowski] According to PSL, restraint toward NATO and the European structures would make it possible to avoid antagonism in relations with Russia. The party claims the Russian market is insatiable and that selling our goods there is in the vital interests of Poland.

I am for exporting to Russia, but it is not a matter of life or death for Poland. Opening the Western markets is very important to us, it will enhance the dynamics of our economy and contribute to our wealth, but we do not need to pursue that goal at all costs. Polish exporters are doing quite well on Western markets. I always stress that our current trade with Denmark makes up for one-third of our turnover with Russia, and continues to grow without any credits, concessions, or guarantees.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Does your resignation mean we have no chance of entering NATO and the EU?

[Olechowski] Of course the probability remains. It would disappear if the tendency I outlined gained wide public support.

My aim is to place this issue in the spotlight, as I am deeply convinced that our citizens want Poland to join NATO and EU as soon as possible. Hopefully, the coalition will be forced to assure us that these expectations will be fulfilled in a public debate I wish would take place. The concept of a neutral region stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic must be repudiated in an open debate. There are no strong arguments to support it. These are pipe dreams of finding a third road. If the coalition wants to stay in power and enjoy public support it will have to continue the policies of the previous governments of the past five years.

I wanted a small debate on foreign policy. Thus I prepared a draft letter to a few addressees: the two opposition leaders—Prime Minister Pawlak and Mr. Kwasniewski—and the president. I wrote what our NATO policy should be; I wrote that tense moments with Russia lay ahead, and that we thus had to integrate our Russian policy, which was then falling apart because each power center acted on its own; I also wrote that some sort of internal pact on top priority issues should be signed.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Why do you write letters to Pawlak instead of talking to him personally?

[Olechowski] It took about a week to schedule the 29 December meeting with the prime minister.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Does that mean the prime minister is refusing to see you?

[Olechowski] It means that it was difficult to arrange the meeting. I asked to see him and it was impossible to set a date.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What if you simply entered his office?

[Olechowski] I did that once or twice. But there are times when you want to have everything on paper, just in case. So that differences of opinion are recorded. Besides, a letter obliges you to reply.

Now that my letter to the prime minister in which I responded to his criticisms has been published without my knowledge, I can only shed further light on the issue, lead to confrontation, and insist that as an ordinary citizen I want to find out where the prime minister is taking me with his foreign policy.

I shall insist that if the prime minister wants to keep his office he must give a detailed answer, not a vague response.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Going back to the division into three groups in the government, which would you say Pawlak belongs to? The one which advocates our joining NATO, the one that is undecided, or the group that has a different solution?

[Olechowski] To the one which has a different solution and is implementing it through seemingly haphazard visits paid by PSL activists in the region stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What is the difference between your Russian policy and the Russian policy Pawlak would like to implement?

[Olechowski] We assumed that we do not agree with Russia on the structure of the international security system, yet we have close-knit cooperation on all other levels. I developed various projects, for instance "Wokulski," and presented them before the Senate and the Sejm in my expose. Such a policy required immediate proof that it was not only verbal, but that it entailed specific action. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] did not have the instruments necessary to do that. My projects were killed by the government.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] But killed also by the Russians. They killed them before the government did.

[Olechowski] Not exactly. Kozyrev answered my suggestions in writing. he had found several of those projects interesting. Then Podkanski came forth with his rival project. Charges were formulated and brought against MSZ that it was treading on the territory of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Last year, however, marked a substantial improvement in trade with Russia.

[Olechowski] You can see that improvement in statistics, in economic turnover, in the increasing number of private contacts: more than two million Russians came to our country last year. The number of bilateral visits of experts and government officials grew.

The dissonance in politics remains. And there is the threat that Russia may condition economic cooperation on security issues. The Russians have already made two or three such statements. Under these circumstances, a state which refuses to change its priorities must coordinate its policies so as to avoid allegations that some [political groups] would be willing to make a compromise.

For me it was particularly important to avoid a false note in our voice in the West: on the one hand we aspire at integration, and on the other, we implement a completely different model. We cannot say in one breath that we want to join NATO and that we want to change it, that we will join NATO if NATO changes. And some of the coalition politicians actually do say that.

Our policy is not hostile toward Russia, it is friendly. But what would talks with the Russians on security lead to? They would have to end in undermining the sense of NATO's existence.

I vividly remember the words of one of the politicians from our region: "I will never talk about security with the Russians. What kind of negotiations would there be when the difference in potential is so huge? The smallest forum for discussing security issues with Russia is CSCE. That is where the proportions are balanced." I deeply believe that.

How could we reach an agreement? What compromises would we have to make? What would their price be? We must keep in mind that Russia is active in trying to prevent Poland's entry to NATO. We see what they are saying, declaring, and doing. I therefore insist that we need very tight coordination, and we have to see to it that our political intentions are clearly expressed. Lack of coordination is inadmissible. The Office of the Council of Ministers began establishing its own contacts with the Russian prime minister's office, as if giving signals that MSZ is standing in the way of launching more active relations with Russia. All this without informing MSZ. Contacts with Moscow are maintained through the trade counsel's office, which has begun functioning independently of the ambassador. That office even judges the foreign minister.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] You say PSL is coming forth with its regional concept. Yet the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is also an advocate of delaying our membership in NATO. Tadeusz Iwinski who is responsible for foreign affairs in SLD said the delay should be three to five years, so as not to antagonize Russia. Wlodzimierz Konarski, another party expert on foreign affairs, said he would advise against entering negotiations with Russia on security—unconditionally.

[Olechowski] The concept of a regional superpower was formulated by PSL. SLD politicians, on the other hand, are simply hostile toward the West and, in my belief, will never choose the pro-West option. Nether Iwinski, nor Konarski, nor Pastusiak. They openly stated that Poland should join forces not with the West, but with Russia.

PSL activists are promoting the concept of Poland's neutrality in international relations. Their colleagues from SLD talk a lot, but I have not observed any efficient efforts on their part of hampering progress.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Do you think Russia is likely to begin seeking political allies in Poland and to souse our politics from the inside?

[Olechowski] I am deeply convinced that the threat has already become real. Moscow has, nevertheless, learned that SLD is adhering to the pro-West consensus. During his visit to Moscow, Sejm Speaker Oleksy demonstrated a stance consistent with my letter to Kozyrev. It later turned out that Russia was courted, but through private PSL channels.

During the NATO debate, Russia demonstrated that it will try to make our entrance to NATO difficult. That is how I interpret calling off Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit. Russia wants to interfere first by actively convincing Western states that it does not make sense. Secondly, by creating the impression that Poles are Russophobes and warning the West: if you take the Poles, you will import Russophobes and a genetic Polish-Russian conflict. Finally, they want to interfere by banging their fist on the table so that the Polish scissors will reply [paraphrase of well-known Polish saying]. They will reply only if people believe in the attractiveness and need for the huge Russian market, or if they believe that Poland should join the East—an ongoing debate in Poland for centuries—or if they have clandestine relations with Russia. They must be a huge group. [passage omitted]

Milewski's Speech in Sejm Defense Debate

WS2301091595 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 20-22 Jan 95 p 2

["Excerpt" of speech given by Acting Minister of Defense Jerzy Milewski during Sejm debate on national defense on 19 January: "Objectives for the Ministry of National Defense for Now and the Immediate Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The general assumptions of Polish security policy and the current situation which the prime minister has just outlined allow us to identify objectives for the National Defense Ministry for now and for the next few years. First of all, our Armed Forces should be adapted to current defense needs, and their structure defined in accordance with financial resources allocated by the state for national defense.

It is extremely important to undertake activities facilitating our membership in NATO over the next few years, which is one of the major political goals of the Republic of Poland.

The most important problems the Defense Ministry cannot solve without prior decisions made by the Sejm include primarily: laying down legal regulations on the defense system which would also provide for the Armed Forces, and defining the level of subsidies for national defense at an adequate level and for at least several years to come.

Let me begin with the first issue. Legal regulations pertaining to defense are greatly diversified and dispersed in over 100 laws. The provisions were formulated in various times and in many cases are long since out of date. A deep reform of the Armed Forces has been implemented for five years now with the aim of adapting their structure and size to modern requirements. Amendments to the law, however, have been rare: in the fall of 1991 the old law on compulsory military service was slightly modified; in the years 1992 and 1993 new emblems and a new oath were introduced, and Polish Army Day was established; in December 1993 a new law on military pensions was passed.

Further restructuring of the state defense system and improving the efficiency of the Armed Forces is no longer possible unless basic legal regulations pertaining to that system are amended. At the Defense Ministry, we are currently developing a comprehensive legal package with the ultimate aim of defining the new status of the Armed Forces in the civil, democratic society of the Republic of Poland.

We have already submitted two government draft projects for approval to the Sejm: a law on military lodgings, and an amendment to the law on vocational military service. The aim of the first draft is introducing a new system for satisfying the housing needs of the military community in line with the state housing policy, and limiting Defense Ministry expenditures on military lodgings. The second draft is to allow for adapting the course of military services for cadres to the current needs of the Armed Forces in a democratic system.

The Sejm has also been presented with two other, nongovernmental draft laws crucial to the functioning of the administration of state defense. One of them is the draft law presented by the president of the Republic of Poland on the authority of state organs in the defense system, the other the deputy project on the office of the minister of national defense.

Currently, I wish to stress most of all the governmental draft law on compulsory military service and defense objectives which is being discussed in the course of intense debates within the Ministry.

This legal regulation, which has a profound meaning for the Armed Forces, should replace the majority of the hitherto provisions within the outdated law on compulsory military service.

The draft pertains in particular to the military service of rank-and-file soldiers and conscripts. The draft amendment to the law on the service of vocational soldiers which has recently been presented to the Sejm pertains to the cadres of the Polish Army. The chief objective of the draft law is creating a situation in which all citizens will evenly share responsibility for national defense in conditions of a market economy while retaining the universal character of these obligations. We also wish to rationalize the procedures for restaffing the Armed Forces with conscripts and shorten the duration of basic military service to 12 months.

Another significant document is being prepared at the Defense Ministry at present, namely a new draft law on military discipline. The project shall closely define principles of disciplinary control, provide a catalog of demerits and awards, and specify punitive measures for petty offenses while adhering to human rights and conforming to European Union standards.

A draft law on the Military Police and other disciplinary authorities in the Army is also being developed.

We are paying great attention to a draft law on the military information services that is currently being prepared. Thus far, there has been no separate law which would comprehensively define the status of these services and the principles of their operations. We estimate the draft shall be completed by the first quarter of 1995 and will include many solutions adapted from the law on the Office of State Protection from 1990.

A draft law on the superintendency of State Treasury property, administered by organizational units of the Ministry of National Defense is closely related to the issue of lodgings for the Armed Forces, as it would absolve the Armed Forces of the expensive responsibility of administering military housing facilities. Those costs are a huge burden for the Defense Ministry budget.

The Ministry of National Defense has also undertaken an obligation to draft a law specifying the conditions, legal consequences, and procedures of introducing martial law and proclaiming a state of war.

The Ministry of National Defense has also approached the government with an initiative to take patronage over the legislative process which is to produce the draft of a new law on declaring a state of emergency. That law would replace the outdated state of emergency law dating back to 1983. An extensive draft together with an exhaustive commentary was developed in 1993 jointly by the National Security Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defense. It currently rests with the Defense Committee of the Council of Ministers and is shortly to become the subject of interministerial consultations.

Fields of activity that have been only partially provided for in the hitherto lower level legislation must be regulated in the immediate future. Laws must be formulated on, among other issues, the principles of deploying Polish military units and forces abroad within missions of UN, NATO, and other international organizations. As Poland is contending for membership in the West European Union and NATO, and full-fledged participation in Partnership for Peace, we must lay down the legal principles for the deployment of foreign military units on the territory of our country.

The second basic problem facing the Defense Ministry which requires a decision to be made by parliament which I referred to at the beginning of my speech is the necessity of establishing the volume of expenditures on defense at an adequate level and in adequate time.

Today, after five years of reforming and reducing the Armed Forces and systematic, radical cuts of expenses on national defense, we have still failed to attain a satisfactory technical and organizational condition for our Army. It is thus mandatory to devise a new project of restructuring the Armed Forces still further, within several years, which would in particular allow for a gradual modernization of military equipment and facilitate Poland's membership in NATO.

In developing that project we want to finally break away from the quantitative approach to assessing the Armed Forces that has been dominant in the past few decades, replacing it with a qualitative angle. In our conditions not the size, not manpower, but the quality of our Armed Forces should be the criterion of all evaluations, analyses, and suggestions. Quality, in terms of progress, has two dimensions: technical advancement and agility.

The structuring of expenditures on the Armed Forces must thus guarantee adequate means for arms purchases and research, which are minimal when compared to day-to-day support costs. Equally important—in my belief even more so—is the quality of our Army in terms of agility. Agility is enhanced by meeting training requirements and project implementation. Even the best equipped army is incapable of meeting the demands of a contemporary battlefield unless it implements adequate training programs. The fundamental criterion for a modern army has to be quality. Quantity is a function of quality requirements and the economic capacity of the state manifested by the level of budget subsidies for defense.

The Defense Ministry is carrying out a series of surveys on that issue. We have developed alternative projects for cost-effective measures to alleviate the situation. We are comparing our conditions with those of other states, both East and West. The output capacity of our arms industry as well as possibilities of cooperating with foreign countries and imports are taken into account.

A general conclusion formed on the basis of reports and analyses unequivocally indicates the necessity to:

1. establish a model for the drafting of annual defense budgets,

2. steadily and gradually reduce manpower in the Armed Forces in times of peace, adjusting their size, organizational structure, and equipment according to means. Ancillary units and infrastructural services would be the first to be reduced, the front line units would remain intact.

The point of departure for further work on this project and a precondition for its implementation will be a decision made by parliament as to an approximate amount of expenditures on defense in a timeframe of at least five years and the manpower level of the Army in times of peace. To put it simply, suggestions are the following:

Variant I

If the Sejm guaranteed that approximately 3.5 percent of the GDP would be allocated to the MON budget, in times of peace Poland would have at its disposal a well-equipped Army with a size equal to the limits defined within the CFE treaty (234,000 men in the ground forces and the air force, plus an unlimited number in the navy);

Variant II

If the Sejm concluded that Poland can allocate approximately 3 percent of the GDP annually to defense, it would imply a reduction in manpower to a level of 200,000 men (15 percent below CFE limits);

Variant III

Were the MON budget to remain at a level similar to that of this year—approximately 2.5 percent of the GDP—it would mean that the Sejm decided the Polish Armed Forces have to be reduced to about 160,000 men (30 percent less than the CFE treaty provides).

The top authorities at MON are realistic in their postulates that the MON budget (expenses on national defense, military pension plans, etc. inclusive) should grow gradually from this year's level of 2.5 percent of the GDP to approximate 3 percent in the year 2000. We could then afford to have a relatively well-equipped Army with about 180,000 men in times of peace and adequate reserves in case mobilization is called for within five years.

It is worth noting at this point that reducing manpower in times of peace does not mean that basic arms limits provided for by the CFE treaty have to be reduced. Cuts in manpower thus allow more efficient saturation of the Armed Forces with basic weapons, enhancing the technical condition of our Army, or, in other words, improving quality over quantity.

We hope the Sejm will make its decision accounting for the above assessments. Only then will the Defense Ministry be able to develop a realistic project for modernizing the Armed Forces and lay down a timetable for its implementation. Otherwise, all research will have to remain in the study phase.

As time goes by, it will be increasingly difficult for us to make up for delays in the field of defense. We will also lose an opportunity of breaking away from the practice of spending taxpayers' money in emergencies without the possibility of long term planning, which is an absolute necessity for security and defense.

Support for Walesa 'Condition for Agreement'

LD2301085695 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0811 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 23 Jan—According to Lech Falandysz, deputy head of the President's Chancellery, the support for Lech Walesa by the ruling coalition is a condition for agreement with the president. "It would be a historic compromise," Falandysz said today in an interview for Polish Radio Three.

Minister Falandysz did not deny, when asked, that the president took part in a competition by one of the national radio stations. The interviewer Monika Olejnik invited the president to take part in competitions prepared by Radio Three.

Pawlak Did Not Name Proposed Ministers to Walesa

LD2301120595 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1140 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 23 Jan—After the meeting between President Walesa and Prime Minister Pawlak, presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski told a PAP journalist that, contrary to an earlier announcement by the coalition, the prime minister did not present their candidates for the posts of national defense and foreign affairs ministers.

The meeting between the president and the prime minister lasted 40 minutes.

Agreement Signed With CR on Debt Repayment

LD2101152795 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1421 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Walbrzych, 21 Jan—Grzegorz Kolodko and Ivan Kocarnik, deputy prime ministers and finance ministers of the Polish Republic and the Czech Republic [CR], signed a protocol today in Duszniki Zdroj (Walbrzych Province) on the repayment of Polish debt to the Czech Republic. The debt amounts to $57 million.

The bilateral agreement provides for its repayment in transfer rubles and in material forms through building and assembly services in the zone adjoining the border. A clause has been included in the protocol of the agreement that the work will be done by Polish companies selected by Czech investors from the most favorable bids. The agreement also provides for contracts to be carried out with materials supplied by the Polish side. Orders for Polish companies are to be proecological, conducive to the improvement of the natural environment on both sides of the border.

The undertakings mentioned in the agreement concern 26 tasks to be carried out in the regions of Nachod and Broumov.

Ethnic Autonomy Said Not Attack Against Unity

AU2001145695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During today's news conference of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] Bela Marko, the chairman of the party, said, quote, internal self-determination does not represent an attack against the unity of the Romanian state, unquote.

Talking about the same issue, UDMR exective chairman Csaba Toth pointed out that the sole thing contested by the UDMR is the formulation used in Article 1 of the Constitution, according to which Romania is a national state, as such a definition contradicts reality. At the same time Toth emphasized the fact that the UDMR does not contest Romania's definition as a unitary state, as stipulated by that same article of the Constitution.

In that context the UDMR leaders remarked that the declaration of the UDMR's Executive Presidium stresses the fact that the party is a supporter of the practical and effective putting into practice of autonomy, a decentralization principle of all local or independent communities regardless of their ethnic structure.

Bela Marko assessed the declarations issued by the UDMR's partners within the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] expressing their view of the UDMR plans for self-rule as superficial and based on the wish to accumulate political capital by displaying anti-Hungarian feelings.

At the same time, the UDMR leaders explained that the offensive nature of their stance is due to the fact that the solving of the proposals they forward to the competent fora are systematically refused.

After mentioning the fact that over the past few days they have held talks with Corneliu Coposu [chairman of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] and Emil Constantinescu [president of the CDR] and that further such talks are also planned, Csaba Toth warned that the UDMR will stop issuing blank checks, our correspondent Letitia Militaru informs.

Government Urges Hungarian Council Be Dissolved

LD2001210295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Romanian Government has called upon the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] to dissolve its national council consisting of its local government members. According to Bucharest, the body, which was set up a week ago in Sfintu Gheorghe, is unlawful and antidemocratic because it excludes other, non-Hungarian citizens.

The government fears that the aim of the Sfintu Gheorghe action is to transform the HDUR into an ethnic local government super-organization.

HDUR Refuses To Abolish Council Initiative

LD2101223695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest on the reaction of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] to the latest initiative of the Romanian constitutional court.

[Bogdan] The HDUR is not going to abolish its newly founded Council of Local Governments and its institutions. Moreover, it is prepared for the possible court procedure indicated by the government, and it will bear its consequences with dignity. Csaba Takacs, executive chairman of the Hungarians' representative body in Romania [the HDUR] said this today at the conference on local government in [words indistinct], which was attended by HDUR representatives, senators, mayors and councilors of Bihor, Satu, Mures, and Silvaniei counties.

Takacs emphasized that Romanian democracy would be the main loser in a such a court case, because a possible ban on the HDUR would entail Romania's international isolation too. Takacs saw the reason for the government communique attacking the HDUR published yesterday as being that the power striving for centralization considers the regional cooperation program a threat and it is afraid that its good example might spread. He added that the Hungarians of Romania, even in the case of a ban on the HDUR, must carry on with their task although it would be very sad if the community of 2 million people were forced back into its churches and cultural institutions.

Gabor Varga, chairman of the HDUR's Bihor County organization, talked about the decline of the Hungarian population, pointing out that the number of Hungarians in Bihor County has dropped from 210,000 to 180,000 within 10 years.

Finally, Senator Jozsef Csapo talked about the possibilities of regional cooperation, pointing out that it is not at all contrary to Romanian laws and international documents.

Officials on Government Plan To Ban Party

LD2201150095 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A minister of the Bucharest government said recently that there were enough grounds for banning the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR]. [passage omitted] First you will hear HDUR executive chairman Csaba Takacs, who was scheduled to travel to Budapest in the entourage of a Romanian state secretary on Monday but owing to the latest developments, cancelled the visit.

[Begin Takacs recording] It is rather obvious that the government made this decision under pressure from the three new coalition parties. No government members have so far denied this. [end recording]

[Begin recording of Correspondent Levente Suekoesd] Executive Chairman Csaba Takacs said that although the Romanian opposition parties that make up the Democratic Convention do not always agree with the HDUR, they reject the idea of isolating and banning the HDUR. In his view, the issue of banning the HDUR will be on the agenda of the opposition coalition talks on 26 January. [end recording]

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Peter Szoerenyi] Peter Buchwald, HDUR senator, what are the legal grounds of the Romanian argument on the basis of the Romanian Constitution?

[Buchwald] In my view, it has no special legal grounds. Frontal attack against the HDUR has continued since the meeting of the Council of Local Governments, which was formed in Sfintu Gheorghe.

[Szoerenyi] What is the matter with this Council of Local Governments, from the Romanian viewpoint?

[Buchwald] The Council of Local Governments gathers the mayors who were elected from the HDUR's list. It is no novelty, because several other Romanian parties have done the same with their mayors and councillors.

[Szoerenyi] I think the reason the existence of this council worries the Romanians is that it shows a kind of autonomy endeavor.

[Buchwald] This is indeed the case. However, our autonomy endeavors have been included in the HDUR's program from the beginning, and they cannot justify this frontal attack.

[Szoerenyi] Do you, as a politician, think the HDUR can be banned?

[Buchwald] Anything can happen in our country. However, I do not believe that they can verify the charge of unconstitutionality of the HDUR.

[Szoerenyi] What will the HDUR do now?

[Buchwald] As far as I know, our leaders will hold talks in Bucharest with various party leaders—perhaps even with the foreign minister or President Iliescu.

PNTCD on Forming Opposition Coalition, UDMR

AU2301125895 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] PNTCD [National Peasant Christian- Democratic Party] President Corneliu Coposu stated today at the party's weekly news conference that he supports the idea of setting up a large opposition coalition as a counterweight to the protocol recently signed by the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], PRM [Greater Romania Party), and PSM [Socialist Party of Labor]. Coposu also said the rapprochement between the PDSR, a party that declares itself a social democratic party, and the other parties—which are referred to as extremist parties, especially in the West—is not at all accidental.

Coposu said that all four other parties are, without exception, of Communist origin by instruction, mentality, and anti-Romanian character.

In the same context, PNTCD spokesman Radu Vasile announced that the PNTCD has already received indications that the protocol in question will have negative effects on Romania's image abroad.

Referring to the latest developments in UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] activity, Senator Vasile said that the PNTCD will never grant the idea that Romania is not a national state and noted that, quote, we can be conciliatory on any issue except those that are indisputable: namely, the national character of the Romanian state, its territorial integrity, and its national independence, end quote.

On the same issue, PNTCD President Corneliu Coposu emphasized in turn that his party unconditionally supports the rights of ethnic minorities, in keeping with the provisions of the country's laws and according to international conventions to which Romania is a signatory, but will never agree to the UDMR's demand to turn an ethnic minority population into privileged citizens.

Asked to give his viewpoint on the opportuneness of the UDMR's presence in the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] Coposu said that any decision to withdraw from the CDR rests with the UDMR. He warned that any isolation of the UDMR would have catastrophic consequences for both for the UDMR and the country's interests—informed our correspondent Elena Perdichi.

Funar Approves Protocol, Warns of Extremism

AU2101174295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1405 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Statement by PUNR leader Gheorghe Funar after the signing of a cooperation protocol with the Social Democracy Party of Romania, the Greater Romania Party, and the Socialist Party of Labor in Bucharest on 20 January—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] The protocol signed today actually sanctions today's real situation on the Romanian political scene, as it resulted from the elections held in autumn 1992. However, with the signing of this protocol we are taking a step forward as regards the understanding between the four signatories, to the extent of better cooperation in Parliament and in supporting the government team. In my opinion, to sum up the provisions of this protocol, I would say that it basically aims at ensuring greater support for the governmental team, proceeding from the idea and need to maintain the country's economic and social stability.

As far as the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] is concerned, the protocol that we signed today is also going to be ratified by the party's National Council. A few minutes ago, we concluded a meeting of the Standing Bureau, which examined this protocol. In the end, after the proper vote was taken, we decided to sign the protocol as it stood. However, we regret that in the first part of the protocol, which refers to aspects of domestic policy, we failed to reach a consensus on introducing a provision that stipulates that the four parties pledge to take steps to outlaw the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]. We regret that this clause was not included, particularly in the current circumstances of the Romanian political scene and in view of the UDMR's strong actions this winter, which it intends to continue.

According to information available to us, the UDMR will not restrict itself to mere statements about a Hungarian autonomous region and the setting up of a parallel and illegal public administration body in the Hungarian language. We have information that they plan to proceed in the near future to occupy certain town halls in various Romanian localities. In this respect, we regret that the protocol did not include this PUNR request.

We call upon the four signatory parties—I mean, the three others, apart from the PUNR, which already supports this view—the Romanian Government, and, particularly, the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of National Defense to take the necessary measures to thwart these UDMR activities.

I take this opportunity to call upon ethnic Hungarians in Romania to distance themselves from these extremist actions on the part of the UDMR leaders. We Romanians want to live in peace and good understanding with all ethnic groups, including the ethnic Hungarians. However, we cannot tolerate the extremist actions that they have resorted to, which they also want to continue in the immediate future.

To return to this protocol, the PUNR approves of the fact that it was concluded. We hope that we are thus taking a good step forward in cooperation among the four parties and in supporting the government team. Thank you.

PRM's Tudor Stresses National Stability

AU2101160695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1405 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Statement by PRM leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor after the signing of the cooperation protocol with the Social Democracy Party of Romania, the Romanian National Unity Party, and the Socialist Party of Labor in Bucharest on 20 January—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] To begin with, I would like to say that we are pleased with the responsible and profoundly democratic way in which these four parties have decided to cooperate to find the most viable and efficient means of pulling the country back from the deep precipice over which it was thrown by the double-headed Roman-Stolojan [Roman, prime minister 1990-1991; Stolojan, prime minister 1991-1992] government. I consider this day, 20 January 1995, an important day for this country's future, and I do not think it devoid of significance that we find ourselves here today, in the Elisabeta Palace, where the white cornerstone of the birth of the Republic in Romania was laid on 30 December 1947. After all, a republic was the constitutional form desired by Nicolae Balcescu [leader of the 1848 revolution] in Romania, by George Washington in the most advanced democracy of the world, and by all those who truly favor work and dignity and not aristocratic privileges.

We are all the happier with this protocol as we took the initiative of working it out and insisted upon its being signed, since the Greater Romania Party [PRM] had felt itself marginalized. We were very useful when it came to the voting, addressing parliament, or speaking our mind through our two fiery mouthpieces, the magazines ROMANIA MARE and POLITICA, but we were not allowed to be present when it was being drafted and decisions important for the fate of the country were being made, a country which, I am sure, all those listening to me now or present here at this moment love just as much. If, in the legal system, one proceeds from a presumption of innocence, I would also like to proceed from an all-round presumption of patriotism in the social and political life.

We are parliamentary parties and believe that the time has come to reject firmly any accusatory label, set pattern, cliche, and slogan, because all those who insult us are actually insulting that part of the electorate—numbering hundreds of thousands or millions of people—which elected us. If this is not understood, then Romanian society will be like a good car, which is constantly improving its performance but has the brakes on all the time. It is high time we all show greater maturity and responsibility and remember that millions of people of this country as well as millions of Romanians from the diaspora—all together, there are some 30,000,000 Romanians around the world—well, we should remember that all of them expect us to join forces and pull the country out of this crisis.

Let us also reflect on the fact that it may not have been accidental that this protocol was signed at the beginning of the international year of tolerance. We are all in favor of tolerance. We are Christians. We do not have to stick a label on our breasts to proclaim this fact. We are Christians by birth, by origin, and in our desire to establish a true concord within our nation. In this respect, when the protocol was discussed in its preliminary stages, we fully agreed that the reprobate phenomena of chauvinism, xenophobia, and extremism should be combated. We fully endorse this, since we never were, and cannot be, accused of such a thing; after all, we are Romanians in our own home. However, we asked that the protocol should also include a clause whereby the four signatory parties also condemn any anti-Romanian phenomena and manifestations.

You must have realized from television and various press items that some people think Romania is like a flock of sheep without a shepherd. This is not tru,e and we will see to it that the Romanians are not humiliated in their own home. We welcome any foreigner who comes here with serious intentions and with a business proposition with substance. We are in favor of the country's orientation toward Euro-Atlantic structures. We are in favor of all democratic reforms that will lead to improving this country's lot. However, we are against robbery and anarchy. That is why, the PRM's political discourse is slightly more forthright and upsetting to the taste of some. But I want to remind you all, whether you like it or not, that almost everything we have been saying for the past five years has come true.

I do not want to make a speech to you here. I would only like to say that the problems with which Romanian society is confronted now, which these four allied parties want to solve, are the problems of national stability and the economy. Romania should not be a poor country. I have a pet theory in this respect, with which I would like to wind up my address. For this, I will give you an example from history—and I would like you to think of it too, even though you may not be historians: namely, that after the Great Union of 1 December 1918, the Romanian people also had to cope with a very difficult four- or five-year period. Nothing moved, and even the union itself was in danger. But all of a sudden, like a miracle, after that strange incubation phenomenon—after a luster of years, as the Romans called a five-year period—the miracle of the Romanian renaissance occurred. Today, a similar situation is repeating itself in other dimensions. Five years have passed in the meantime. We can no longer blame either the Ceausescu rule or the mistakes made in the first two or three years after it. Now it is up to us to take the country out of the crisis. Yes, it is up to us—to the healthy forces of the opposition, if they want to cooperate in this desire; to the press; to the trade unions; and to all those with a Romanian heart—to do something for this nation.

I believe that the Romanian electorate has been, is, and will for a long time remain a left-wing electorate, since the first and second generations of Romanians are children of peasants and workers. Our aristocracy used to exist, but was gradually shattered by the storms of history. Therefore, our electorate is mainly left-wing; consequently, we should pay very great attention to social protection first and foremost.

I would like to conclude with these words—but not before I remind you that a poet called Alexandru Macedonski [early 19th century poet, participant in the 1821 revolution] wrote two verses that splendidly fit this period that we have just concluded. This is what he said: All garbage, that rose high for a split second, eventually sank to the bottom; the rocks remained rocks and the waves remained waves. May God help us, and, to quote Petru Rares [19th century historian]—his saying is the slogan of the weekly ROMANIA MARE and of our party: We will again reach past heights, and even beyond.

Ganic, Silajdzic Meet Contract Group Official

LD2101220895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency member and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic this evening received U.S. Ambassador Charles Thomas, a representative of the Contact Group. Their talks focused on the current military and political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Thomas was briefed about the aggressor's violations of the cease-fire in the Bihac region and the continued blockade of the blue routes. They also examined the results of a recent meeting of the five-country Contact Group and the Contact Group made up of Islamic countries. They supported the initiative that both Contact Groups for Bosnia-Herzegovina should meet soon at a joint session [word indistinct] of ministers of foreign affairs. Ambassador Thomas reiterated that the Contact Group firmly upheld the stance regarding the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial integrity and international sovereignty.

Ganic and Silajdzic insisted on the Contact Group setting out deadlines for the acceptance of the peace plan on offer and sanctioning every failure to comply with these deadlines.

During the course of the talks they also examined issues relating to the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was noted that the United States should offer more active support to the resolution of open issues and the speedier implementation of the Washington Agreement.

Silajdzic: Dissatisfied With Christopher's Letter

LD2201135795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1313 GMT 22 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 22 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim Premier Haris Silajdzic has voiced his dissatisfaction with a letter U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent to his government.

Silajdzic said Christopher's letter, which informed the Bosnian Muslim Government about U.S. administration's intention to renew direct talks with the Bosnian Serbs, was another concession to Bosnian Serbs.

The Associated Press [AP] news agency has quoted Christopher's letter as saying that the current truce offers the United States a chance for renewed talks that must not be missed. U.S. representative in the international 'Contact Group' for Bosnia Charles Thomas has already arrived in Sarajevo and had talks with Bosnian Muslim Government officials. Representatives of the other four Contact Group member countries—France, Great Britain, Germany and Russia—are due to arrive in Sarajevo on Monday.

AP reported that a U.S. Sarajevo Embassy official visited Thursday the Bosnian Serb administrative centre of Pale, but did not give any information as to what had been discussed there.

Silajdzic said Christopher's letter had confirmed U.S. support for the original plan on the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a ratio of 51 percent for the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia and 49 percent for the Bosnian Serbs. He said, however, that he did not see a point in having further talks with the Bosnian Serb Government, which, he said, gave a clear-cut 'no' to the contact group plan.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter brokered, and the warring sides accepted, a ceasefire agreement last December, which was a basis for an agreement on a four-month cessation of hostilities. By accepting the agreement Bosnian Serbs had accepted the Contact Group plan as a basis for renewed peace talks.

Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke said in Sarajevo on Jan. 9, that the Contact Group plan should be accepted as a basis for further talks.

Izetbegovic Replies to Letter

LD2201183095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who is on a visit to Egypt, today sent a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

President Izetbegovic was in this way replying to the message of the U.S. secretary of state which was handed to him yesterday via the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. The U.S. administration was reacting to the problems that have arisen in connection with the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to the possibility of a resumption of peace talks.

In his letter Christopher reiterated the U.S. stance on preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders, and on the peace plan of the five-country Contact Group, including the maps of internal lines of separation.

Karadzic Meets U.S. Contact Group Representative

LD2201143995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1410 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, had a meeting in Pale today with Charles Thomas, U.S. representative in the Contact Group, on the resumption of peace talks.

"The basic thing is to maintain the cessation of hostilities. The Serb side shall not respond to enemy provocations and do everything it can to ensure that the ceasefire holds. Consequently, this would ensure the resumption of peace talks," President Karadzic said at the end of the meeting in a statement carried by SRNA agency.

Assessing his talks with Thomas as very constructive, the president of the Srpska republic announced that all experts of the Contact Group would arrive in Pale tomorrow.

Visibly pleased with the outcome of the meeting with Serb negotiators, Thomas confirmed the visit by the Contact Group to Pale and the Muslim part of Sarajevo tomorrow.

"Intensive dialogue will be resumed, and I hope it will lead to the resumption of peace talks," Thomas said in the end in a statement carried by SRNA.

Silajdzic Threatens Croats Over Muslim Refugees

LD2101205095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2034 GMT 21 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 21 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic on Saturday said the Muslims would use "diplomatic or military means" to make possible the return of refugees to their homes in the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia.

Silajdzic told a meeting of the Alliance of Refugees and Displaced persons in the Muslim part of Sarajevo that it was now very difficult to speak about the obstacles to their return home, the Bosnian Serb News Agency SRNA quoted the Muslim Sarajevo Radio as saying. Silajdzic is also prime minister in the government of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia.

The U.S.-brokered Federation was formed in March 1994 after more than a year of heavy fighting between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats in southern and central Bosnia. The return of refugees was one of the main issues covered by the Washington Agreement, which was the basis for forming the dual Federation, but the provisions relating to this problem have remained mostly unimplemented, confirmed both the Croat Herzeg-Bosna Radio and Sarajevo Radio.

Only in the region of [word indistinct] in central Bosnia, group of about 800 Croats have returned home, said the Croat Radio. It added, however, that "Muslim forces of occupation have denied them all human, political and national rights and banned their free movement." The radio said about 190,000 Croats had been expelled from Muslim-controlled areas in Bosnia while about 55,000 Muslims had fled from the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna.

Silajdzic described the political situation in the territory of the Muslim-Croat Federation as totally vague. The Federation is not yet operational because the federal partners have so far managed to elect only the president and the government, while both sides retained their own police and army forces in territories they currently control.

Silajdzic Meeting With Refugee Association

LD2101224995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] An assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina association of refugees and displaced persons was held in the Bosnian cultural center in Sarajevo today. The assembly was attended by representatives of civic associations, cantonal and municipal committees of the refugees' association, humanitarian organizations and state, military, and religious officials of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The assembly was addressed by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic on behalf of the Bosnia—Herzegovina Government. Borka Rudic has a report:

[Rudic] We do not have a perfectly clear political situation on the of the Federation; therefore, it is difficult to speak about the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said addressing members of the assembly of the association of refugees and displaced persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On its part, the government will do everything to attain a political agreement and to create other conditions for the refugees' return to their homes, because I fear we will lose the most important thing—the people, the prime minister stressed, adding that our people first of all have to be given quality information on the situation in the country and realistic possibilities for their return.

According to the current state of affairs, it is impossible to carry out some big actions in that respect, because our citizens, primarily Bosniaks, were not evicted by chance. This was done in the name of the genocidal idea of great-Serbdom; their return cannot be secured by any administrative measures. We shall be creating conditions by diplomatic measures, and military measures if need be, for their return to their homeland, Haris Silajdzic stressed in conclusion, promising that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government will provide all necessary assistance for future activities of the refugees' association. [passage omitted]

Koljevic Sees Improved Prospects for Negotiations

LD2201182295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1809 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 22 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb Vice President Nikola Koljevic said

Sunday that the international 'Contact Group' for Bosnia-Herzegovina did not want to impose a solution, but to be a mediator between the warring sides in the former Yugoslav republic.

The Bosnian Serb republic vice president told a local radio in Kragujevac, a city in the neighboring Yugoslav republic of Serbia, that the Contact Group representatives believed everything would depend on the outcome of direct contacts between the Serbs and the Muslims.

The Contact Group—comprising the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and Germany—in July 1994 proposed a plan dividing the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb republic at a 51:49 percent ratio. Koljevic said the latest U.S. stand on the necessity of direct talks with the Bosnian Serbs could contribute to an early restoration of negotiations between the warring parties. He said the change of Washington's policy came after the publishing of several articles on the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina which were more objective and unbiased.

Koljevic said that good conditions for negotiations were created after the mediating mission of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the signing of the four-month truce because the talks could now be held in a comparatively peaceful atmosphere.

The warring sides in Bosnia - the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats—signed an accord on a four-month cessation of hostilities, which took effect on Jan. 1. Koljevic also said that the British Government's decision to reinforce its units deployed with the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] raised hopes that the ceasefire could hold and be controlled.

Both the outgoing and the incoming UNPROFOR commanders for Bosnia, Gen. Michael Rose and Gen. Rupert Smith, are British.

Dudakovic: Talks With UN Commander Without Results

AU2001193795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sadikovic] General De Lapresle, commander of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, visited the Bihac region today. He held talks on the implementation of the cessation of hostilities with Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps Commander Brigadier Gen. Atif Dudakovic and Bihac Mayor Hamdija Kabiljagic. Gen. Dudakovic told us the following after the talks:

[Dudakovic] We have just had a meeting with Gen. De Lapresle. Gen. [word indistinct] Colonel (?Lemier), UNPROFOR commander for the Bihac region, also attended the meeting, while Mr. Kabiljagic and myself attended on behalf of our side.

I informed Gen. De Lapresle about the current situation in the Bihac region—that is, in the 5th Corps theater of operations—telling him that, since the signing of the agreement of 23 and 31 December, not one of the points signed has been implemented in this region. The problems include the control of the establishment of the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the Serb Army of the Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina from the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory, the establishment of UNPROFOR observation posts on the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the opening of humanitarian corridors, medical evacuation, [word indistinct]. This is the 20th day, and not one point of the agreement has been implemented or observed.

These problems have been presented in a precise and correct way, and the general tried to explain, saying that they would try to direct their activities particularly toward the Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina to establish a relatively just peace in this region. [Words indistinct] this informative meeting, without any concrete results and future measures.

[Sadikovic] Let us also add in this report that throughout the day, the chetniks kept attacking almost all the defense lines in the theater of operations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps and the Croatian Defense Council for Bihac. The most intense attacks were again directed at the Velika Kladusa front, where Martic and Abdic's chetniks fired mortar shells and attempted several infantry breakthroughs.

This afternoon a new grouping of forces was registered both on that front and along the border with the so-called Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina. There were also attacks on the other parts of the front today, particularly in the Bihac and Bosanska Krupa areas, where snipers and sporadic shelling were registered.

Ljubijankic Reports on SDA's Position on Issues

AU1901163195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Report by Mehmedalija Sisic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following the session of the Main Committee of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], the party held a news conference in Sarajevo today. The main topics were the functioning of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a (?projection) of the tasks of the Bosnia-Herzegovina state bodies this year, and current issues concerning the peace negotiations. Journalists were addressed by Irfan Ljubijankic, president of the party's Main Committee. Journalists were also addressed by (?Nebib) Sacirbegovic, [word indistinct] Selagic, and Semso Tankovic, heads of the SDA branches in the United States, Austria, and Croatia respectively. Mehmedalija Sisic has the story:

[Sisic] In his introductory address, Irfan Ljubijankic, president of the SDA's Main Committee, presented the party's positions on these topics in the form of a resume of yesterday's session.

[Ljubijankic] We decided to adopt all the (?memoranda) on the failure to implement the Washington Agreements and expressed a firm commitment to the urgent and complete implementation of the Washington Agreement, the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Vienna Agreement.

Point two, [word indistinct] must be fully used as an instrument to start and accelerate the implementation of the Federation Constitution and the signed agreements with the help of influential people, especially the signatories of the Washington and Vienna Agreements.

Regarding the point two on the agenda, which was supposed to establish the strategy for future negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina, we concluded that the precondition for the continuation of the negotiations is the acceptance of the Contact Group's plan by Karadzic's Serbs. We will be very firm on this and will not start negotiations before Karadzic says a clear yes to the Contact Group's plan.

If this precondition is met, negotiations will be held by a republican delegation that will include members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The delegation will be appointed by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As regards the venue, we would prefer it to be Sarajevo Airport, or some other place if we cannot agree on that. The platform for these talks will be as follows:

Number one, the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders must the basis of any agreement.

Point two, territorial delineation, as proposed by the Contact Group, is possible if a mutually acceptable agreement is reached on the 51:49 ratio.

Point three, as regards Sarajevo, we are striving for an undivided city under a two-year UN administration, (?until) some (?better) solution is found.

Point four, the Main Committee opposes further lifting of sanctions introduced on Serbia and Montenegro until Bosnia-Herzegovina is recognized within its internationally recognized borders.

Point five, if the Contact Group's plan is not accepted by 30 April 1995, we will ask that the arms embargo be lifted. Therefore, we adhere to our position that the arms embargo should be lifted.

As regards point three of the agenda at yesterday's session of the Main Committee, which was entitled Projections of Tasks for State Bodies as Envisaged by the SDA, the Main Committee concluded that the speech by President Izetbegovic, points one to 12, be adopted as conclusions of the Main Committee.

[Sisic] Irfan Ljubijankic also briefed journalists on two further conclusions that were reached at yesterday's session.

[Ljubijankic] We conclude with regret that the position of the Bosniak people in Serbia and Montenegro continues to deteriorate. The Bosniaks in Sandzak, who are an inseparable part of the Bosniak nation, are being persecuted, arrested, and ill-treated. The SDA has warned the international community about this on several occasions. However, the latest events in Sandzak are disturbing the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and throughout the world. Rigged trials that are conducted after the Stalinist fashion, bans on political, religious, and even humanitarian (?work), the dismissal of prominent Bosniaks from work and social posts, and other forms of ill-treatment show that our constant involvement to protect their rights and survival is needed.

Therefore, we appeal to the international community finally to take energetic steps better to protect the Bosniaks in Sandzak. At the same time we appeal to the Bosniak people in Sandzak to strengthen their unity (?through) resistance against Serbian fascism in order to survive in their [word indistinct].

The Main Committee has also adopted a brief statement of support to the Chechen people. At today's session of the Main Committee, the SDA has extended support to the people of Chechnya to persevere in the difficult and unfair struggle for survival [word indistinct].

[Sisic] One of the first journalists' questions referred to the conclusions on the work of state bodies in the year ahead. Ljubijankic said that after some 70 speeches yesterday, the 12 conclusions on this issue were born out of the wish to introduce several systems in the work of state bodies. Asked about the head of the Federation and whose initiative [words indistinct], Ljubijankic said that this was part of the (?concept), and that this, too, will be resolved. He said this:

[Ljubijankic] A six-month rotation has been agreed upon. All of the reasons that existed when we reached the agreement are still valid. There was no request from the Bosniak side. On the contrary, there was a request from the Croatian side, namely that Kresimir Zubak's mandate be extended. [passage omitted]

President Zubak Views Crisis in B-H Federation

AU1801143095 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 95 p 7

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and president of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, by Ivan Sabic; place and date not given: "Everybody Knows Who Signs on Behalf of the HVO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We talked to Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and president of the Presidential Council of the Croat

Republic of Herceg-Bosna, immediately after he was received by President Tudjman, along with the deputy president of the Federation, Ejup Ganic. It was a week before the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation, at which the "presidential crisis" was to be resolved.

[Sabic] As you have said, it was established at the meeting with President Tudjman that the process of establishing the Federation was at a standstill. One of the misunderstandings obstructing the implementation of the Constitution is the overlapping of jurisdiction—that of the Federation and of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What should the role of the bodies of authority of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina be?

[Zubak] The Federation Constitution precisely defines the relationship between the bodies of authority of the Federation and those of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We abide by that. It is clear that in building the Federation the jurisdiction of the Republic's bodies of authority becomes narrow; the Federation Constitution defines the duration and validity of the Republic Constitution, which in itself says that the Federation Constitution is above the Republic Constitution, and that the Republic Constitution will remain valid and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and other institutions will function in accordance with it, but only insofar as they do not infringe upon the jurisdiction of the Federation bodies. Our position is that the institutions of the Republic must remain during the period before the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is finally solved because the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an internationally recognized entity, and we acknowledge that.

Sarajevo Speculations

[Sabic] Along with the misunderstanding about the "rotation" in the Federation leadership, the prime minister did not allow the TV Bosnia-Herzegovina team to attend the government session in Sarajevo. This was immediately interpreted as a disagreement that would result in his being replaced, in which the Croat proposal concerning the possibility of your leaving your present position in the event the prime minister is a Croat was obviously taken into account. What is your comment on this?

[Zubak] All this is speculation. As the public knows, when the initiative was launched in Zenica that there be a "rotation," the explanation being that it was a purely technical issue, we said that in legal terms matters were completely different. That same Constituent Assembly made the decision in the way prescribed by the Constitution that I be president and Mr. Ganic deputy president of the Federation during the transitional period. The duration of this Federation mandate was not limited. This decision can only be changed in the same way—with the consent of the majority of representatives of both peoples. Moreover, we said that it was not politically correct to have officials from the Muslim people in all the top positions in both the Republic and the Federation at the same time. We cannot accept this, and it is not in accordance with the Washington Agreement, which says that the Croat people is in all matters equal to the Muslim. Moreover, the issue is the transitional period, on which the future and prospects of both peoples depend. So we cannot allow only the Muslim people's representatives to make the contacts and agreements with the international community on behalf of the Croats. We can discuss the "rotation" in the leadership of the Federation only on condition that an alternative be found, that a Croat be appointed to one of the top positions. Some people speculated about this in Sarajevo and interpreted it as though a secret agreement had been reached according to which Silajdzic was to be replaced.

[Sabic] Do you have any idea how the rumor could have spread that Silajdzic's replacement was a done deal?

[Zubak] This was partly due to the fact that neither I, as Federation president, nor the Croat ministers in the Federation Government are completely satisfied with the way Mr. Silajdzic has headed the government. The government did not at all discuss many issues we Croats are interested in. For instance, we are not satisfied with his attitude toward our proposal that Mile Akmadzic be appointed ambassador of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Washington. There are many other reasons. The government has not done what was expected of it in the domestic sphere either, though it could have done so, with the conflicts having stopped, with a better flow of goods and people, and so on. We have a critical attitude toward all this, but that does not mean that we want to get into whether Silajdzic will be replaced. We simply do not want the Croats to be dragged into it, because we are abiding by the agreement we reached at the beginning, according to which the Croat officials in the Federation are elected by the Croats, and the Muslim officials by the Muslims. Whether the Muslims are going to reorganize themselves is not our concern.

Only a Croat on Behalf of the HVO

[Sabic] Did you take part in the talks on resolving the present situation?

[Zubak] Occasionally, but in principle I do not want to become seriously involved in the negotiations between the two parties at the moment, because this time the issue concerns me personally, so interpretations could emerge that my main motive was to stay in that position.

We Will Not Be the First to Break the Agreement

[Sabic] Some unusual things have happened regarding the cease- fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Serb side signed it, and the HVO finally accepted it only after you had stated that the Croats would not consider it obligatory to observe a cease-fire they had not signed. How did all this go?

[Zubak] Deputy president Ganic and I talked in Zenica with Yasushi Akashi about the elementary issues for the signing of the cease-fire. I said that we had signed a political agreement with the Muslims, and that we were building a new state community, but that when it came to the army our positions were not coordinated, that there were two separate military components, and that because of that I could not have a command position in relation to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, nor could a Muslim have one in relation to the HVO, especially Mr. Izetbegovic, who is president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. I had already said what our position was regarding the bodies of authority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic. I said that we supported the cease-fire in principle, but that everybody was aware of who could sign such a document on behalf of the HVO.

The main problem was to coordinate the positions of the Serbs and the Muslims, because it is not difficult to agree on a cease-fire with the Croat side. When they ended the negotiations, we accepted the cease-fire without any particular problems, although we had the military initiative. In that we had nothing in particular to demand, because the cease-fire agreement contains practically the same items as those listed in the cease-fire agreement that the Croat and the Muslims side concluded in Split at a certain point.

[Sabic] The annex on stopping the violence and ethnic cleansing of Croats and Muslims on Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina was added to the document signed by the Croat and Serb representatives. Do you think that the annex will yield certain results, or was this merely a political move intended to make the Serbs confess their atrocious deeds?

[Zubak] This is a good formulation. I discussed the situation on Serb-controlled territory with General Rose. I pointed out that there was ethnic cleansing of the Croats and Muslims, and that they were being mobilized, taken to working platoons in extremely difficult weather, and without food.... I asked that the issue be regulated. Rose told me that this was contained in items 4 and 5 of the cease-fire agreement, which do say something about that in a very unprecise way, but I insisted that it be explicitly stated, which was finally done, in the form of an annex.

Whether this will produce any effect, and to what extent UNPROFOR will be able to influence the implementation of the annex would be difficult to tell now. I would not like to disappoint the Croats and Muslims who stayed in the Serb-controlled territories, especially since the Serbs have not acknowledged many agreements concerning the stopping of the mobilization and the ethnic cleansing.

[Sabic] Commentaries often speak of the four-month cease-fire "that is supposed to lead to a complete cessation of hostilities". What is your view?

[Zubak] I am very cautious about it. It is difficult to say how the situation will develop. There has been a standstill at the front lines, but it is questionable to what extent this is a matter of observing the signed agreement, and to what extent this was caused by the fact that it was impossibile to conduct combat activities in this weather. As far as the Croat side is concerned, I can say that the HVO will observe the signed agreement to the extent that the other sides observe it. At any rate, the HVO will not be the first to break the agreement.

If considerable progress is made during this period in the sense of a final solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after 1 May we will have all the legitimate rights to carry out new liberation activities. We will be the ones to judge at which part of the front line and with which forces, and we are already prepared for this in many areas.

[Sabic] After the signing of the cease-fire agreement the Contact Group started coming in again, and their peace plan, which has been somewhat forgotten, is mentioned as the starting point for the future negotiations. Therefore, the "take it or leave it" has melted. What is your comment on that?

[Zubak] The cease-fire has obviously encouraged the Contact Group a little. They have in mind the fact that the Croat and the Muslim leadership have not yet started to coordinate their positions. I can speak about all this only as a representative of the Croat people, and not as the Federation president, but seen from that position things are as follows: We believe that some of the principles that have been arranged and that are contained in the Contact Group plan are the minimum below which we cannot go. The 51:49 ratio by which the territorial demarcation should be carried out is certainly one of them; we can accept corrections of the borders of some of the areas, which is also contained in the Contact Group plan, but this cannot be done at the expense of the Federation territories in which the Croat people were the majority before the war.

If in the meantime there is some progress on the Serb side and if this formulation, according to which the plan is the basis for negotiations, is only a way for the Serbs not to be derogated and to be introduced into the negotiations, then I will accept it.

[Sabic] You have mentioned some problems regarding relations between the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. In that sense, the problem of establishing the joint command and of passing a new law on defense, in which not much progress seems to have been made, are certainly the most interesting.

[Zubak] We have completely different concepts. The Croat side believes that during this period the two components, the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, should remain, but that the competence of the joint headquarters should be extended in the sense that it passes orders and other decisions that are binding on both components. The headquarters should be formed on the principle of an equal ratio of Croats and Muslims, and the supreme commander of the armed forces should be the president and deputy president of the Federation who must make all the decisions through consensus. This is realistic and feasible at this stage. We believe that this is the way to make a new step in the association, so that it yields appropriate results on the ground, which some of the true foreign friends of the Federation agree with. However, the representatives of the Muslim people, especially the military ones, have a different concept of this. In short, they would like the HVO to be immersed in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which we cannot accept, as it would be contrary to the Washington Agreement and everything we have achieved.

Silajdzic Receives Iranian Ambassador in Sarajevo

LD2101215495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, received Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, Iranian ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In lengthy talks, Prime Minister Silajdzic informed the Iranian ambassador about the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Special attention was given to the difficult humanitarian situation which is acquiring critical proportions in the besieged areas. Taherian expressed Iran's readiness to continue providing and increase its assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other issues important for furthering the relations between Iran and Bosnia-Herzegovina were also discussed.

UN: Serb Liaison Officer Leaves Tuzla Airport

AU2201151795 Paris AFP in English 1444 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 22 (AFP)—A Bosnian Serb liaison officer, whose presence at the UN-controlled Tuzla Airport sparked a blockade of the facility by outraged Bosnian Army troops, has left the base, a UN military source said Sunday [22 January].

He said the officer had left the base, located in northeastern Bosnia, late Saturday but added that the blockade was continuing as of Sunday afternoon.

The Army and the Moslem-led Bosnian Government had strongly protested the assignment of the officer, charging that he had been the commander of an artillery unit that had shelled Tuzla for more than two years.

Bosnian troops, backed by police and occasionally by local citizens, have blockaded the base for the last 10 days. The airport is the sector headquarters for the United Nations, where around 5,700 UN peacekeepers from the Netherlands, Pakistan and Scandinavia are deployed.

Ejup Ganic, vice president of Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation, earlier this month denounced a decision by General Sir Michael Rose, UN Bosnia Commander, to assign the officer to the base, charging that it had been done to distract attention from Serb failures to honor a nationwide truce agreement. He also argued the officer should have been placed closer to the frontlines.

The New Year truce called for the positioning of liaison officers from the warring parties at locations controlled by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UN authorities here insisted that the Tuzla airbase, as a regional headquarters, was an appropriate venue and vigorously denounced the army blockade.

The dispute threatened to cast a shadow over Gen. Rose's final days as commander here, where he has been criticized by the government for having been overly accommodating to the Serbs. Rose is to complete his mission on Tuesday.

UN Reports on Progress

AU2201175895 Paris AFP in English 1715 GMT 22 Jan 95

[By Nathaniel Harrison]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 22 (AFP)—UN officials, rushing to score a final victory for Bosnia commander General Michael Rose, came close Sunday [22 January] to settling a bitter row with the government here and reported progress in talks to reopen Sarajevo supply routes.

UN sources said Rose had been pressing hard for an agreement between Bosnian Serb and government authorities on the roads before the official end of his mandate on Tuesday. "Rose is anxious to have at least one convoy pass (on the supply road) on Monday before he leaves," said a well-placed UN source.

The general, little loved by Bosnian Moslem officials who have found him too lenient with the Serbs, was expected to leave Sarajevo for Zagreb on Monday, according to a UN spokesman. Until Sunday it had been feared he would depart with no prospects in sight for ending a Bosnian Army blockade of a UN-controlled airbase at Tuzla, northeast Bosnia.

But the row appeared headed for resolution with the departure from the base late Saturday of a Bosnian Serb liaison officer, whose presence there had outraged the army and government.

Reached in Tuzla by telephone, Captain Philip Jerichow of the United Nations said the blockade was continuing Sunday but added that contacts had been made with the army and an easing in the restrictions was expected soon.

The supply routes meanwhile remained closed late Sunday despite another UN-brokered meeting between Bosnian minister for UN affairs Hasan Muratovic and parliamentary speaker in the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic Momcilo Krajisnik. But a UN civil affairs official reported that "progress had been made," with the two negotiators consulting their superiors overnight before meeting again early Monday.

One of the routes, running south across the airport and in range of Serb guns, is of critical importance for the residents of the capital, as it connects them with the rest of government-controlled Bosnia. A New Year truce signed by the warring parties stipulated that the airport crossings were to be reopened, but a dispute over the type of traffic to be authorized has stymied UN negotiators and kept the roads closed.

While the Serbs want to restrict use to humanitarian goods brought in by eight UN-related agencies, the government argues that for besieged Sarajevo essential goods carried by all modes of transport—notably commercial trucks—should be authorized.

At Tuzla, an anticipated settlement with the government could also ease pressure on UN officials dealing with an ultimatum from Bosnian authorities to open the base to humanitarian flights by February 1 or leave the facility altogether by March 1. UN spokesmen last week said they wanted the airport opened but had not received approval from the Bosnian Serbs, whose forces have the base in range from nearby heights. [passage omitted]

UN Troops Free To Move

LD2301091195 Stockholm Sveriges Radio Network in Swedish 0700 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The UN soldiers in Bosnia can move about completely freely again after the blockade against several UN camps has been lifted. UN soldiers from Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Pakistan have been locked up since 12 January in the airport area in Tuzla. The reason for the blockade was that a Serbian liaison officer had been stationed at Tuzla airport. The disputed officer has now left the airport.

UN: Muslims Violating Cease-Fire in Grbavica

LD2101203195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2000 GMT 21 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan. 21 (TANJUG)—A U.N. spokesman in Sarajevo said Saturday that Muslims had opened small-arms fire on the Bosnian Serb district of Grbavica in Sarajevo on Friday, violating the four-month cease-fire agreement.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Col. Gary Coward as saying at a press conference that two Bosnian Serb soldiers had been wounded in the incident, which occurred when the Muslim forces fired two shells on Grbavica.

Coward said the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was generally quiet on Friday and early Saturday with clashes easing in the Bihac pocket in northwestern Bosnia. However, SRNA cited a Bosnian Serb army statement as saying that the Muslims on Saturday were continuing attacks on Bosnian Serb villages and positions in the Bihac area.

The Bosnian Serb army sources said Saturday that the Muslim forces were violating the latest truce (which took effect on Jan. 1) near the town of Konjic in Herzegovina, as well as in the area of the town of Doboj, northern Bosnia-Herzegovina. Coward told SRNA that Muslim troops had not withdrawn from the demilitarized zone on Mt. Igman near Sarajevo yet, despite the Muslim authorities' repeated promises that they would, and that the "blue routes" to Sarajevo were still closed because of it.

The Muslim troops were supposed to have withdrawn by Jan. 4 from the demilitarized zone, which they occupied in the summer of 1994, in violation of the accord signed in August 1993, when the Bosnian Serb army ceded Mt. Igman to UNPROFOR. Coward said that the crisis at the UNPROFOR base at Tuzla airport, blocked by the Muslim forces for ten days, had not been resolved yet and that attempts to resupply it had only had a limited success.

The Muslims had demanded the departure of a Bosnian Serb liaison officer from the airport and set an ultimatum to U.N. peacekeepers to open the airport for humanitarian flights by Feb. 1 or leave.

The Bosnian Serbs demanded that the opening of the airport be made conditional on guarantees that the Muslims would not use the facility for military purposes.

Serbian Opposition Welcomes U.S.-Serb Talks

LD2301112495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1058 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—Serbia's opposition Democratic Party has welcomed the U.S. administration's decision to open direct talks with the Bosnian Serb republic as part of the peace process.

A statement released by the party on Sunday said the diplomatic isolation of the Bosnian Serb republic had failed to produce results, and peace could be reached only through direct talks with the Bosnian Serbs.

THE NEW YORK TIMES on Saturday [21 January] reported that the U.S. would open direct talks with the Bosnian Serbs, and that the Muslim government in Sarajevo had been informed about it.

The Democratic Party statement said the U.S. decision was in keeping with the peace mission of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the stand of the international 'Contact Group' that its plan for the territorial division of Bosnia was only a basis for further talks. Carter undertook the mediating mission in Bosnia in December last year at the invitation of Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic.

Carter brokered the agreement on a four-month cessation of hostilities, which went into effect on Jan. 1, and the acceptance of the Contact Group plan as a basis for the resumption of the peace talks. Under the Contact Group plan, tabled by the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany in July last year, the Muslim-Croat Federation is to get 51 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory and the Bosnian Serb republic 49 percent.

The U.N. Security Council in late September last year adopted a resolution banning contacts with the Bosnian Serb republic, which has rejected the Contact Group plan, dissatisfied with some of its elements.

Yugoslavia severed all political and economic relations with the Bosnian Serb republic and closed the common border with it in early August last year, after the rejection of the Contact Group plan by the Bosnian Serb officials.

Closed Door EU-Croat Talks Begin in Mostar

LD2101112895 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks have started at the Croatian Embassy in Mostar between a delegation of the Republic of Croatia headed by Prime Minister Nikica Valentic and European Union [EU] administration officials headed by administrator Hans Koschnick. Zdenko Vranjes reporting for Croatian Radio:

[Vranjes] Besides Prime Minister Valentic, the Croatian delegation includes Deputy Prime Ministers Mate Granic and Borislav Skegro, Defense Minister Gojko Susak, and Bosiljko Misetic, President Tudjman's envoy for relations with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. On arrival in Mostar, the delegation met with Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak and west Mostar Mayor Mijo Brajkovic, who are also taking part in the talks with Koschnick and his associates.

Prime Minister Valentic said at the beginning of the talks with EU officials that the very composition of the Croatian delegation speaks of the extent of Croatia's interest in the implementation of the Washington Agreements and the sincerity of our wish to help implement the agreement on the establishment of the EU administration in Mostar, which Croatia fully supports. Croatia's strategic interest is the closest possible cooperation between the Croats and Muslims in the Federation and the Federation's linkup with the Republic of Croatia, Valentic said.

At the beginning of the meeting, EU administrator Koschnick said that, in its plans for the organization of the city, the European administration is bearing in mind the need for the Croat and Bosniak communities to organize their own separate lives, but also to work together for the benefit of their city.

The talks continue behind closed doors.

Officials Report on Talks

LD2101151895 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We begin this bulletin with a report from Mostar, where a Croatian Government delegation headed by Prime Minister Nikica Valentic held a meeting with EU [European Union] administrator Hans Koschnick. Zdenko Vranjes has the report.

[Vranjes] The talks behind closed doors between the high-level delegation of the Republic of Croatia and European administration officials lasted more than two hours. Valentic made a statement after the meeting.

[Begin Valentic recording] We came here on a very high level, as a Croatian Government delegation, to get a first-hand insight into the problems and try to help the legal bodies find instruments for resolving all problems. We held genuinely open talks with Mr. Koschnick on the implementation of the Washington Agreements and especially on the memorandum and agreement on Mostar. Problems do exist. Their existence was mutually acknowledged. They are serious, but not to the point where they will be unsolvable.

Personally, I am satisfied. I believe that this visit has achieved some progress in resolving problems. It is particularly important that the legal bodies of Herceg-Bosna receive full support in tackling these issues. Maximum attention should be paid to public order, to the struggle against all forms of criminal activity. They can count on full support from the Croatian Government in this respect. [end recording]

[Vranjes] EU administrator Koschnick also commented on today's talks.

[Koschnick, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian report] I was informed that the government in Zagreb was ready to assist in the search for the best solutions to remove all the problems in Mostar. This, together with the talks in Sarajevo, will help the international community to find a solution acceptable to all sides—Mostar, Herzegovina, the Federation, and Croatia. We want to cooperate, but we do not want new blockades, Koschnick said. [passage omitted]

EU: Croats To Blame for Situation in Mostar

AU2001155995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Report by unidentified correspondent from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation in Mostar is serious. No progress has been made on the freedom of movement issue or the implementation of the memorandum on understanding, while the EU [European Union] administration has on several occasions clearly identified the Croatian side as being responsible for this. Koschnick's [EU Administrator] deputy, Klaus Metscher, said this at a news conference today and emphasized the EU commitment to try to get an agreement on all issues from both the Croatian and the Bosniak side, adding that it should not be forgotten that the EU has given Koschnick a mandate to administrate and, if agreement is lacking, he will make decisions independently. . .

The direct cause for these sharp accusations against the Croatian side on the issues of freedom of movement and the formation of a joint police force in Mostar was last week's chess championship, which was prevented from taking place in the EU building by the west Mostar police.

There has been no progress on freedom of movement since 7 September 1994, [words indistinct] said. The situation has even deteriorated. The [words indistinct] has been in Mostar for six months now and I still do not know who is in charge of the policies of the western part of Mostar, [words indistinct] stressed.

Because of the seriousness of the situation in Mostar and the lack of cooperation by the Croatian side, Metscher said, a meeting has been organized for tomorrow between Koschnick and a top-level delegation from the Republic of Croatia, which will be led by Valentic, Granic, and Susak, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak and representatives of the west Mostar authorities. The meeting will be held behind closed doors and reporters will be informed about the results of the meeting through a statement or at a news conference.

The seriousness of the situation is best illustrated by the fact that the power line that would have supplied the eastern part of Mostar with more electricity has not been put into operation today. We are having problems with the Croatian side and we are trying to find a solution. If we fail to do so, we will soon lay all our cards on the table and inform the Security Council and the public about what is happening, Klaus Metscher said.

Koschnick Admits Mostar Mission 'in Crisis'

LD2101111995 Berlin N-TV in German 1100 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The EU's [European Union] involvement in rebuilding Mostar has been put into doubt, according to [EU] administrator Hans Koschnick. Koschnick explained what he meant in an interview with N-TV.

[Begin recording] [Koschnick] If the Croats believe that a joint city is not needed, that there is a desire to remain separate, that they do not want to live together with the Muslims but want to live apart, that they do not want to try out Federation models any more because they do not work in any case—that is one area of discussion in situ—then the European nations' task has no point any more. We are there not just to rebuild, but to bring people together. These issues will be clarified this week. The Croatian foreign minister and defense minister and the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation are coming to discuss the matter with me this weekend. I think we will know more about what the Croats want in a week or two.

[Unidentified correspondent] If I understand you correctly, your mission is in crisis—that is, in a situation of having to decide whether there is any point to it?

[Koschnick] Yes, that is the right way to put it. [end recording]

ICRC Confirms Prisoner Exchange in Sarajevo

AU2001123795 Paris AFP in English 1158 GMT 20 Jan 95

[By Nathaniel Harrison]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 20 (AFP)—Bosnian Government and Serb authorities were set Friday to release 100 prisoners, 50 from each side, in the first tangible gain from a New Year truce, the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] reported.

ICRC spokeswoman Nina Winquist said the parties had confirmed that the exchange would take place beginning at 2.00 p.m. (1300 GMT) across the Brotherhood and Unity Bridge that spans the Miljacka River in central Sarajevo.

In the northwest Bihac pocket, meanwhile, UN monitors recorded 74 explosions overnight following heavy fighting on Thursday. UN military spokesman Gary Coward said this was from attacks on Bosnian Government troops by dissident Moslems allied to rebel Serbs from neighboring Croatia.

The fighting occurred around two villages to the east of Velika Kladusa, which the Moslem rebels, who are led by businessman Fikret Abdic, recaptured from the mainly Moslem Bosnian Army in mid-December.

General Bertrand de Lapresle, UN commander for all of former Yugoslavia, was to visit Bangladeshi UN troops in the pocket on Friday and also planned to see General Atif Dudakovic, leader of the Bosnian army Fifth Corps in the region. [passage omitted]

The ICRC has identified 893 people who are being held in connection with the 33-month-old war in Bosnia, of whom 562 are held by the Serbs, 311 by the Bosnian government and 20 by the Croats. But the organization estimates the real figure to be around 1,500.

Sarajevo Gas Officials on Supply Problem

AU2001144395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Interview with Sarajevo Gas Official Becir Gribacevic by Aida Omerovic in Sarajevo on 20 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Omerovic] Mr. Gribacevic, a report that arrived in our editorial office yesterday said that individual [words indistinct] Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad are manipulating the gas. That is why [words indistinct] than normal. This was said today by (Fuad Samaric), deputy secretary of the secretariat for [words indistinct] communal services.

[Gribacevic] There are some manipulations that we are trying to prevent through cooperation with the public security services, but they still occur, as they did in Mojmilo a few evenings ago, and they are often happening at (Anex). That series of explosions that took place at Pofalici had exactly these consequences because there were some unauthorized manipulations at the station.

[Omerovic] Who is [words indistinct]?

[Gribacevic] Well, these are citizens who, how shall I put it, think they are authorized to endanger people and property in this way in their own name or in the name of some local, well, interests, I cannot find any other expressions.

[Omerovic] Tell me, these valves are in the substations, is it not so?

[Gribacevic] Yes.

[Omerovic] Why are substations not (?guarded), why police members...

[Gribacevic] [interrupting] They are guarded. Firstly, we can say that they are locked, there are locks on them.

[Omerovic] Who has the key?

[Gribacevic] Only Sarajevo Gas.

[Omerovic] How can citizens then get to these valves.

[Gribacevic] Well, locks can be broken.

[Omerovic] Why has it not been reported to the Security Services Center?

[Gribacevic] Every such occurrence is reported. We expect to see specific results at the end.

[Omerovic] [words indistinct]

[Gribacevic] We have direct and very good cooperation with the Security Service, the municipal [words indistinct].

[Omerovic] Tell me what is the real pressure of gas entering the city that is shown at your [word indistinct], as UNPROFOR yesterday announced that the pressure of gas entering the city is seven bars.

[Gribacevic] [words indistinct]. Butila is the point of entry to the city. Butila is therefore one of the main city (?reception) stations. Butila is under the aggressor's control. Therefore, that [word indistinct] of theirs is coming into Ilidza and I do not know how much is leaving the station, as UNPROFOR has not said. Therefore, that [words indistinct] is the entrance pressure and, (?compared with) optimum values, it is at least three times lower than needed.

[Omerovic] According to your measurements, at how many bars is the gas entering the city.

[Gribacevic] According to our measurements, less that one bar is entering the city's free territory. Everything that comes to Butila comes to Ilidza first. It is consumed there and whatever is left is the gas that enters the free part of the city.

[Omerovic] Tell me, through how many valves is [word indistinct] into our city?

[Gribacevic] Again through one valve, the one in Kasindolska Street.

[Omerovic] Citizens from Vojnicko Polje, which is the closest to Kasindolska Street, are receiving minimum gas.

[Gribacevic] You see, that is what I told you, everything below one bar is [word indistinct].

[Omerovic] Yes but they have extremely low pressure compared with other parts of the city and they are the closest to Kasindolska Street.

[Gribacevic] No they are not, the gas first goes to Dobrinja.

[Omerovic] Tell me one more thing. In the region of [words indistinct] on days when according to reduction plan there should be no gas, there is gas in one part [words indistinct]. How is that possible?

[Gribacevic] This is a result of unlawful manipulations [passage indistinct].

[Omerovic] [words indistinct] are freezing when they do have gas [passage indistinct]

[Gribacevic] First of all, it is necessary to open one more big city entry point for gas. There is another main city station at Hum which was disconnected the first day of the war when the aggressor closed down the valve at Semizovac. This station has not been opened to this very day although this was a part of the agreement reached at the airport in December.

Progress in Serb-Muslim Talks on Blue Routes

LD2201175095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Srpska republic had talks today with the the Muslim side about opening "the blue routes" in the Sarajevo area, the exchange of prisoners, medical and social evacuation from Gorazde, and freedom of movement.

In a statement carried by SRNA, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the people's assembly of the Srpska republic and head of the Serb delegation at the negotiations, says that a certain degree of progress has been made as the main issue has been resolved, that of the transfer of goods across the airport.

"We agreed that the airport is solely reserved for civilian traffic and the movement of humanitarian goods organized by internationally recognized associations. The additional demands on the part of the Muslims refer to certain improvements that would facilitate more efficient deliveries of humanitarian aid to the Muslim part of Sarajevo," Krajisnik clarified.

"It is in our interest above all to carry out exchanges of prisoners and this is something we will insist on," Krajisnik said and added that agreement has been reached that every citizen has the right to change, temporarily or permanently, his place of residence while the agreement on the cessation of hostilities is in effect.

"This ruling, which we should legally formulate and sign tomorrow, will apply to all citizens," Krajisnik confirmed.

According to him, the Muslims expressed a desire to carry out the provisions of the agreement relating to the social and medical evacuation of the citizens of Gorazde in particular.

"We are particularly concerned about the situation in Sarajevo. We told them today that there can be no peace in this city until camps such as the Tarcin camp are disbanded," Krajisnik said in conclusion.

Muratovic on Talks

LD2201190195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A new UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and UNHCR-mediated meeting between a Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation led by Bosnia-Herzegovina Government Minister Hasan Muratovic and the Serb aggressor side was held at Sarajevo Airport today.

The delegations discussed the reopening of routes across the airport and freedom of movement. Due to the fact that some new options in connection with the resolution of these two issues emerged neither side was able to make any decisions without wider consultations. The next meeting is to be held tomorrow.

In a press statement, Minister Muratovic declined to give his estimate on whether and when the routes will be reopened, but stressed that considerable progress has been achieved in the talks.

No Agreement on Reopening

LD2001222795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A UN-mediated meeting on the implementation of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities was held in Sarajevo Airport today. The Serb aggressor side was expected to give its final consent to the reopening of blue routes, on the basis of an agreement signed on 17 March 1994.

In addition to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] civilian sector representatives, Mr. (?William Eagleton), and UNHCR representatives led by UNHCR head for Bosnia-Herzegovina [name indistinct] also attended the meeting. Our delegation at these negotiations was led by Hasan Muratovic, the chairman of the State Committee for Liaison with the United Nations; the Serb side was led by Momcilo Krajisnik.

The Serb aggressor side tried to divert discussion to topics that were not planned for the talks today, and for which our delegation did not have authorized representatives.

No agreement was reached at the meeting today regarding the reopening of blue routes. Views of both sides were examined, and it was agreed that a new meeting should be held on Sunday, 22 January.

The Serb aggressor side has been increasingly reluctant to implement the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and has been trying to link all its elements to some other problems, so that its implementation should be completely blocked, Minister Hasan Muratovic said following the talks today.

U.S. Weapons, Advice 'Passed' to Bosnians

LD2001180995 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1711 GMT 20 Jan 95

[By political correspondent Sian Clare, PA News]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Senior United Nations sources believe American weapons and military advice are being secretly passed to the Bosnian forces, Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown said today.

Arriving back from a six day trip to Bosnia, Mr. Ashdown warned that senior UN military figures had told him American small arms and ammunition were getting through to the Bosnian Army despite the UN arms embargo.

Top class military advice had also reached the Bosnian side, with their forces discarding "First World War" tactics and now behaving like US marines.

Two senior UN sources were "absolutely convinced" that American assistance was getting through, he told a Westminster news conference, although British UN commander Lt-Gen Sir Michael Rose had denied it.

In his seventh trip to the war zone, Mr. Ashdown toured British troop camps, spent two days in Sarajevo and met Gen Rose, Bosnian Prime Minister Alija Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. He also warned that a UN troop withdrawal was virtually impossible. It would take two and a half months to complete and require thousands of troop re-inforcements to carry it out.

The terrain was very rough, local people would lie in front of the trucks to stop the soldiers leaving and it would discredit the UN, he warned. On the prospects for peace, he said: "I remain very pessimistic. I can see no movement from the Serbs so far."

The four month ceasefire was in danger of becoming merely the annual winter lull in hostilities, he warned, unless the Serbs changed their tone.

Number of Serb Troops Desert at Gorazde

AU2001153695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Report by Mustafa Kurtovic from Gorazde]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday and overnight the aggressor fired provocatively with small arms at our defense lines from Vranovina. They were also firing from the direction of Foca at the demarcation lines from (Osanica) to Ilovaca.

According to reliable information we received from the special services of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in Gorazde, members of the aggressor's army have become completely insubordinate, and an increasing number of them have deserted the front lines. They say that they have had enough of this war and enough of the deceptions served to them by their military leaders. They are no longer willing to give their lives for their leaders' plans.

We have received dramatic appeals for help from the Gorazde hospital [words indistinct]. There is no [word indistinct], no medicine [words indistinct]. Another request has been sent out for urgent supplies in medicine and sanitary material to be delivered to the Gorazde hospital.

U.S. Sacrificed Bosniaks, Chechens for Yeltsin

AU2001203295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The first month in the four-month cease-fire has passed with no change in the behavior of the Pale separatists and their international advocates. The chetniks have not opened the blue routes, they have continued to destroy Bihac, and they have continued to intimidate the population by opening fire along the entire demarcation line. This was said at today's news conference by the Head Committee of the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Party Deputy Chairman Mujo Kafedzic stressed that the first month of the cease-fire had sobered up every serious and realistic citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina and rid them of the illusion that the separatists led by war criminal Radovan Karadzic would accept any solution that did not fit in with their concept.

The MBO stressed that the U.S. policy was sacrificing the Bosniak and the Chechen people in order to save its protege Yeltsin, thus allowing the Russians to become an important factor in international politics again, and give their contribution to the creation of the so-called Greater Serbia.

Karadzic Hosts Farewell Reception for Rose

LD2001131795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1204 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 Jan (SRNA)—Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic received British General Michael Rose, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, today and held a farewell reception to mark the end of Rose's mandate.

"A few steps were taken on the road to peace during this period compared to the previous one, and I think that the investment made in this area has been profitable," Rose stressed and added that he would "pass on to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali his opinion about the situation in the field."

President Karadzic confirmed that, despite some obstacles, "huge progress has been made in establishing final peace." He stressed the important role played by Gen. Rose.

Top political leaders of the Srpska republic attended the reception for Gen. Rose, who will be replaced by another Briton, Gen. Rupert Smith.

Ministers Talk With EU Official in Mostar

LD2001153595 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic, Deputy Prime Minister Borislav Skegro, Foreign Minister Mate Granic, and Defense Minister Gojko Susak will go to Mostar tomorrow. Together with President Kresimir Zubak of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, they will hold talks with EU [European Union] administrator Hans Koschinick and his aides to discuss the difficulties encountered in Mostar.

This was revealed at a news conference today in the office of the EU administration [in Mostar]. Here is Zdenko Vranjes with the report:

[Vranjes] Ambassador Klaus Metscher, the deputy to EU administrator Hans Koschnick, said at a news conference today that the European administration of Mostar is in a serious crisis. Agreements and the accord on the freedom of movement are not being observed, Metscher said and cited a number of examples to substantiate his claim. It seems to me that we are going backwards, Metscher said, and added that he expects much from tomorrow's talks between administrator Hans Koschnick, President Kresimir Zubak of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and the delegation of the Republic of Croatia which is coming to Mostar tomorrow. Metscher said that after tomorrow's talks some things in Mostar should see fundamental changes.

Granic on Talks in Mostar, UNPROFOR Mandate

LD2101231395 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2150 GMT 21 Jan 95

[Studio interview with Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, by an unidentified correspondent; from the "Picture vs. Picture" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Our guest tonight is Mate Granic, foreign minister and deputy prime minister. Good evening and welcome back from Mostar. [passage omitted]

What are the practical problems that give Hans Koschnick [European Union administrator in Mostar] the most headaches?

[Granic] Bringing back life in all its aspects to Mostar. This means the problems of electricity, water, crime, eviction from apartments, and the work of the European administration. It is very interesting, as Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak pointed out during the talks, that Mijo Brajkovic, the Croat mayor [of Mostar] and Koschick spoke about the same problems, which was very important and positive because that immediately provided a basis for possible solutions. At the end, Prime Minister Nikica Valentic said that as the Croatian Government, we would give firm support to the implementation of a law-governed state. We believe that after our visit certain things will move in a better direction. [passage omitted]

We spoke a lot with Croat leaders—Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Federation; Brajkovic; Bosnian Croat Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic, Tihomir Blaskic. They are firmly in favor of the Federation. This was our joint conclusion, and that is an encouragement for us and we give them firm support in that. I think that the talks with the Bosniak leaders about certain fundamental issues should be speeded up. These issues are the structure of the Army, the police, and finances. If these issues were solved in the spirit of the Washington Agreement, many other problems would be solved too. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] What are the other modalities that Yasushi Akashi and Butrus-Ghali discussed with Tudjman, under which UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia could be renewed?

[Granic] As far as Croatia is concerned, there will be no negotiations on the decision of the president of the Republic to cancel UNPROFOR's mandate. However, Croatia is prepared to discuss all peace initiatives that could lead to a speedier reintegration of the occupied areas, including, of course, control mechanisms, the mechanisms supervising the reintegration. Here, we can talk about the OSCE or European monitors or some other international forces. Therefore, the main point is to find a model for a speedy reintegration in agreement with the international community.

[Correspondent] When do you expect the Z-4 plan for Croatia, for the reintegration of the occupied areas, to be published?

[Granic] Later this month.

[Correspondent] By the end of this month?

[Granic] Yes.

[Correspondent] How will it be done? Who will be the first to comment on it? The Serbs from the occupied areas or Croatia?

[Granic] From what we know, they will propose it both to the Republic of Croatia—it means that they will give it to President Tudjman—and on the other hand to the Serbs from the occupied areas. Of course, they will present it to the international community as well. We will then give our opinion about it.

[Correspondent] Will it be negative?

[Granic] When we see the plan we will give our opinion. The versions we have seen so far were positive in their framework, but not in their content.

[Correspondent] Which elements were not positive?

[Granic] Certainly the type of local autonomy..

[Correspondent] It was too large?

[Granic] Yes.

[Correspondent] In which aspects?

[Granic] We will speak about that when we see the plan.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much, Mr. Granic. I hope that things will develop as Croatia wishes: That the occupied Croatian areas will be reintegrated by peaceful means.

[Granic] That is our goal and we will do everything to do that, to move in that direction.

[Correspondent] Thank you.

Tudjman 'Prepared To Use Force' in Krajina

AU2101202295 Paris AFP in English 1958 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Hamburg, Germany, Jan 21 (AFP)—President Franjo Tudjman said Croatia was prepared to use force to recapture Serb-occupied territory within its borders "if necessary," a report said Saturday [21 January].

"The Krajina Serbs and the Belgrade Government know that we are capable of liberating our country by force of arms," Tudjman told the German weekly DER SPIEGEL in an interview published in its latest issue. "If that should be necessary, we will not shy away."

The Croatian leader said he was "certain that (Serbian President Slobodan) Milosevic will not intervene." Milosevic was "isolated" and "his army did not succeed in conquering Croatia in three years," Tudjman said. He dismissed the prospect of a war between Croatia and Serbia, announcing "an exchange of ambassadors in the near future."

Earlier this month Tudjman wrote to the United Nations ordering UN peacekeepers out of Croatia following the expiry of the UN mandate there on March 31, saying the last UN troops should be out by June 31.

Though some analysts said that announcement might be bluff intended to pressure the UN into taking stronger action towards the separatist Serbs, who control about a quarter of Croatian territory, UN officials in Zagreb say they are taking the Croatian pull-out order very seriously.

According to Tudjman in DER SPIEGEL, the fighting in the Bihac enclave of northwest Bosnia "shows that (the Serbian Army) is weakened and he (Milosevic) cannot take the risk of new military adventures—the situation is very favourable to us."

Separatist Bosnian Serbs, backed by Croatian Serbs, rebel Moslems and, according to some sources, Serbian troops and material, have failed to capture the Bihac enclave since they launched an offensive there in late November.

Tudjman said his decision on the non-renewal of the UN mandate in Croatia was "definitive." The UN forces "have settled for the status quo instead of forcing the Serbs to make peace," he said. "The Serbs have abused the UN presence to reinforce their occupation, and we have been prevented from acting militarily."

Akashi Hopes UN Peacekeepers Remain in Croatia

LD2001191295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1559 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tokyo, Jan. 20 (TANJUG)—U.N. special envoy for the former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi on Friday said he hoped U.N. troops would remain in Croatia after their current mandate expired on March 31.

Akashi told TANJUG that Western European countries were very much interested in having the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR] troops remain in Croatia to prevent a new, far bigger and more dangerous escalation of the war. He said that was why he, himself, hoped the U.N. peacekeepers would remain in Croatia.

Simultaneously with deciding to deny further hospitality to UNPROFOR, Croatia has renewed war threats against the republic of Serb Krajina. Akashi said he hoped the pressure put on Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by Great Britain, France and other European countries would produce results. He said he believed that Tudjman had been compelled to call for UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Croatia under strong pressure from the nationalists in his government and party.

Akashi said he believed that Tudjman was very serious about his decision and was not gambling, as some people believed. U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed in Croatia and the republic of Serb Krajina since Spring 1992 to separate the warring sides until a political solution is found.

Serbs in Croatia founded their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslav Federation and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian constitution.

The United Nations decides on the mandate of the U.N. peacekeepers. Asked whether the UNPROFOR Headquarters would remain in the Croatian capital of Zagreb even if the peacekeepers were withdrawn from Croatia, Akashi said all possibilities were being considered, including the one for the offices to be moved to Sarajevo.

Akashi is in Tokyo for an international seminar on U.N. peacekeeping operations in the world. Another U.N. official and participant in the seminar recalled during the interview that the U.N. troops had remained in the Congo in the sixties despite calls for their withdrawal from Congolese President Joseph Mobutu.

Seks: Army Preparing To Liberate Occupied Areas

AU2001153895 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 95 p 22

[Interview with Deputy Assembly Chairman Vladimir Seks by a GLAS SLAVONIJE correspondent; place and place not given: "It Is Going To Be Most Difficult for Us To Regain Baranja and Slavonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [GLAS SLAVONIJE] Is UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] really going to leave?

[Seks] From a formal legal point of view, the Security Council may decide against Croatia's will, although there are also some other views. Regarding the decision to extend the mandate, I think that it is hardly possible, as UNPROFOR would have to be given a mandate to use force. However, it would then find itself surrounded in Croatia as a force directed against the latter's sovereignty. In the wake of this decision by Croatia, permanent members of the Security Council would find it hard to reach consensus on extending UNPROFOR's mandate and granting it the power to use force now, after not having done so before. First, such an agreement in the Security Council is impossible and second, not a single one of the countries that would send their soldiers would agree to this. This is why I think that they will respect Croatia's decision.

[GLAS SLAVONIJE] Therefore, any submission to pressures from the world is out of the question?

[Seks] Until 31 March and within the following three months in which time UNPROFOR would have to leave our territory, considerable options will be open to achieve solutions—in agreement with NATO, the European Union, the Security Council, and the United Nations—that would guarantee the realization of the basic Croatian demands. The time limit is open, so changes are also possible if needed. What is of key importance is Serbia's recognition of Croatia in its international borders, securing Croatian borders with Serbia and the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina held by the Serbs, as well as the safe return and protection of refugees, in which Croatian authorities must also participate. If these goals are achieved by 31 March or by 1 July at the latest, one could perhaps discuss a certain participation of international forces in solving our problems. However, I am very skeptical in that respect.

[GLAS SLAVONIJE] Has the issue of Baranja and eastern Slavonia been sufficiently stressed in the talks with the Serbs so far?

[Seks] This issue has been discussed, it has not been forgotten. The opening of a section of the motor road and, I believe, the railway as well, is the first realistically feasible and easiest step. It is certain, however, that solving the problem of the occupied territories of eastern Slavonia, western Srem, and Baranja is going to be the most complex and possibly also the bloodiest part of the process of regaining the occupied regions.

[GLAS SLAVONIJE] Were any talks held with the Serbs in eastern Slavonia and Baranja?

[Seks] Far from it, they have been refused a priori. The talks were refused not only by the Serbs from the region, but by UNPROFOR as well. Croatia has shown good will toward regaining its territories in a peaceful way and will continue to do so, but it is preparing its army as well. We are not preparing ourselves for war in the sense of attacking, although we have been strengthening our army and we already have units capable of liberating the occupied regions. Everybody knows that we are no longer helpless and lacking weapons. We are prepared for both ways.

[GLAS SLAVONIJE] In your opinion, which is the most probable way?

[Seks] I have been of the opinion from the very beginning that no imperial war machine can be crushed in any other way, but with military logic and military power. I think that this will be the solution. I do not know whether we are going to do it alone or with the help of the world, but I think that that is impossible without crushing the Serbian military power in Baranja and eastern Slavonia.

Kostovic on Occupied Areas

LD2001163895 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic and Deputy Defense Minister Josip Juras visited the Skradin area this morning. They toured Croatian units deployed on the separation line and visited the villages of Dubravice and Bicine in the Skradin hinterland. In Skradin they held talks with officials from the Sibenik area about rebuilding the facilities damaged during the war and the return of refugees. Zoran Bujas has the story:

[Bujas] [passage omitted] Commenting on the current political situation, Ivica Kostovic said:

[Begin Kostovic recording] You are aware of the fact that Croatia took a resolute step with the announcement of President Tudjman's decision to, in a way, take fate in his own hands, and assume a huge responsibility for everything that will happen in the next few months and before the end of the year. You know that this means [that we need to produce] as many peace plans as possible, as many Croatian initiatives and talks as possible, including, of course, talks with Belgrade. Why? Because we must prove that, in addition to our determination to stick to our decision and despite our army's readiness, the peace option is a priority for us. [end recording]

Over the next few months, six at the most, we will know exactly when and how all the refugees will go back to their homes. He added that by the end of 1995 we will probably be in Drnis as well. However, seeing that the reactions of Belgrade and of the Serbs are impossible to predict, we will continue strengthening our forces in order to, if necessary, fight our way to our borders, Ivica Kostovic said, concluding his speech in Skradin this morning.

Deputy Defense Minister Josip Juras also addressed the people and stressed that today he saw for himself again the lofty motivation inspiring the Croatian units in the Skradin hinterland, as well as their readiness to carry out all orders, including a possible order to liberate the occupied Croatian areas by military means.

Martic on UNPROFOR Mandate Beyond 31 Mar

LD2101153695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1450 GMT 21 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 21 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina president Milan Martic has said that Croatia had virtually declared a war on the Krajina Serbs by deciding to deny hospitality to UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] beyond March 31.

In an interview with the Belgrade Saturday's daily BORBA, Martic said that 'a decision to deny hospitality to UNPROFOR cannot be solely Croatia's, because both the republic of Serb Krajina and Yugoslavia had given their approvals for UNPROFOR's deployment.

'I am convinced that Croatia and its president had not made the decision of their own accord,' said Martic and added they had probably received a signal 'above all from their permanent sponsor—Germany.'

He said the plan created by mediator Cyrus Vance brings Yugoslavia under obligation to protect Serb Krajina should the U.N. peacekeepers pull out from Krajina, and the Krajina Serbs had guarantees to this effect. Martic said Serb Krajina and the neighboring Bosnian Serb republic had signed an agreement on mutual assistance in 1992.

The Serb Krajina territory was placed under U.N. protection in the spring of 1992, in compliance with the Vance plan signed on Jan. 1, 1992, but has since been the target of four Croatian military offensives. The U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed to separate the warring sides until a political resolution to the crisis was found.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman informed, on Jan. 12, United Nations Secretary-General Butros Butros-Ghali that Croatia would deny further hospitality to the U.N. peacekeeping force in Croatia after its mandate expired on March 31.

Talks on political issues between Knin and Zagreb have not started yet. Two agreements had been signed so far: an agreement on separation of forces, in March 1994, and an economic accord in Dec. 1994.

Martic said that Serb Krajina 'was absolutely determined to find a peaceful resolution to all disputes with Croatia,' and that it was not threatening and would not want to threaten, Croatia with a war.

Should the war be imposed on Serb Krajina, it would be the 'beginning of an end of Croatia', Martic said.

In another interview with the Belgrade weekly NIN, Martic expressed an identical Serb Krajina position and said Serb Krajina was ready to accept UNPROFOR's mandate beyond March 31, should the U.N. Security Council extend it.

'Should the international community, however, finally support Tudjman's decision, it would be the only party to be blamed for a new war and, I am confident, for its disastrous consequences not only in relation to the Croatia-Serb Krajina conflict, but also relating the future of a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and peace in the Balkans,' said Martic.

Mikelic Urges UN To Reject Croatian Decision

AU2201210295 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 22 Jan 95

[Interview with Borislav Mikelic, republic of Serbian Krajina prime minister, by studio announcer in Belgrade; Mikelic via telephone from unidentified location—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Studio announcer] The government of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] has written to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali prompted by Croatia's demand regarding the cancellation of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate. We have RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic on the line. Good evening.

[Mikelic] Good evening.

[Studio announcer] What exactly does the letter state?

[Mikelic] The RSK government session, held yesterday and today, reviewed the relations with the Republic of Croatia as regards the implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994, and the second phase of negotiations with Croatia on economic relations and the ensuing agreement which we accepted and signed on 2 December 1994, the implementation of which is now in full swing. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's decision to end the UNPROFOR mandate on 31 March 1995 has caused concern and poses a serious threat to the implementation of the agreements signed hitherto and calls into question further negotiations.

We, of course, wish to acquaint Butrus-Ghali with several important facts. First, after the cease-fire agreement was signed on 29 March 1994 its exceptionally successful implementation was reflected in the establishment of a buffer zone between the warring sides. Once the buffer zone was in place, the military units and heavy armaments were withdrawn from the area and control—along with police forces of both sides—was more or less handed over to UNPROFOR. This put an end to the war operations, killing, and the Croatian armed forces' incursions into our territory, which used to be a very frequent occurrence—with tragic consequences—in the previous two years. UNPROFOR's departure from the area on 31 March 1995 would have as a consequence the danger of the situation reverting back to the period up until 29 March 1994.

Second, the first concrete results of the economic agreement which we signed on 2 December 1994 are the opening of the international Zagreb-Belgrade Highway and the return of generator parts to the Obrovac Power Plant. Moreover, I have to say that the monitoring and security function that UNPROFOR has on the highway [changes thought] its withdrawal would inevitably result in the threat to the safety of passengers on the stretch of the highway that runs through the Republic of Croatia, which would in turn reflect on the issue of traffic safety on the stretch of highway currently protected by the United Nations.

Furthermore, we wish to inform Mr. Butrus-Ghali, that is, His Excellency Butrus-Ghali that the implementation of the economic agreement is now focused on opening the oil pipeline tomorrow, 23 January 1995, followed by the opening of the first, Petrinja-Sisak water supply system, and in one month, the first long distance electricity transmission line. Since the next phase of the negotiations is supposed to center on achieving an agreement on the opening of the Zagreb-Okucani-Slavonski Brod-Mirkovci-Tovarnik and Zagreb-Knin-Split railroad lines, and particularly negotiations on refugees, our side will not be ready for these negotiations if the UN Security Council cancels UNPROFOR's mandate.

[Studio announcer] Have certain problems already arisen in the implementation of the economic agreement with Croatia after Croatia's decision to end the UNPROFOR mandate?

[Mikelic] Well, our people on the ground are dissatisfied and, of course, concerned, and there is apprehension as to what will happen if UNPROFOR withdraws and that is what we are actually doing now [as heard]. That is why we are saying that we expect Mr. Butrus-Ghali to acquaint the Security Council with the exceptionally successful results that UNPROFOR has achieved in strengthening the cessation of hostilities and establishing trust through the solving of economic issues between the two warring sides. At the same time, we expect him to inform the Security Council that we are concerned that the positive results that UNPROFOR has helped achieve will be called into question if the mandate really comes to an end on 31 March 1995. We of course expect the Security Council not to accept Croatia's unilateral decision to end the peace forces' mandate and in this way cancel the status of protected areas which is effectively the territory of the RSK and in this way cause a new escalation of war operations in the area.

[Studio announcer] One more question. What is the RSK's and the Serbian people's attitude toward UNPROFOR's presence on the RSK territory?

[Mikelic] I have to say that relations are extremely correct and have been such since the very start. In the time from February 1992 up to the present the [Serbian people] have not been exposed to any provocations, conflicts, or mistrust; this was more often the case in Croatia—just think of last year—and as far as we are concerned, we have expressed the desire that UNPROFOR stay the whole year, two if need be, up until the time when a definite political solution is achieved between the RSK and the Republic of Croatia.

[Studio announcer] Thank you. That was RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic.

Mikelic: 'Inevitable' War Following UN Pullout

AU2001170995 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 95 p 7

[Article by Dj. Djukic: "Return to the Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Petrinja, 19 Jan—"UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] arrival meant the implementation of the Vance plan agreed by Croatia, Serbian Krajina, and Yugoslavia. The UN Protection Force came to the territory populated by the Serbian people, who have the right to self-determination just like all other peoples and who therefore formed the republic of Serbian Krajina in this region. Our state has never resisted UNPROFOR's arrival or opposed UNPROFOR in carrying out its duties. The republic of Serbian Krajina is of the opinion that UN forces should stay until a final political solution is found, as envisaged by the plan," Krajina prime minister Borislav Mikelic told POLITIKA today, commenting on the decision by Croatian President Tudjman that UNPROFOR must leave the region.

Regarding the consequences of the possible departure of the protection forces, Mikelic said that this may be disastrous for peace.

"Since the blue helmets arrived, the situation has considerably improved and the most important things were that conditions were created for the signing of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, that a buffer zone has been introduced between the two warring sides, and, that, thanks to that, there have been no significant excesses or armed clashes. With their departure, things would return to the beginning, two armies would be confronting each other, and war would be inevitable. It would halt the extremely positive process that began with the signing of the economic agreement, which has gradually been realized. UNPROFOR is a very important factor there as well, because its role cannot be taken over by either of the sides and everything would be disturbed. For example, the opening of the highway has depended upon UNPROFOR controlling it. At the moment, it is treated as a road under international control, therefore without either Croatian or Krajinan insignia. UNPROFOR's departure would mean the closing of the road," the Serbian Krajina prime minister and head of its negotiating team said.

In Mikelic's opinion, an even greater problem would arise with the opening of the railroads, which is also planned, as well as with other parts of the agreement to be topics for future negotiations.

As regards the consequences that Tudjman's decision may have on the implementation of the economic agreement, Mikelic is optimistic and believes that the agreement's implementation will continue.

"The generators for the power station, which were being rehauled in Croatia, were sent to Obrovac today. One of the Croatian president's intentions is obviously to mitigate internal discontent in Croatia as the very decision to have UNPROFOR depart has political motives and the Croatian authorities themselves doubt its fulfillment," Mikelic said in conclusion.

Krajina Serb Leader: Joining Croatia 'Impossible'

BR2001161995 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jan 95 p 7

[Article on interview with Slobodan Jarcevic, adviser to Krajina Serb president Milan Martic, by Ulf Andenaes in Belgrade; no date given: "Croatia Serbs Ask UN Troops To Stay"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"If the UN forces withdraw from our territory we expect Serbia to help us in the fight against Croatia."

So said Slobodan Jarcevic, adviser to rebel president Milan Martic and former foreign minister of the Serbs' breakaway state in Croatia. We met him in the interest section which the Croatia Serbs have set up in Belgrade—a sort on mini-embassy. AFTENPOSTEN was seated at a table where he was also holding a meeting with a representative of the Serbian breakaway state in Bosnia.

"Our president has invited the United Nations to station all its troops on our territory, if the Croats really do throw them out. We Serbs need the UN soldiers because we are living under their protection. We have asked the United Nations to let them stay. We will put everything we have at their disposal," Jarcevic promised.

[Andenaes] And if the United Nations rejects this proposal?

"In that case we are ready to offer military resistance to Croatia's aggression. I know that Serbia and Montenegro will help us, for we are the same people. One part of a nation cannot allow another part of the nation to perish."

[Andenaes] The Croats say they want to keep the peace.

"We do not believe them. We have gotten used to the Croats' lying. We call on all Serbs to come and fight by our side, whether they live in Serbia, in Montenegro, in Bosnia, or elsewhere. Several of the national parties in Serbia have already promised this," Jarcevic claimed, naming several of them.

His recurrent theme is what he describes as Croatian murders of Serbs throughout history. He touched on this time and time again in the conversation, almost like an obsession. All sorts of massacres and bloodbaths, with the accompanying claims of mass graves past and present. Death tolls in their hundreds of thousands were thrown around the room.

In the same breath this enterprising politician sold us a book on the same bloody theme. He described the Croatian state as a "monster"; in the world of his imagination it is a machine for driving out and killing Serbs.

"What more than anything sets its stamp on our people is the memory of the Ustasi's (the Croat terrorist regime during World War II which exterminated many Serbs) mass murders," Jarcevic said.

[Andenaes] But President Tudjman does not belong to the Ustasi?

"There is no difference," Jarcevic claimed. "When Croatia broke away in 1991 we would have been content with self-rule within Croatia. But Tudjman's government immediately tried to crush us. Tudjman has never kept any promises, apart from one—to kill Serbs. The Croats hate us. They want to exterminate us," he declared.

[Andenaes] What about the 300,000 Croats who have been driven out of Serbian-controlled territory?

[Jarcevic] Let me explain. Last year the Croatian Government told the United Nations that 179,000 Croats had lived in our region before the war. Now the great liar Tudjman is talking about 300,000. How can they believe him?

[Andenaes] What are you expecting from the negotiations between Serbs and Croats, chaired by Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord David Owen?

[Jarcevic] Unfortunately these two mediators see only one possibility for a solution, and that is to get us into Croatia. But we want a united Serb state with the Serbs in Bosnia and in Serbia itself. Nevertheless we have been willing to cooperate with Stoltenberg and Owen. We have made concessions on important points, such as our agreeing to open the road between Zagreb and Belgrade. In return the Croats were to help to see to it that we get our power network back. But this has dragged on. The problem is that we Serbs always keep our promises, while the Croats break their promises after three days. If the UN troops are withdrawn we will have to close the road again.

[Andenaes] On what terms would it be possible for you to join Croatia

"There can never be any suggestion of that. Impossible. Those in Croatia who want to behave decently toward our people are so few that they will never have power," the Serbian rebels' spokesman claimed.

Figure of 300,000 Expelled Serbs Defended

LD2001211995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1905 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 20 (TANJUG)—The Serb National Party, an opposition Croatian parliamentary party, on Friday protested the attempts of Deputy Parliament Speaker Vladimir Seks to dispute that 300,000 Serbs had been expelled from Croatia.

The party, which was recently severely criticized by Seks, said in a released statement that its figure of 300,000 expelled Serbs was based on documents of international institutions and human rights organizations and on statements of Croatian Government representatives.

The party statement quoted head of the Croatian Government office in Belgrade Zvonimir Markovic as saying it was the goal to have 150,000 Serbs return to Croatia from Serbia.

A report presented by U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali to the Security Council in May 1993 said that about 251,000 Serbs had been expelled from Croatian towns since 1991, when fighting was triggered by Croatia's secession from the former Yugoslavia. The report said Croatia had carried out ethnic cleansing on the largest scale in the former Yugoslavia. Seks, however, insists that only 53,000 Serbs have moved out to Yugoslavia from the Croatian- controlled territories and 224,000 have stayed.

The Serb National Party statement said Seks intentionally overlooked international institutions' reports on Serbs who had fled Croatia and was attacking the only Serb party in the Croatian Parliament for making those figures public and acquainting the Croatian president, government and parliament with them in a written form.

Tudjman, Valentic Discuss New Cabinet List

LD2001151995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman received Prime Minister Nikica Valentic in the Presidential Palace. In accordance with the agreement that the prime minister should remain at his post, he will put forward the candidates for ministerial posts and propose solutions for other remaining personnel and organizational issues early next week, before the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia.

The prime minister informed President Tudjman about implementation of the government's economic program so far. In connection with the current internal and external conditions, taking into consideration the cancellation of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] mandate and the international obligations assumed by Croatia, they particularly stressed the need for political unity in the implementation of all the national policy guidelines about which President Tudjman spoke in his report to the Assembly in December, as well as the unity of all elements of the social and state spheres of life in implementing the government's economic stabilization measures and the overall national policy.

Prime Minister Nikica Valentic will present his choice of candidates to the president of the Republic early next week.

RSK Receives Generator Equipment From Zagreb

LD2001133395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1212 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 20 Jan (TANJUG)—In line with the agreement on economic relations with the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], the Republic of Croatia returned today the poles for the generator at Krajina's Obrovac hydroelectric plant, the RSK Ministry for Energy announced today.

The generator poles, which were being overhauled in Koncar [factory] in Zagreb when the war broke out, were brought back to the RSK with an UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] escort via the Jasenice border crossing near Obrovac.

When the poles are mounted on the generator, the second generator of the Obrovac hydroelectric plant, which has been working at 50 percent of its capacity thus far, will be restarted.

Serb Krajina Decree on Border Crossings

LD2201155895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1219 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—The government of the republic of Serb Krajina has issued a special decree on border crossings.

According to the decree, the government has determined border crossings with Hungary, the Srpska republic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the autonomous province of western Bosnia, and on the separation line with Croatia. Although around 20 crossings on this separation line have been determined, it is only possible to cross into the Republic of Croatia at Okucani (motorway) and Lipovac, with the permission of the relevant bodies.

Other crossings over the separation line, the decree says, "may be open only on the basis of the government's special decision."

RSK Companies To Implement Economic Agreement

LD2201202795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1209 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 22 Jan (TANJUG)—At its session in Knin today, the Government of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] passed a ruling on the implementation of an economic agreement with Croatia.

According to the ruling, the following will carry out the duties included in the package of economic agreements: the public companies of Krajina in the sphere of power generation, the Krajina Road, and the Vukovar Road; and the Krajina Oil Industry public company and the republic's directorate for development in the sphere of water supplies.

The government has put the Ministry of Trade and Tourism and the Krajina Oil Industry public company in charge with regard to the establishment and operation of an RSK-Croatia joint oil company for the operation of the oil pipelines.

Totalitarian Tendencies in Croatia Discussed

95BA0081C Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 19 Dec 94 pp 25-27

[Interview with Miko Tripalo by Stojan Obradovic; place and date not given: "A Homeland Without Hope"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Obradovic] What are the main reasons you undertook to form a new left social-democratic party? What is more, although you yourself have been known to say that you are sick of politics, you have agreed to head the Action of Croatian Social Democrats?

[Tripalo] There is no need for me to point out that Croatian society and the Croatian state are in a profound crisis. I do not deny the merits of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and Tudjman in creating the Croatian state. They were the first to formulate in the clearest terms the position concerning a sovereign Croatian state, and my hat is off to them for that. However, everything they have done since, in my opinion, has been profoundly mistaken. A third of the territory has been lost, we find ourselves in a situation—I say this openly—where we will have difficulty integrating that territory into Croatia. The people are being promised coffee of some kind in Drnis, lambs in Knin, but the displaced Croats are in an ever more hopeless situation. In Croatia, that is, an unscrupulous capitalism of the Latin American type, merciless toward the population dependent on its labor, is being created. The Croatian state is being exploited by a minority, the Croatian people have been divided, Croatia is being ruled more and more by fear and hopelessness. More and more young people are leaving without hope, and when young people have no hope, the homeland has no hope either.

Nor is Croatia immune to tendencies toward totalitarianism. In that situation, there is a need for a strong left, for an up-to-date social-democratic party that ought to be an important factor in stabilizing the political scene in Croatia and offering resistance to these extremely adverse political and social processes. Such a party has been missing, and I agreed to the many appeals that came from the Socialist International and important left-wing political circles, individuals, and intellectuals in Croatia to attempt to help form such a party. Although I parted company with the former regime, I never parted company with the idea of social justice and social democracy, and that has remained my permanent political commitment.

When I took up this job, my main idea was to unify the existing social-democratic parties in Croatia, because otherwise we cannot expect a strengthening of the left in Croatia. But not just that. I am deeply convinced that the space for a new unified left-wing social-democratic party is much greater than the sum of those parties. We have a large number of people whose thinking is leftist and who are in a social position to objectively lean toward left-wing parties. But many of them have not found the right political intermediaries for their commitments, neither before nor now, and here a strong and decisive left-wing party is required.

[Obradovic] As for unification, no very significant results have been achieved as yet. The strongest Croatian left-wing party, the SDP [Social-Democratic Party], has even explicitly rejected that. Why?

[Tripalo] Although in the very process of forming our Action we have not managed to win over the SDP to unification, we have since then continued attempts to bring about the conditions for that. For example, to form a coordinating committee that would work toward unification over a longer period of time, or, we have proposed cooperation in the parliament, and it is also possible that a joint caucus might be created that would also be open to other independent deputies who are not far from our political commitments, and so on. However, we have again received a response to all this that they do not want unification, and that they will work with us as they would with any other party. I think this clearly shows who is against unification of Social Democracy in Croatia. Even before, I had lengthy conversations with Racan in which I explained and advocated that idea of unifying Social Democracy, but the answer I got was that this is a plot against the SDP and against Racan personally. But I am ready at any time to withdraw from the post of president in the unifying convention of Croatian Social Democracy and let that new party choose its new political leader. But the problem does not lie in plots at all, but in very clear leadership ambitions, material interests, and property and positions that have nothing to do with Social Democracy. And what seems to me perhaps the most important are the erroneous political assessments. The SDP and Racan are constantly saying that the right in

Croatia is getting stronger and that if there should be a major social and political uprising, the government is ready for a showdown not only with the citizenry, but also with the political parties that have been expressing the interests of the citizens. That is why the SDP has said that it is not interested in unification of the left, but that political cooperation should be established with the center, and some of their representatives have been saying that they are not interested in either the left or the right, but in taking power. That, in my opinion, is an orientation designed to save their own skins, not to represent the interests of a threatened population. This is a compromising and capitulating position, one that is very dangerous for the future and development of democracy in Croatia. Our position is altogether different, and we want to oppose the wanton looting of Croatian society that is taking place under the sponsorship of the incumbent party, the far-reaching impoverishment of broad social strata, the utterly destroyed social security, which has fallen below all European standards, and we are ready to share the destiny of that threatened population if there should be repression by the government.

[Obradovic] How in that context do you assess the parliamentary debate that just took place on transformation of property in Croatia and the present situation in that regard?

[Tripalo] There is no state in Europe that is more centralized than Croatia. All funds and decisionmaking concerning people have been concentrated in the presidential palace. In that way, the incumbent party is exercising unlimited power over people and property. The Croatian public has had an occasion in past days to hear the debate concerning transformation of public property. I am convinced that there has never been such looting of property in our history. The HDZ is saying that only 5 percent of their members have any shares of stock. That is absolute nonsense, because it is generally known, and this is confirmed by their people, that one name turns up as the buyer, but quite different people stand behind that, when we are talking, of course, about major stockholders, not the small ones. None of that could happen unless the banks were taking part, especially Privredna Banka of Zagreb, which is the center of all the misappropriations that have been happening in connection with the transformation and through which the top leadership of the incumbent party is controlling the situation. The juncture which things have reached is best illustrated by the fact that Croatian President Tudjman had the nerve during his visit to Chile to have dinner with Adronik Luksic, one of the richest Chileans, but he forgot that before that he personally intervened to have the Karlovac brewery sold far below its worth to that very same Croatian emigre. I do not know whether the president himself had some financial gain from that, but this is an example of the selling off of Croatian property. There is no doubt that the so-called transformation of property in Croatia is full of thievery and misappropriation, which have been coming from the highest circles of political power. Incidentally, does not the Croatian public have the right to find out the origin of the wealth of the Tudjman family, the Kutle family, or the Todoric family, and to know when they acquired it? Where did they get the money, when they are talking about how they were persecuted, imprisoned, and prevented from doing anything? Where, then, did they get the money if payment is being made with real money, not fictitious money? The HDZ represents the interests of war profiteers, the rich, and the robbers.

[Obradovic] What is the situation of Croatia today, in your assessment?

[Tripalo] From the international standpoint, we are not in a good situation, even though President Tudjman says the opposite. Perhaps that is the case in Chile and Argentina, which is where he shaped his impressions in that regard. I really do not know, but our reputation is undoubtedly falling with the international public, and today fewer and fewer of them would advocate exercise of the legitimate and justified rights of the Croatian people to recovery of the parts of Croatian territory now occupied. All of those schemes with various contact groups for resolving the issue of the UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones and Bosnia-Herzegovina are dubious as to their outcome. It is sad that I and the leaders of other opposition parties were informed by the U.S. ambassador in Zagreb as to the contents of the economic agreement between the Croatian authorities and the local Serbs, instead of our being informed about the platform for a political agreement with the Serbs by our chief of state, as would be the elementary political procedure in a normal democratic state, rather than having Tudjman issue an order in Argentina that those contents could not be revealed to parliamentary deputies, while at the same time the Serbian media were publishing that agreement, and we deputies in the Croatian parliament ended up getting it from there. We are given the explanation that we cannot debate and vote on those documents as parliamentary deputies, because that would be recognizing the supposed international subjectivity of the so-called Krajina, but actually it is a case of evasion of a broader debate, above all in the parliament, of the key issues of the Croatian state, which are above all the jurisdiction of the parliament.

[Obradovic] How do you evaluate the most recent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian role in that?

[Tripalo] Croatia has unfortunately made many cardinal and also decisive mistakes in Bosnia, and I think that it did so once again with its position concerning Bihac. For now, the umpteenth time, it is not just the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina being decided in Bosnia, but also that of Croatia. That is, if a compact territory is made embracing Cazin Krajina, Bihac, and the Una railroad, which firmly links up the so-called Krajina and the Serbian areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the Croatian negotiating position in advance of the upcoming negotiations with the Croatian Serbs over political modalities of the integration of the UNPA zones in Croatia will be much more difficult than up to now. Although I do not favor any kind of a war, especially not total war—both because of the human casualties and also because I think that Croatia is neither militarily nor politically prepared for it, nor do we have the international support required, it therefore seems to me that a limited action of the Maslenica type or the Medjak pocket on the territory of the UNPA zones might nevertheless help in maintaining a certain military-political, but also psychological balance. What worries me is my conviction that the Croatian side has not given up on the division of Bosnia and in keeping with those intentions it is continuing to conduct a policy which will, of course, come crashing down about our ears.

[Obradovic] Do you think that the problem of the UNPA zones can be settled peacefully?

[Tripalo] I want to believe it is possible. Because in case of a resolution by the military option, however effective that option might seem to many people at this point, there would not be a final solution of that question, but rather what we would have in Croatia is a Northern Ireland, and perhaps in a far worse version, and there is some question as to how long that would last. But a different policy on the part of Croatia toward the Serbs, not only in Krajina, but also in the remainder of Croatia, which is often forgotten, could have a constructive impact toward that kind of peaceful solution.

[Obradovic] Do you think that the political platform being offered by the so-called mini contact group, the Z-4, concerning integration of the UNPA zones in Croatia, provides the basis for reaching an agreement?

[Tripalo] I think that Croatia can take that as a platform for talks, which does not mean that all the propositions in that document have to be accepted. Especially because our law on the rights of ethnic communities contains most of the things proposed concerning Serbian autonomy. Not, of course, the proposals concerning a separate currency, flag, and certain other matters, but the possibility does exist of forming legal, executive, and two-tier judicial authority. So, if we start with the fact that those who are offering that document are not thinking in terms of "take it or leave it," but think of it as the basis for negotiation, then probably both sides have to make some compromises. And probably no side is going to be entirely satisfied, but that is the nature of political compromise.

[Obradovic] What do you think about the proposals of Serbian politicians in Croatia like Djukic, Pupovac, and others who feel that definition of the Serbian people as a constituent nationality would be the real basis for an agreement?

[Tripalo] I think that no longer comes into consideration. That is a principle that was operative in altogether different political circumstances during the existence of socialist Yugoslavia and with specific relations among the nationalities making it up. However, following its disintegration, it is entirely unacceptable for any other nationality in Croatia to have a status that would allow it, say, to participate in key issues of political life with a veto or some other similar form. That formula would mean that the Serbs would actually be getting a state within a state in Croatia.

Susak-Cicak Litigation Seen as Political

95BA0061B Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 28 Nov 94 p 9

[Article by Zoran Daskalovic: "The Minister Before the Court"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When he filed a private criminal complaint of slander against Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, with the intention of obtaining a court verdict as evidence that Cicak is spreading lies about him and the Defense Ministry, Gojko Susak probably had no idea what might happen to him and that instead of the deerhunter role he saw for himself in the court case, he could become the target. After the first hearing, however, that possibility is no longer so unrealistic. Aside from the "shootout" at the level of criminal law, the Susak-Cicak case has already taken a turn into the waters of a political trial. If not in the courtroom itself, then certainly in the public domain. It was the political dimension of the case that Susak himself had in mind when he decided to file the complaint, and Cicak will certainly take pains to see that it becomes its dominant feature. And in that way he will put Susak's intention of using a private complaint to get a court to try Cicak and convict him as a mere slanderer where it belongs: in the category of a trial for a verbal crime.

Although it is first and foremost a court case, the conflict between a minister who is a favorite of President Tudjman and one of Tudjman's most unfavored opposition politicians will be yet another political trial of strength between differing visions of Croatia: Cicak's Croatia of romantic nationalism and Susak's hard-line constitutional Croatia at any price. And at the same time yet another attempt (they have not been so rare of late) to discredit one of the heroes of the Croatian spring of 1971, which Cicak certainly is.

Where Does Slander Begin?

The complaint itself is written in the style of an untouchable wielder of power operating from a position of inviolable judgments and assertions. It states that Cicak gave an interview to a journalist from NOVI LIST that was published on 7 May of this year and was announced on the front page with the headline "Defense Ministry Hotbed of Organized Crime," with the subhead "In My Opinion Gojko Susak Bears the Main Responsibility in the Defense Ministry." Since the headline and subhead are the work of NOVI LIST, not Cicak, the second count of the complaint of Susak and his lawyer, Zvonimir Hodak, cites two of Cicak's sentences in the interview: "I must say that the opinion prevails in our committee (HHO [Croatian Helsinki Committee]—author's note) that the Defense Ministry is a hotbed of organized crime, especially in the area of housing policy, but not there alone," and the other: "And in my opinion it is Gojko Susak who really bears the main responsibility for what happens in the Defense Ministry." Then comes the third and last count of the charge: "Because the PT (private plaintiff—author's note) is the defense minister of the Republic of Croatia, and because the accused has with this assertion committed flagrant slander in the press, and because the acts of the accused thus contain all the elements of the criminal act under Article 71, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia, it is proposed that the accused be tried before a court and punished under the law."

Because the Criminal Code states that "the essence of the crime of slander," as referred to in the complaint, is an act of the accused whereby falsehoods are presented or conveyed that could harm someone's honor and reputation, Cicak's lawyer, Slobodan Budak, said in the first hearing that the complaint does not state which are the falsehoods in the sentences of Cicak cited that have slandered Susak, and at the same time he called for the minister to appear in person before the court and testify to that point. Over the objection of Susak's lawyer, the judge, Aleksandar Zunder, decided in favor of Budak's motion and ordered Minister Susak to be summoned to the next hearing in order to testify that he deems himself slandered and to state which of Cicak's assertions are in question.

Thus, the defense has achieved what it wanted in the preliminaries to the trial. On the one hand to learn exactly what Susak is referring to as falsehood and slander in charging Cicak, and on the other to bring the minister himself from the pedestal of power down to the courtroom to testify in public as to the injury to his honor and reputation. It is essential to Cicak's defense, that is, to determine exactly whether Citizen Susak considers himself to be slandered by the false assertion that in the HHO "the opinion prevails that the Defense Ministry is a hotbed of organized crime" or the assertion that in Cicak's opinion "Gojko Susak bears the main responsibility for what happens in the Defense Ministry." Or by both assertions at the same time. Since Cicak did not say that Susak is a "criminal," but that he bears principal responsibility for the situation in the Defense Ministry, which in the opinion of the HHO is a "hotbed of organized crime," Gojko Susak must take pains to back up his private criminal complaint and persuade the court that he personally has been slandered and that this is not an expression of a political view and assessment of the activity of a government body, namely the Defense Ministry.

The Main Culprit and the Accomplice

Even if he succeeds in doing that, discussion of the activity of the Defense Ministry will nevertheless be predominant in the trial. That is, there will be the effort to prove that the ministry is "a hotbed of organized crime" and to show the extent to which Minister Susak is objectively and subjectively responsible for the situation in it. That he is responsible is beyond dispute, because this is so stated even in the law. There might be discussion of whether he bears "principal responsibility," and in the first hearing Cicak and his lawyer agreed to this when they offered Gojko Susak an excuse. With the excuse they emphasized still more that Cicak's intention was not to slander Gojko Susak, and with Cicak's qualification that President Tudjman bears still greater responsibility than Susak for the situation in the ministry, since he appointed him to the office of minister, they have politicized the trial still more. That is, now the state's attorney, following the logic of Susak's complaint, ought to charge Cicak with slandering President Tudjman, since under the law he is required to protect his honor and reputation.

If the court throws out Susak's private criminal complaint as unfounded, this will begin to establish a practice in Croatia in which it will be possible to criticize still more freely the activity of the government and use the harshest terms in doing so. But if it decides to continue the trial on the basis of the complaint, then Cicak and his lawyer will have an occasion to speak in detail about the activities of the Defense Ministry in the courtroom, but also in the court of public opinion. After all, if anyone has been slandered in the sentences by Cicak that have been quoted, then it is the ministry, and if Susak considers that this mainly concerns him as a private individual, then in the end that is his problem.

As far as we have been able to learn, Cicak and Attorney Budak are ready even now to prove that the majority opinion of the HHO is that the "Defense Ministry is a hotbed of organized crime." Understandably, they still do not want to speak about the details of the defense. However, in any case Cicak's defense from those positions is no longer merely his personal affair, nor is it merely the problem of the Croatian Helsinki Committee, but the affair of all other nongovernmental organizations, opposition politicians, and other politicians, as well as that part of the public that believes that there has been unlawful activity in the work of the Defense Ministry. Or, for that matter, even those who merely believe that the boundaries of public speech about the activity of the government are far broader than those that apply to an individual.

In arguing that there has been "criminal activity" in the Defense Ministry, Cicak's defense, if it comes to that, will be focused above all on the evictions from military housing conducted on the basis of decisions issued by the ministry, but also on all the other deviations which have been spoken about in public with no connection to Cicak and the HHO. From the property gained unlawfully in connection with the purchase of weapons and everything else needed by the Croatian Army, and then the generous allocation of housing to certain officials of the ministry, all the way to sending members of the Croatian Army to battlefields in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its involvement in the Croatian-Muslim war without decisions of the constitutionally authorized bodies of government.

The Complaint as a Boomerang

Even now they are preparing a lengthy list of witnesses who would parade before the court. These are above all people who have felt on their own skin the "blessings" of the moves made by the Defense Ministry. Not only tenants evicted from military housing on the basis of decisions of the ministry, but also the other side, those who have been moved into that housing or who themselves moved in by force. And the decisions allocating the housing to them were issued in disregard of the Law on Temporary Use of Housing. That is, the law states that the Republic of Croatia, in order to care for displaced persons and refugees, and also defenders of the Republic of Croatia and their families, has the right to use housing and dispose of it when it is vacant, vacated, or abandoned. Quite often decisions were issued, especially to members of Hvidra [expansion unknown], concerning occupied housing, which put them in a situation of resorting to violent and unlawful occupancy of the housing allocated to them.

Aside from the great number of persons directly injured, Croatia's defense is prepared to call as witnesses certain politicians and activists of nongovernmental organizations. For example, Stipe Mesic and Josip Manolic might appear in court, but also Goran Dodig, who until June was assistant defense minister, and, we have learned in circles close to the HHO, resigned from his post in June because he was not given a free hand in thoroughly reassessing all the debatable activities within the ministry that have already been discussed at length in the media.

All in all, Cicak and Budak, his lawyer, but also many others in nongovernmental organizations, are preparing to turn the trial concerning Gojko Susak's private criminal complaint into a political trial par excellence. In which the defendant's box will be occupied not by Cicak, but by the Defense Ministry and its dirty linen. At a similar trial in Split concerning the private complaint of Vladimir Seks against Nikola Viskovic, the court punished Viskovic with a token fine. But it did punish him, in spite of his effort to prove that this means continuing in Croatia the practice of convictions for verbal crime. It is important to see, then, whether the Zagreb opstina court will incline toward the practice in which government officials can file private complaints and pursue in the courts those who make adverse public statements not about them personally, but about events in areas for which they are responsible by the logic of their position. On behalf of the freedom of speech, then, it would be good if Susak's complaint against Cicak at least turns out to be a dud, if not a boomerang.

FRY Chairman Urges Normalization of Relations

LD2001195995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1428 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 20 Jan (TANJUG)—Democratic Party Chairman Zoran Djindjic, who returned to Belgrade with a Democratic Party delegation from a two-day visit to The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], today urged the beginning of normalization of Belgrade-Skopje relations, the first step being the opening of bureaus.

Djindjic said at a news conference that the aim of his party's visit was to encourage the two governments to make an energetic step towards rapprochement, which is in the interest of citizens of both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and stability in the region.

He conveyed his positive impressions from the visit, which the Democratic Party delegation made at the invitation of the Macedonian Assembly in the course of which he met the FYROM President, government ministers, representatives of political parties, and local Serb representatives.

Djindjic stressed that the Macedonian media showed great interest in the visit, particularly because the Democratic Party represented Serbia there, and added that this positive energy should be used. He said that the visit was also a "subtle criticism" of the lack of action on the part of the Federal Government and that our national interest must not be defined by relations with third countries.

Djindjic said that in talks with FYROM President Kiro Gligorov he had learned that the Macedonian side did not make the establishment of relations conditional on recognition. Djindjic added that Gligorov said that mutual recognition would be the right move, but if that is impossible, then the opening of offices would be a step in the right direction.

"If the Yugoslav Government fails to react to the proposal on the opening of bureaus in Skopje and Belgrade, then a question arises whether our relations with Croatia are better," he added.

Ilija Djukic, chairman of the Democratic Party foreign affairs committee, holds that the FYROM is one of the newly created countries with which we can easily normalize relations because the "separation was civilized and without any dramas." [passage omitted]

Comment on OSCE Commissioner's Statement

AU2001123495 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonia 19 Jan 95 p 2

[Commentary by Zaneta Skerlev: "The Illegal University—Not Acceptable for Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The regular visit to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] of Max van der Stuhl, the high commissioner for national minorities of the OSCE, aroused exceptional interest in the media. The reason was not because it was the first such visit since this official has already visited Macedonia a couple of times before, but because he was expected to say something "more concrete" on the latest events related to the Albanian university in Tetovo. There was speculation that this was exactly the reason he came to Macedonia. As we know, the high commissioner met a number of ministers in our country's government: He met Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and he also had top level discussions—with President Kiro Gligorov. This expanded and exhaustive "exchange of opinions," as well as the meetings of Van der Stuhl with representatives of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and with the appointed director of the famous Tetovo university Fadil Sulejmani, added to the hot atmosphere that was expected to culminate in the commissioner's making a statement on the most important discussion, the one with the President of Macedonia.

On his departure from Gligorov's cabinet Van der Stuhl, who is known as a person who does not choose to explain a lot to the journalists, that is the public, about what and how he said something and what and how was said to him, gave a statement in which he said that the "Macedonia's determination to further promote harmonious interethnic relations" was explicitly emphasized to him, and that he is "always surprised by the government's effort to use international expertise in the preparation of new legal projects."

"As far as the initiative for a Tetovo university is concerned," he said, "the text of the CSCE document from Copenhagen in 1990 projects the right to national minorities to create their own educational system, including university education. Nevertheless, this document also says that this has to be done within the framework of the existing national legislature, which has to be respected."

Undoubtedly, this part of Van der Stuhl's statement aroused the greatest interest, not only because of the fact that "this was expected" as the most important part of his views concerning the situation about the university, but also because of the possibility for making various interpretations on what he said. Some went so far in their interpretations as to conclude that Macedonia can, if it wants, show flexibility and change its national legislature, because in that case there can be a university in the Albanian language, as it has been approved by the CSCE, now the OSCE, document.

In the document of the CSCE from Copenhagen in 1990 (that was indicated by Van der Stuhl) where the rights of the minorities are treated within the framework of the conference on human dimensions, it says that national minorities, among other things, have the right to "establish and have their own educational, cultural, and religious institutions, organizations, and associations, and they can ask for financial donations and other assistance in conformity with the national legislature." This document does not suggest or mention anywhere any interventions on national legislature. On the contrary, all the text concerning the rights of minorities emphasizes respect for the laws and legislature of the state. Actually, the high commissioner for national minorities Max van der Stuhl agreed at his meeting with President Gligorov with the fact that the illegal organization of the Tetovo university is contrary to the law, as the cabinet of the President stated and the commissioner did not deny.

Now we have the impression that the media pushed the emphasis of Van der Stuhl's visit in another direction. Perhaps it would have been better if attention had been concentrated on the need for a faster revitalization of the Academy of Pedagogy in Skopje, for instance, for which there are great possibilities within the Constitution and the laws for solving the problem of education in the mother tongue of the national minorities, primarily Albanian. Nevertheless, it was good to turn Van der Stuhl's attention to the positions and the rights of the Macedonian national minority in the neighboring countries, and we have the right to expect to hear more about this from the OSCE commissioner.

We can also expect Max van der Stuhl, or some other OSCE officials in some of their future visits to Macedonia, to mention that, beside their mother tongue, national minorities must also learn the official language of the country in which they live. They might also mention that all the activities of the minorities for the accomplishment of their democratic rights and freedoms must not be contrary to the aims and principles of the UN Charter, of the international laws, and the Final Act, including the principle on the territorial integrity of the countries-members, and all this was also mentioned in the 1990 documents in Copenhagen, while we had the possibility of hearing just a part of it from the high commissioner.

Nevertheless, the best thing would be if the OSCE officials could work and lobby for the faster admission of the Republic of Macedonia into the OSCE. If Macedonia becomes an equal member, and that is something that it has been trying to achieve for almost two years, for some inexplicable reason without result, our country will have greater possibilities for accepting, ratifying, and applying all OSCE documents, including the one from Copenhagen, of course. In that case Macedonia will be able, within the framework of the organization, to provide a better and more efficient contribution to the solution of the problems, both its own and those of all the other countries, including the one relating to national minorities.

Weather Prevents Tetovo University Classes

AU2001160695 Skopje MIC in English 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A considerable number of students from a number of towns in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] arrived in Tetovo yesterday. According to MAKPRESS, the students claim that they had passed the entrance examination to one of the faculties of the University in Albanian language and were informed that classes would begin on the 20th of January.

According to the students, their attempts to find the seat of the rector's office and elected Rector Fadil Suleymani, to ask him when and where the classes would be held, were without success.

In the meantime, sources from the Party for Democratic Prosperity stated that the seat of the only thing certain for now, is that the classes will not start on the 20th of January at any of the faculties, and the only reason given for that are the low temperatures and snow.

Defense Minister Kacin Responds to Allegations

AU2001203795 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The State Chamber is today holding an interpellation on the work of Defense Minister Jelko Kacin. On behalf of the group that proposed it, the charges contained in it were outlined by deputy Ivo Hvalica, who quoted numerous laws, parliamentary rules of procedure, and other documents that Minister Kacin had supposedly violated. Afterward, Kacin replied to individual charges, including those announced yesterday regarding the abuse of credit cards, the misuse of ministry cars, and the maintenance of a private telephone at the state's expense.

Then representatives of all the deputies' clubs spoke, with the exception of the United List and the National Party, which did not avail themself of this opportunity provided by the rules of procedure.

Prior to the continuation of the coalition talks and the appointment of a new foreign minister, the position of the Christian Democrats deputies' club is especially interesting. The party's leadership has decided to support the interpellation and vote for Kacin's dismissal but it is not yet known whether the vote will be public. The interpellation will succeed if 46 deputies support it. [passage omitted]

SKD's Demands in Negotiations With LDS

AU2001203695 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After yesterday's interruption caused by the parliamentary debate on constitutional charges against Prime Minister Drnovsek, negotiations between the Liberal Democracy [LDS] and Christian Democracy [SKD] were expected to continue at noon. But because the parliamentary interpellation in the work of Defense Minister Kacin had not yet finished, the new round of talks did not take place until the afternoon.

According to our information, the representatives of the LDS and the SKD did not make any headway. A session of the LDS Executive Committee is scheduled for today while the SKD Council is expected to meet on 24 January finally to ratify an addendum to the coalition agreement, if one is agreed.

We have learned today that the SKD leadership believes that it will be difficult to make any kind of final decision at this session. But the SKD expects the talks with the LDS to resume today or tomorrow.

We have unofficially learned that in the talks so far the SKD, in addition to the demands already known, that is, for the Ministry of Economic Relations and Development and four state secretary posts, also demanded the ambassadorships in Bonn, Rome, Buenos Aires, and Vienna, the founding and management of the denationalization agency, an SKD member on the Managerial Board of the Privatization Agency, another as head of the Bureau for European Integrations, a deputy directorship of SOVA [Slovene Intelligence Security Agency], and SKD members on the management boards of funds and companies dealing with the infrastructure. This party has supposedly also demanded that the parliamentary Commission for International Relations be headed by Lojze Peterle.

For the time being, it is not known when the United List will be drawn into the negotiations between the two parties; however, we have learned that a candidate for Slovene military attache to Zagreb is supposedly General Janez Slapar.

On the basis of the SKD's vote in the interpellation in the work of Defense Minister Kacin, Prime Minister Drnovsek will decide on whether or not officially to nominate Mojca Drcar Murko as the new foreign minister. It is known that another candidate for this post is Davorin Kracun.

We have learned that Drnovsek has not yet forwarded an official candidate to parliament. This will most probably happen tomorrow. An extraordinary parliamentary session, which will vote on the new foreign minister, will be held on 25 or 26 January.

Deputies Discuss Foreign-Debt Strategy

AU2001125295 Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene 19 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Vida Kocjan: "Debts Discussed Behind Tightly Closed Doors"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday, the State Chamber deputies again discussed the problem of debts to a group of foreign commercial banks, behind tightly closed doors. They were deciding among several options put forward by the government, which also prepared a top secret documentation about the financial consequences of each of the options discussed.

They justified the top secrecy of the documents by a fact that their publication would alert foreign debtors about the agreed Slovene tactics in the future negotiations with them. [passage omitted]

The deputies were deciding whether to continue the negotiations or to wait for the outcome of the Geneva negotiations late into the night. It is also known that the opposition deputies were staunchly opposed to some of the government proposals.

Federal

Savovic: Country Wants UNESCO Membership

LD2001191895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1652 GMT 20 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 20 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister Without Portfolio Margit Savovic said Friday that Yugoslavia wanted to be active again in UNESCO as its full-fledged member.

An official statement said Savovic, who is in charge of human and minority rights, said this in talks with Luis Ramallo, advisor to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization director-general.

The October 1994 suspension of the selected sanctions against Yugoslavia in the field of culture, sports, air and sea travel, enabled Yugoslavia to restore cooperation with UNESCO.

Ramallo, who on Thursday visited Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija at the Yugoslav Government advice, said he was pleased with the talks he had had with local authorities and ethnic Albanian representatives, the government statement said.

The statement quoted Ramallo as saying that ethnic Albanians were ready to unconditionally restore dialogue with Yugoslav authorities and that UNESCO was ready to assist in this matter.

Savovic said that it would be good if dialogue took place, but that the question of the status of ethnic minorities, including the ethnic Albanians, fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of Yugoslav bodies, and not the international community.

A strong ethnic Albanian separatist movement has been active in Kosovo and Metohija for decades. Ethnic Albanian political leaders want the province to secede from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and join neighboring Albania.

Speaking on behalf of the Yugoslav Government, Savovic thanked UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor for his efforts toward establishing the truth about the destruction of Serbian orthodox churches in Croatia and for UNESCO's readiness to take part in their restoration. Since Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, 279 orthodox Serb churches have been destroyed or damaged in Croatia.

Ramallo also met with Serbian Minister of Science and Technology Slobodan Unkovic. An official statement issued after the meeting said Unkovic and Ramallo had voiced satisfaction at a possible promotion of cooperation between Yugoslavia and UNESCO. The statement said UNESCO would promptly send its experts to help refugees from war zones in the former Yugoslavia and to work on the protection of cultural heritage. The statement said Unkovic and Ramallo had discussed possibilities for Yugoslav experts to become involved in UNESCO's scientific, educational and cultural programs.

Visiting Zimbabwean Official on UN Sanctions

LD2001213795 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2017 GMT 20 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 20 (TANJUG)—A Zimbabwean parliament official was quoted Friday as confirming Zimbabwe's position that the sanctions against Yugoslavia are unjust and should be lifted immediately.

The official, Parliament Deputy Speaker Naison Ndlovu was speaking with vice president of Serbia's governing Socialist Party and chairman of the Yugoslav parliament's Foreign Policy Committee Borisav Jovic, said a statement released by the party's main board. The statement quoted Jovic as thanking Zimbabwe for its principled and consistent attitude to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Jovic said Zimbabwean leaders had not succumbed to outside pressure, unlike some non-aligned countries which were pressured into taking unprincipled positions on developments in the former Yugoslavia. Ndlovu, for his part, said that groundwork should be laid for wide-ranging cooperation between Zimbabwe and Yugoslavia once the sanctions were lifted.

The United Nations Security Council imposed comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro in late may 1992, alleging the country's involvement in the Bosnian civil war.

Zimbabwe, a non-permament member of the U.N. Security Council at the time, was the only one to vote against the sanctions. The Zimbabwean parliamentary delegation met Friday also with Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce Vice President Danlo Perovic. The talk brought to light an interest in reviving bilateral cooperation after the lifting of the sanctions.

Serbia

Electricity Situation Called 'Increasingly Grave'

AU2001203595 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by M. Cevalovic and M. Petrovic: "Twelve Hours Without Electricity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The energy situation in Serbia is becoming increasingly grave and the power cuts increasingly long. Starting yesterday, three groups [out of a total of six] of consumers are being disconnected for six hours at a time alternately, so electricity is available for six hours and then it disappears. It is true that these are just the plans aimed at "reducing" consumption to a level that meets the capacity of Elektroprivreda Srbije [Serbian Power Industry—EPS]. Few of these have been implemented, or at least this was the case yesterday, because consumption has been constantly growing and thus the EPS supply service has frequently demanded emergency [havarijsko] cuts.

Owing to the restrictions to curb consumption or, to put it better, bring it into line with production, any pattern to the power cuts has been lost and the periods of darkness are unexpectedly growing longer. Therefore, the mid-December situation has been repeated, when the distribution centers took care of the quotas, developed their plans for reductions, and then, when nobody abided by the permitted limits, the EPS supply service implemented power cuts.

Darkness on Various Bases

Belgrade encountered great problems in electricity supplies yesterday. Its residents are using approximately 20 percent more electricity than that envisaged by the quotas, and, thus, the municipal distribution center, by implementing its own measures of restrictions in groups, is not managing to reduce consumption to the level set by the EPS distribution center. Thus, yesterday morning, the EPS supply service on three occasions ordered urgent "emergency cuts" because of the high consumption, namely at 0700, 0900, and at 1300. In addition to the scheduled disconnections of defined groups, power cuts also occurred in emergency breakdown groups and also on the basis of other criteria—the EPS imposed disconnections from the high-voltage grid—and the result was that at one stage half of Belgrade was without electricity. Priority consumers (hospitals, water supply system, and even the supply service of the Belgrade distribution center) were disconnected, too. [passage omitted]

Why cannot Belgrade manage to abide by its quota? The problem here is that 34 percent of the electricity goes to preferential consumers, and all those connected on long distance heating systems, as well as commercial premises, have recently been exclusively heated by electricity. [passage omitted]

Will the Situation Improve?

Luckily, one must admit, the production capacities of the EPS (mines and steam power stations) are even outstripping the projections. So, the steam power stations have "released" 96 million kWh over the past few days and the EPS, too, has broken its daily production record. In 24 hours it generated 130.6 million kWh of electricity. They emphasize, though, that it is impossible to maintain such a production level in the long run and that, since the reserves have been exhausted and there is no fresh influx of water, consumption must fall. They say that this can only be accomplished by power cuts. But will the situation improve?

This primarily depends on the weather. At the moment, only warmer weather can help us, as heating stations will also work better in such a case. The snow will melt, producing more water for hydroelectric power stations, and there will be fewer additional heating requirements.... When all this happens, the EPS emphasizes, there will be fewer power cuts. On the other hand, those in the know claim that it must be clearly pointed out that, under present conditions and with the quantities of natural gas that we have, the heating from the power stations cannot improve. It is also clear that it is impossible to meet electricity consumption requirements of the order of 130 to 140 million kWh, which would obtain without the cuts. It is obvious that we do not have the resources to make any major urgent interventions with alternative energy resources, either. Reports about shortened hours in schools and cold kindergartens, which are without heating oil, best illustrate the energy shortage. However, in such a situation citizens would prefer more order in the cuts.

Sainovic Clarifies 1995 Economic Policy

AU2101205795 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 21 Jan 95

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister and Economy Minister Nikola Sainovic by Dusko Petrovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sainovic] We are implementing a continuous 1994-95 economic policy. We are implementing the concept of the program, and, as we have done earlier, we intervene when certain aberrations appear in the economic sphere, on the market. This is what characterizes the beginning of 1995; we now have restrictive monetary measures, you know that the monetary mass is under control, and credit expansion has been halted. On the other hand, the states, both Federal and Republic, are adhering to this policy by implementing an extremely restrictive policy in realizing their budgets; namely, all three governments have decided to realize below the regular consumption of 10 to 20 percent in the first quarter which is an extraordinary and special measure of saving for a state, and in conditions of an extremely restrictive budget. Therefore, I believe that the state is doing everything to convince both the economy and the citizens that we are implementing the program as we set out to do, with real funds, without expectation of inflation with the objective of reviving production, and that everything we are doing is being done on the basis of real funds.

[Petrovic] How will the Federal Government, taking into account economic logic, support the Serbian Government's initiative to lower prices to the level of July 1994?

[Sainovic] The basic thing is that we are all implementing one program, which means that the struggle for lowering prices conducted by the Serbian Government has support in the economic and monetary policy of both the Federal Government and the National Bank. To put it simply, the monetary mass and credit policy is under control. In other words, decreasing prices is the only way to generate money in the economy since we are implementing a restrictive monetary policy.

[Petrovic] The Federal Government recently established its program for 1995. It has announced as many as 100 legal projects in the sphere of legislation that it will submit to the Federal Assembly for review and adoption. I would like you to comment on the legal projects that will affect the financial aspect of the economy. What can we expect?

[Sainovic] This year, 1995, will be the year in which the harmonization of our laws with the new constitution will be completed, and a year in which our legal system, particularly in the economic field, will be completed. Therefore, I expect that springtime in the federal assembly will be characterized by intensive work on establishing our legal system, which for our economic life means the defining of healthy, legally regulated conditions, the defining of the market economy in our conditions on a legal basis, which in turn means a lot less leeway for gray economy, legal insecurity in economic transactions, and the creation of conditions for comprehensive economic progress.

[Petrovic] Thank you for the interview.

Kosovo

Rugova Demands To Partake in Issue of Secession

AU2001220095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Article by Shaban Arifaj from Prishtina]

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's news conference, President Ibrahim Rugova stated that Kosovo is demanding to participate in the issue of secession of the former Yugoslavia, as Kosova is part of the former Yugoslavia. President Rugova greeted all international commitments for a preventive diplomacy and for putting forward the Kosova issue for a peaceful and democratic solution. He also commented on the opening of new Kosova representation offices in many European countries. Shaban Arifaj is on the line from Prishtina:

[Arifaj] During this week, too, Kosova was at the center of attention of the international public for being under circumstances of violence and repression. President Rugova illustrated this at a regular news conference for correspondents with Kosova's presence in international institutions and associations. On this occasion, he greeted the statement of U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department, Peter Tarnoff, that the Kosova issue is on the daily agenda and has been labeled a problem. He also greeted French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe's statement on establishing a preventive diplomacy in Kosova.

Regarding efforts to internationalize the Kosovo issue, President Rugova mentioned that Kosovar representatives were attending the UN seminar in Vienna "Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Determination in the 21st Century," in which representatives of other former Yugoslavia were also participating.

Dr. Fehmi Agani said that the seminar focused on the problem of self—determination. Two interpretations were presented: The first was by Mr. Akashi, who stated that issues should be resolved under our conditions and without changing borders. The second interpretation, which was upheld by the majority of participants, stated that the world today has no reason to be afraid of border changes, because it is better to break down borders than not having sound relations with other states.

President Rugova at the news conference spoke about the intensification of repression manifested mainly in raids under the pretext of searching for arms in various parts in Kosova and pursuits of political and humanitarian activists and former Albanian policemen. On this occasion, he demanded the release of all prisoners and those convicted in Kosova.

Dr. Rugova also spoke about the Serbian campaign and propaganda with the aim of colonizing Kosova and reiterated the demand for the participation of Kosova in the issue of secession of the former Yugoslavia for being its former Federal unit.

Answering a question about the opening of Kosova representation offices, President Rugova stressed that, for the time being, Kosova has such representations in Europe and in the United States, but it does plan to open other representation offices in various European countries.

Responding to another question on the Chechen model of resolving the foci of crisis, President Rugova said that this cannot serve as such a model.

Rugova Speaks About Representation Offices Abroad

LD2001164695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1344 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 20 Jan (TANJUG)—Ibrahim Rugova, chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], confirmed today that he has representation offices abroad.

At a news conference in Pristina, Rugova did not specify in which countries these offices are, but he said that "they are in several countries, and more will be opened soon."

Answering a journalist's question, the DSK leader confirmed that during his recent visit to Germany he discussed with German officials the possibility of opening a similar, as he calls it "Kosovo representation office" in that country. Asked whether he was given support for that initiative, after thinking for a while and trying to avoid answering, Rugova said that he was given support.

The DSK chairman did not explain what kind of "Kosovo representation offices" abroad they are or where they have been opened. However, his statement on this issue today is in line with the obvious attempts of the separatist propaganda headquarters to persuade their own public that the creators of the phantom "Republic of Kosovo" are allegedly establishing "official communication" with main decisionmaking centers in the world.

The BUJKU newspaper, which publishes Rugova's stands, recently mentioned the possibility of opening such "bureaus" in the United States, France, and Germany. As far as is known, Rugova has so far had an office only in Tirana, but it closed because of disputes over its "representatives."

Defense Ministry, Army Officials Hold Talks

LD2001134895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1045 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 20 Jan (TANJUG)—Bogoljub Bjelica, deputy Federal minister for defense, and Lieutenant Colonel General Blagoje Kovacevic, deputy chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav Army, held talks in Pristina last night with Serbian Government Minister Vekoslav Sosevic, district officials in Kosovo-Metohija, and representatives of regional bodies of the Federal Ministry of Defense, the provincial Ministry of Information announced today.

It was assessed that a high degree of defense preparations had been achieved due to the excellent cooperation between the ruling bodies, Yugoslav Army, and units of the Serbian Ministry for Internal Affairs in this area, the statement says.

Further joint activities were agreed upon in connection with the realization of defense tasks within existing material possibilities, thereby making a concrete contribution to the implementation of the program of economic stabilization, the statement says.

As part of their regular activities, Bjelica and Kovacevic visited some of the units and institutions of the Pristina Corps.

Bukoshi: Reunion of Forces To Liberate Republic

AU2201152195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 21 Jan 95

[Telephone report by Mehmet Haziri from Prishtina]

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview with the journal ZERI of Prishtina, Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Bujar Bukoshi cited as very necessary the reunion of all political forces and the opening of internal dialogue. He called for an active commitment of the intellectuals alongside existing political forces, if a body made up of representatives of national liberation should be established. For more on this interview, our correspondent from Prishtina Mehmet Haziri is on the line for you:

[Haziri] Talking about Kosova's international and current position, Prime Minister Bukoshi stressed that Kosova is a known international institution, whose status unfortunately has remained the one it was before the autonomy was abolished. However, Dr. Bukoshi adds in the interview with ZERI, Kosova definitely is not considered as Serbia's internal affair. We have come to a point when we should study tactics for realizing our strategy—the independent state.

Meanwhile, the progress of the Kosova issue first depends on internal relations and the force of will to realize the independence of Kosova.

In his comments on the possibility of a conflict exploding in Kosova, Dr. Bukoshi states that Albanians have shown themselves to be champions in avoiding it, but they may show themselves to be champions in desperate actions to liberate Kosova. They could have a potential commitment in two phases of some 300,000 well-armed soldiers who are very well motivated for war, and they could transfer the battlefield even to the narrow territory of Serbia.

Dr. Bujar Bukoshi considered it important to avoid conflict in Kosova, but drew attention to the fact that Kosova is occupied and we should think very well on how to liberate it. Passivity, waiting, and lethargy are not always succesful, even in private life, Dr. Bukoshi stresses.

Bukoshi considered it futile to answer ZERI reporters' questions on the work of the Government of Kosova and the successes it has achieved at a time when, as he said, it has become fashionable that all have gotten down to the patriotic work of praises and self-praises. Meanwhile, to talk about successes of the Government of Kosova, they are (?discounted) by the grave situation in Kosova, Bukoshi pointed out [sentence as heard].

The criticisms addressed to the government do not leave me at peace, Bukoshi said. However, Bukoshi rejected the criticisms that, as he said, are not serious and contain intrigues, insinuations, and lies. In this category, he included those charging abuse of material means, thus expressing his readiness to discount them publicly with facts.

Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosova, considered some of the criticisms against him and the government as a result of a search for a victim in a situation of crisis, underlining that the criticisms are uttered by those whom, as he says, are interested in another solution to the Kosova issue.

In this context, he ranked Deputy Chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] Dr. Fehmi Agani who, at a meeting in Germany, declared that we formed the government only for formal reasons.

In the interview with ZERI, Prime Minister Bukoshi declared that there is no conflict between him and the LDK and between him and the chairman of the LDK and the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. He said that it would have been normal that if such conflict had existed, then President Rugova would dismiss the prime minister. Dr. Bukoshi considered as very necessary the reunion of all political forces and the opening of inner dialogue. He called for an active commitment of intellectuals alongside the existing political forces, if an institution with representatives of national liberation would be founded, he said.

Vojvodina

VMSZ Concerned About Territorial Division Plan

LD2101142795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Arpad Madarasz reports from Novi Sad on the new worries of the Hungarians of Vojvodina:

[Madarasz] The presidium of the Association of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMSZ] rejects the Serbian plan for territorial division because it threatens directly the interests of minorities in Vojvodina, said Executive Deputy Chairman Sandor Egeresi. He said the plan did not treat Vojvodina as a region and did not take into consideration its cultural and other characteristics. The VMSZ will send its remarks to the government of the Republic and to the OSCE.

The VMSZ does not accept Vojvodina ceasing to be a region, since it is one of the most advanced and densely populated areas in the country. The territorial division plan, however, makes the settlement of those from the South Slav areas possible. It would change the ethnic makeup of Vojvodina. This is a human and citizen's rights issue, and it threatens minority rights as well. It is within the scope of international law. Therefore, the VMSZ will inform the international public about this, said the VMSZ deputy chairman.

VMDK Expresses Concern About HDUR

LD2201181795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK] is worried about the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR]. This transpires from VMDK Chairman Andras Agoston's letter to the HDUR's leaders. Jozsef Klemm reports from Novi Sad:

[Klemm] Agoston pointed out that the Hungarians of Vojvodina know from experience that the real aim of the psychological warfare waged against Hungarian political organizations living in minority in the Carpathian basin is to intimidate these communities. That is how the political forces want to persuade these long-suffering ethnic groups to give up their struggle and to sink back into submission, into a situation where the ever-accelerating processes of assimilation and emigration call into question the identity of the minority communities.

Agoston highlighted the importance of the aspirations for autonomy. These ideas have already become known and recognized on the stage of international politics. The path on which we have set off leads to Europe, and it creates the conditions of democratic coexistence in the multiethnic countries of this region of the continent.

We believe in you and in the victory of our joint fight, reads the VMDK chairman's letter to the HDUR's leadership.

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